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Abstract 
Global demand for peacekeeping is growing, especially in Africa. The United 
Nations has traditionally been at the forefront of developing peacekeeping 
theory and practice, and remains the primary operational agency for 
peacekeeping in Africa. But increasing emphasis is being placed on the African 
Union to assume greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. 
The AU is still comparatively new and is in the process of developing its peace 
and security architecture. Over the past decade, the international community 
has been supporting African peacekeeping, both to build AU capacity and to 
provide direct operational support. In 2005 the international community 
agreed a collective ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians threatened by 
gross violations of their human rights. And civilian protection is increasingly 
included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. Within the context of 
contemporary complex, multidimensional peacekeeping (‘peace support’), 
civilian protection is not an exclusive operational objective, but is rather one 
of a number of mandated tasks aimed at establishing more sustainable 
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security as part of a broader peacebuilding goal. The AU has embraced the 
responsibility to protect principle, adopting a constitutional commitment to 
protect the rights of vulnerable civilians, including through peacekeeping 
interventions if necessary. But how capable is the AU in practice to deliver 
effective peacekeeping to protect civilians? And how appropriate is 
international support to help realise this ambition? 
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African Union Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection 
 
An Evaluation of the EU Strategy for Africa and the G8/Africa Joint 
Plan 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
This thesis hypothesises that the African Union can, with appropriate 
international support, develop over time peacekeeping capability that can 
contribute to the protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict.  
 
In order to explore this hypothesis, this thesis poses three basic research 
questions: 
 
1) how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting 
civilians in international peace and security policy? 
 
2) is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping 
operations? 
 
3) can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to 
the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment? 
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To explore these questions, this thesis looks at two international initiatives to 
support AU peacekeeping capability: the EU Strategy for Africa and the 
G8/Africa Joint Plan. 
 
Context 
 
Global demand for peacekeeping is growing,. This is especially true in Africa. 
The United Nations has traditionally been at the forefront of developing 
peacekeeping theory and practice. The UN remains the primary operational 
agency for peacekeeping in Africa. But increasing emphasis is being placed on 
the African Union to assume greater responsibility for peacekeeping on the 
continent. Other international actors are also supporting AU and UN 
peacekeeping in Africa. 
 
The AU is still comparatively new and is in the process of developing its peace 
and security architecture. It has relatively little experience of peacekeeping 
and is in the process of building capability to deploy missions. Over the past 
decade, the international community – notably the European Union and the 
G8 – has been supporting African peacekeeping, both to build AU capacity 
and to provide direct operational support. In Darfur, the AU and the UN have 
deployed the first example of a joint, ‘hybrid’ mission. 
 
In 2005 the international community agreed a collective ‘responsibility to 
protect’ vulnerable civilians threatened by gross violations of their human 
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rights. And civilian protection is increasingly included in the mandates of 
peacekeeping missions. As Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor assert, “the link 
between the protection of civilians and peacekeeping mandates is central … 
the safety and security of civilians is critical to the legitimacy and credibility of 
peacekeeping missions”.1  
 
Within the context of contemporary complex, multidimensional peacekeeping 
missions, civilian protection is not an exclusive operational objective, but is 
rather one of a number of mandated tasks aimed at establishing more 
sustainable security as part of a broader peacebuilding goal. Williams has 
noted that basing peace operation policies on a multilayered conception of 
protection would better safeguard civilians.2 Holt and Taylor, meanwhile, note 
that the protection of civilians in the context of peacekeeping operation is “a 
critical component for a sustainable political peace”.3  
 
The AU has embraced the responsibility to protect principle. Its Constitutive 
Act includes a commitment to protect the rights of vulnerable civilians, 
including through peacekeeping interventions if necessary.4 But how capable 
                                            
1 Holt, V. and Taylor, G. (2009), Protecting Civilians in the Context of Peacekeeping Operations: 
Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges, New York: UNDPKO/OCHA, p.3. 
2 Williams, P. (2010), Enhancing Civilian Protection from Peace Operations: Insights from 
Africa, Research Paper No. 1, The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Washington DC, 
National Defense University Press, p.4. 
3 Holt, V. and Taylor, G. (2009), Protecting Civilians in the Context of Peacekeeping 
Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges, New York: UNDPKO/OCHA, 
p.23. 
4 African Union (2002), Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4 (h); African Union 
(2000), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union. 
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is the AU in practice to deliver effective peacekeeping to protect civilians? And 
how appropriate is international support to help realise this ambition? 
 
Methodology and structure 
 
In order to respond to the research questions outlined above, this thesis 
reviews academic and other relevant literature, including official 
documentation. It also incorporates original, primary research material 
gathered by the author during field-work, through face-to-face, telephone and 
e-mail interviews and participatory activities with a range of international and 
African officials experts in Africa and internationally. In the process of my 
research I have travelled extensively in east, south and west Africa, speaking 
to officials in regional and continental bodies and national troop contributors. 
I have also conducted extensive visits to Brussels, EU capitals, and 
Washington and New York (UN) in the US. This forms the basis of the original 
academic contribution that this thesis seeks to make.  
 
Field research 
 
European Union 
 
Field research into the EU Strategy for Africa, agreed by the European Council 
on 15 December 2005, was based around the author’s role as Specialist 
Adviser to an inquiry by the UK House of Lords EU Committee, Sub-
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Committee C (foreign affairs, defence and development policy).5 The inquiry 
considered what more  needed to  be  done to  implement the Strategy and 
to ensure that the EU’s policies towards Africa are coherent and coordinated. 
The inquiry considered the future of the Strategy from different perspectives 
including the EU’s own action plan, the involvement of  the AU and other 
regional organisations, and the role of international organisations and non-
governmental organisations.  
 
The inquiry developed a ‘call for evidence’, which listed a number of themes 
and questions that would underpin its research. Questions relating to security 
and peacekeeping capabilities are listed below: 
 
• What more needs to be done to implement the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) Africa Action Plan? 
• How likely is the future deployment of Battlegroups and military and civilian 
crisis management missions in Africa?  
• What is the balance between the EU’s military and civilian conflict 
prevention, management and resolution capacity?  
• How can the EU most effectively support the development of the African 
Standby Force (ASF), in line with the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of 
the ASF, at  both continental and sub-regional levels?  
                                            
5 House of Lords EU Committee, (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, 34th of Session 2005-6, July,  
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/206/206i.pdf 
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• How will the anticipated EU-AU-UN interface in peace operations work out in 
practice? What will be their various operational roles? Is there an operational 
role for other bodies, such as NATO?  
• What lessons can be learned from previous EU operational experiences in 
Africa?  
• How can the EU work with the Peacebuilding Commission to improve 
conditions in fragile states?  
• Given the post-conflict focus of the Peacebuilding Commission, what 
initiatives will the EU undertake to support African capacity to prevent 
conflicts?  
• Should the EU focus its peacekeeping efforts on indirect support such as AU 
funding and the provision of  expertise, or on playing a direct military role in 
peacekeeping missions?  
• What further support does the AU require in order to play a significant role 
in peacekeeping in Africa?  
 
During the inquiry, the author was involved in a number of interviews with 
experts. Interviews were held from April 2004 through June 2006 in London 
and Brussels. Interviewees included the following:  
 
• Hilary Benn, former UK Secretary of State for International 
Development; 
• Lord Triesman, former UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
the FCO on the development of the EU’s Strategy; 
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• Javier Solana, then High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy; 
• Robert Dewar, then UK Permanent Representative to the AU;  
• Elmar Brok, Chair of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs 
Committee;  
• Representatives of the Belgian government; 
• Myles Wickstead, former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission 
for Africa; 
• Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute of Security Studies, South 
Africa;  
• Alex Vines, then Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House; 
• James Mackie and colleagues, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management; and 
• Nick Grono, Vice-President for Advocacy and Operations, International 
Crisis Group.  
 
G8 
 
Field research to research the G8/Africa Joint Plan was based on a series of 
interviews with key practitioners and experts from the G8 and from Africa, 
undertaken by the author between April 2004 and April 2005. These took 
place as part of a Chatham House project led by the author, and funded by 
the UK Conflict Prevention Pools, which as intended to provide a strategic 
input to the implementation process following up commitments made in the 
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Joint Plan.6 Particular focus was given to potential outcomes that could be 
pursued during the UK’s Presidencies of the G8 and EU in 2005. Analysis has 
subsequently been updated with desk research and some additional 
interviews. 
 
The objectives of this project were to: 
 
• provide a strategic analysis of key challenges that need to be addressed 
by African and donor institutions and governments in implementing the 
Joint Plan; and 
• identify specific activities relating to the implementation of the Joint Plan 
that could potentially be prioritised. 
 
The project was carried out in two phases, as follows: 
 
1. Consultation with donors to map out existing and planned peacekeeping 
support activities against the commitments made in the Joint Plan. This 
involved drawing on existing sources of information (surveys, 
questionnaires, research etc.) coupled with interviews with officials and 
experts.  
                                            
6 Ramsbotham, A; Bah, A; Calder, C (2005), The Implementation of the Joint 
Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support 
Operations: Survey of current G8 and African activities and potential areas for 
further collaboration, Chatham House 
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Se
curity/g8africapso.pdf 
 14
2. Discussing this ‘map’ of activities and priority areas with African partners, 
researching African perspectives on the way in which peacekeeping 
support is being delivered to build a constructive critique and 
recommendations for improvement. The project also explored potential for 
aligning African peacekeeping priorities with donor priorities, and 
identifying areas where these priorities are clearly different. 
 
The methodology for this research was participatory. Research was primarily 
been carried out through a series of face-to-face, telephone and email 
interviews with officials from key G8 governments, the African Union, African 
regional organisations and African governments. This consultative work was 
further enhanced by two international meetings that were held as part of the 
project: 1) an off-the-record seminar with Ambassador Said Djinnit, then AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner, held at Chatham House in December 2004; 
and 2) an international workshop also at Chatham House in April 2005, which 
fleshed out options for increased action towards the implementation of the 
Joint Plan. 
 
Research involved visits to key G8 actors and partners in London (FCO, DFID 
and MoD), Paris (Quay d’Orsay, Ministere de Defence, Agence France de 
Developpement), New York (DPKO), Washington (State Department and the 
Pentagon), and Brussels (EU Secretariat and EC) – as well as telephone and 
email exchanges with other G8 Member States: Canada, Japan, and Germany. 
Interviews were based on the following general questions: 
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1. What activities are your government currently undertaking towards the 
implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African 
Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations? 
 
2. Are you planning any new activities in this area?  If so, can you share 
information about these plans with us?   
 
3. Have you carried out or commissioned any surveys of PSO7 capacity or 
capacity building programmes in Africa?  If so, can you share these 
with us? 
 
4. What areas of PSO capacity building or individual PSO capacity building 
projects do you think have been most successful?  Why do you think 
that they have succeeded?  
 
5. What areas of the Joint Plan are your government’s highest priority as 
an individual donor nation? 
 
6. Which areas of the Joint plan do you think would be most promising 
for increased joint effort between African and G8 countries in general? 
 
                                            
7 Please note that the Joint Plan refers to ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSOs). These are 
synonymous with complex peacekeeping, as defined in chapter 2. Where 
interviewees refer to PSOs, therefore, this should be understood as complex 
peacekeeping operations. 
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7. What are the key challenges that you think will need to be addressed 
in order for the Joint Plan to be successfully implemented. 
 
8. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as 
presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? 
 
The author also travelled extensively in Africa, with visits to ECOWAS and the 
Nigerian military in Abuja; the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in 
Accra; the Institute for Security Studies, the South African military – including 
the British military support team – in Pretoria; the African Union and various 
European and EU embassies in Addis Ababa; and IGAD and the British 
peacekeeping training team in Nairobi. The author also conducted a 
telephone interview with SADC in Gabarone, and met with UK regional conflict 
advisers in Abuja, Pretoria and Addis Ababa. Interviews with African partners 
were based on the following set of questions: 
 
1. Have you carried out, commissioned or taken part in any surveys of 
peace and security capacity or capacity-building programmes in your 
country, region, or Africa as a whole?  If so, could you share the 
outcomes of this work with us? 
 
2. What activities are you involved in or planning towards the 
implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan? If you are working with 
donor partners on these activities, who are they and what are they 
contributing to your efforts? 
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3. To what extent do the terms of the Joint Plan fit with your priorities for 
developing effective African peace and security architecture, including 
the ASF/standby brigades? 
 
4. To what extent are the AU/RECs/donors coordinating their 
activities/plans for the establishment of African peace and security 
architecture and which areas would benefit most from further 
coordination? How can coordination be improved? 
 
5. What are the key challenges/priorities that need to be addressed in the 
establishment and operationalisation of African peace and security 
architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades? How might 
cooperation between African and donor partners best be enhanced to 
address these? 
 
6. What areas of PSO capacity-building or individual PSO capacity-building 
projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think 
that they have succeeded? 
 
7. What types of capacity-building support would you like to see donors 
prioritising and what other activities do you think the G8 should review 
or include in their programmes? 
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8. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as 
presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? What 
are the key institutions/mechanisms needed to operationalise African 
peace and security architecture and what are the key steps and actions 
to implement this? 
 
Many interviews were conducted on the basis of the Chatham House Rule.8 
Two high-profile interviewees from the AU Peace and Security Commission 
who agreed to be named were Ambassador Said Djinnet and El Ghassim 
Wane, at that time the Commissioner and Director of Peace and Security, 
respectively. More recently (2009), the author interviewed the then Special 
Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for 
Somalia and head of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), HE Nicolas 
Bwakira.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Africa 
 
Chapter 2 develops an analysis of contemporary peacekeeping policy and 
practice in Africa. It traces key post-Cold War developments – relating to 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement, the impact of major operational 
failures in the mid-1990s and subsequent reform initiatives, and the trend 
                                            
8 www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule 
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towards sharing the peacekeeping ‘burden’ beyond the UN. The chapter pays 
particular attention to civilian protection as an increasingly prominent 
peacekeeping function, from the acknowledgement of the principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect in New York in 2005, to the inclusion by the UN 
Security Council of civilian protection as core a mandated objective of 
peacekeeping missions. It includes an applied case study of peacekeeping 
civilian protection in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC). 
 
Chapter 3 The African Union 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the status and development of the African Union peace and 
security architecture. It outlines the AU’s constitutional and institutional 
commitment to provide civilian protection and examines the development of 
the African Standby Force (ASF), including its regional components in the 
Regional Economic Communities in north, south, east, west and central Africa. 
AU peacekeeping capability is contextualised alongside UN peacekeeping in 
Africa, looking at the clarity of the AU/UN relationship, in particular the 
concept of a ‘layered response’ between the two institutions. 
 
Chapter 4  The Africa-EU partnership 
 
Chapters 4-7 focus on building AU peacekeeping capacity, looking first at EU 
and then on G8 engagement. Discussion of the EU-Africa partnership is based 
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around the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2005.9 
Analysis of the EU-Africa partnership is based on the author’s fieldwarok, as 
described above. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter 4 traces the history 
of the relationship, outlining its key structures, examining Europe’s capacity to 
deliver on its commitments to Africa and incorporating European collaboration 
with other multilateral institutions to support African peace and security.  
 
Chapter 5 EU Support for African Peacekeeping 
 
Chapter 5 looks specifically at EU support for African peacekeeping capability. 
It briefly outlines relevant strands of the Africa-EU partnership, including 
governance, democracy and human rights, but focuses in particular on peace 
and security. Chapter 5 reviews EU operational engagement in Africa, 
examining various mechanisms that the EU uses to promote peace and 
security on the continent, as well as exploring the potential role of EU 
Battlegroups, and EU coordination with other organisations. It applies analysis 
of EU operational engagement in an overview of EU actions in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Chapter 5 then examines the African Peace 
Facility, the primary EU tool for supporting African peace and security and 
peacekeeping. It examines EU perspectives on capacity-building for the 
African Standby Force (ASF), as well as EU conflict prevention activities, post-
conflict activities, and EU efforts to support the UN Peacebuilding 
                                            
9 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 
Brussels 19 December, 15961/05. 
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Commission. Lastly, Chapter 5 assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise 
the EU-Africa partnership in practice. This evaluation includes: initiatives to 
create a broad-based dialogue; the role of African governments and 
institutions, and African civil society; the AU’s capacity to deliver; the EU’s 
capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa; the significance of the second EU-
Africa Summit; and the development of a joint EU-Africa strategy. 
 
Chapter 6 G8-Africa Joint Plan: G8 and African perspectives 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 look at G8 support for African peacekeeping, based on the 
author’s field research, as described above. They assess the effectiveness and 
relevance of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to 
Undertake Peace Support Operations (the Joint Plan),10 agreed at the 2003 
G8 Summit in Evian. Chapter 6 outlines the G8 process. It presents G8 
perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan, covering a number of 
key areas of activity, including: G8 activities at continental and regional levels; 
operational support; promoting coordination with African partners and among 
G8 Member States; institutional capacity-building; training; G8 deployments; 
and logistical and equipment support. Chapter 6 then presents African 
perspectives on the implementation of the Joint Plan. Key areas of discussion 
focus on AU leadership of development of the African Peace and Security 
                                            
10 G8/Africa (2003), Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace 
Support Operations (Joint Plan), Annex to Implementation Report by Africa Personal 
Representatives to Leaders on the G8 African Action Plan, 
www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/implement
ation_report_by_africa_personal_representatives_to_leaders_on_the_g8_african_acti
on_plan.html  
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Architecture (APSA); AU/donor coordination; peacekeeping doctrine; the 
practicability of donor demands; assessing African peacekeeping capacity and 
major gaps; coordination among key African stakeholders; and African 
regional integration. 
 
Chapter 7 G8-Africa Joint Plan: implementation 
 
Chapter 7 outlines some key challenges and priorities for implementing the 
Joint Plan. These are grouped into the following categories: African strategic 
vision and leadership; the African Standby Force; African peace and security 
architecture (APSA); institutional human resources/strategic management 
capacity; coordinating donor support; African ownership of the capacity-
building process; financing peacekeeping capacity-building; logistics; and 
training. Chapter 7 then outlines potential areas for agreed action between 
the G8 and Africa, to take forward implementation of the Joint Plan in 
practice. This section focuses on the following key areas of capacity-building 
for African peacekeeping: overview and context; donor coordination; the role 
of the UN; training and logistics; strategic management capacity; 
operationalising the African Standby Force; and supporting the breadth of the 
African peace and security architecture. This chapter examines the extent to 
which the rhetorical pledges made at G8 summits are delivered in practice. 
 
Chapter 8 Case studies 
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Chapter 8 uses a series of case studies of African regional peacekeeping 
deployments in order to gauge how, in practice, African regional 
peacekeeping in partnership with the international community functions to 
deliver peacekeeping and civilian protection. African peacekeeping 
deployments in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia all have 
civilian protection components to their mandates and all aspire to follow-on 
UN missions, and so provide opportunities to evaluate the potential of layered 
AU/UN  peacekeeping. The case studies assess how African deployments have 
attempted to cope with a range of challenges to providing civilian protection. 
Key themes from previous chapters are drawn out and applied, including: 
capability – capacity, mandate, training and doctrine; interaction between 
African regional peacekeeping and the international community. Political 
challenges for the AU include the willingness of Member States to commit 
troops and other essential resources, or to confront powerful Member States 
that are implicated in situations of gross human rights abuses. 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9 assesses the effectiveness of international support to the nascent 
AU peacekeeping capability, in particular in relation to civilian protection. 
African peacekeepers are deployed to some the most challenging conditions 
imaginable, such as Somalia and Darfur. So it is not surprising that in 
situations where civilian protection is part of the mandate, as in Darfur, AU 
operations have struggled to deliver. But peacekeepers can sometimes help to 
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protect civilians even in very harsh environments. Research among civilians in 
DRC, for example, shows that they have felt safer in areas where UN or EU 
peacekeepers have been deployed. The AU, however, even with international 
support, is still some way off being capable of doing this. A key challenge for 
the AU’s relationship with its donor partners is to balance African ownership of 
its peace and security architecture with donor national interest to support its 
development. 
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2) Peacekeeping and civilian protection in Africa 
 
Chapter two responds to the first of this thesis’ three core research questions: 
 
• how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting 
civilians in international peace and security policy? 
 
The chapter develops an analysis of contemporary peacekeeping policy and 
practice, with a focus on civilian protection in Africa. It traces key post-Cold 
War developments in complex peacekeeping:11 
 
• peacebuilding and peace enforcement; 
• major operational failures in the md-1990s in Africa, including brief 
case studies of deployments to Somalia and Rwanda, and resultant 
efforts to reform peacekeeping; and 
• efforts to share the peacekeeping ‘burden’ beyond the UN to include 
other agencies such as regional bodies, as global demand for 
peacekeeping has outstripped capacity. 
 
The chapter pays particular attention to civilian protection as an increasingly 
prominent peacekeeping function, from the acknowledgement of the principle 
of the Responsibility to Protect in New York in 2005, to the inclusion by the 
                                            
11 Variously referred to as multidimensional peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, 
peace support operations and peace operations, this thesis uses the term ‘complex 
peacekeeping’ to describe post-Cold War deployments. 
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UN Security Council of civilian protection as a mandated objective of 
peacekeeping missions. It includes an applied case study of peacekeeping and 
civilian protection in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC). 
 
Complex peacekeeping 
 
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a massive expansion in UN 
peacekeeping, especially in Africa – albeit with a pronounced dip in the mid-
1990s. Between 1999 and 2008 there was a 500 per cent rise in UN peace 
operations globally, more than 80 per cent of which were deployed to Africa.12 
During the Cold War era, UN peacekeeping missions were primarily 
‘traditional’: deployed to situations of inter-state conflict to support a ceasefire 
or similar settlement agreed between two or more conflicting state parties. 
The end of the Cold War opened potential for expanded forms of intervention, 
including in civil wars. Complex peacekeeping developed in response to new 
operational challenges. It incorporates the two major operational functions of 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement. 
 
A peacebulding approach to peacekeeping seeks to go beyond conflict 
management, to address the root causes of war. It acknowledges links 
between peace and security, development, governance and human rights. 
Security and development interact in a number of ways: insecurity and 
                                            
12 Center on International Cooperation (2006), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 
Boulder: Lynne Reiner, p. 3. 
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instability undermine long-term development, while a lack of development, 
poverty and inequality are themselves major causes of instability. At the same 
time, support for peace and stability, good governance and respect for human 
rights can act as drivers for sustainable development. By definition, the 
complexity of peacebuilding implies large, multidimensional operations that 
can deliver a wide range of tasks. 
 
The UN’s Report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations (2000) 
described peacebuilding within the context of peacekeeping operations as 
follows: 
 
[A]ctivities to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the 
tools for building on those foundations something that is more than 
just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited 
to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening 
the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local 
police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human 
rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and 
existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic 
development (including electoral assistance and support for free 
media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation 
techniques.13 
 
                                            
13 United Nations (2000), Brahimi Report, para. 13. 
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Post-Cold War peacekeepers must also be prepared to face armed opposition, 
such as from criminal mafias, warlords and other ‘spoilers’ of peace 
processes, requiring a more robust operational approach under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, including application of force – ie peace enforcement.14  
 
During the 1990s a shared conceptualisation of the fundamental 
characteristics of peace enforcement emerged amongst major Western 
militaries involved in post-Cold War peacekeeping.15 Findlay describes peace 
enforcement as being aimed at guaranteeing the implementation of a peace 
agreement or arrangement, including compliance by the parties with its 
terms, through the ‘judicious’ application of incentives and disincentives. He 
adds that all military activities should form part of a comprehensive political 
and peacebuilding strategy.16 
 
Fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and 
the non-use of force17 – have been seriously challenged when applied to 
complex operations, especially in relation to peace enforcement. 
                                            
14 For more discussion on these themes, see Wheeler, N. (2001), Saving Strangers: 
Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford University Press; Chandler, 
D. (2002) From Kosovo Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention, Pluto 
Press: London. 
15 Findlay, T. (2002), The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, pp. 
374-7. 
16 Findlay, T. (2002), The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, pp. 
374-7. 
17 These principles were codified in 1958 by the then former UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld in his 1958 ‘Summary Study,’ derived from the political and military 
experiences of UNEF I. This report was designed to identify ‘certain principles and 
rules which would provide an adaptable framework for later operations’ and was 
subsequently distilled into a general ‘definition’ of peacekeeping. See also Boutros-
Ghali, B. (3 January 1995), Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc: A/50/60 - 
S/1995/1, para 33. 
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Contemporary peacekeeping doctrine does not assume consent, but focuses 
on ‘building’ it, using ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to control situations where there is a 
local breakdown of consent.18 Complex peacekeeping also demanded a 
clearer distinction between neutrality and impartiality, especially in instances 
of grave threats to human rights. In 1999 Kofi Annan asserted that 
“[I]mpartiality does not – and must not – mean neutrality in the face of 
evil”.19 Complex peacekeepers have also stretched understanding of the 
principle of non-use of force except in self-defence beyond merely defending 
themselves, to defending the terms of their mandate, for example against 
armed ‘spoilers’ with a different strategic objective to that of the 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
Operational challenges: Somalia and Rwanda 
 
International enthusiasm for complex peacekeeping was dramatically reversed 
in the mid-1990s in response to severe operational challenges experienced in 
a number of missions. High profile and influential examples include various 
interventions in response to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. In Africa, 
two disastrous missions were particularly significant, in Somalia and Rwanda, 
which exposed political and capacity limitations of complex UN peacekeeping 
on the continent, and moulded its subsequent evolution. 
                                            
18 United Nations (2008), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 
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19 Annan, K. (22 January 1999), ‘Impartiality Does Not Mean Neutrality,’ The Independent, 
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As Somalia was disintegrating into state collapse in the early 1990s, the stage 
appeared set for the international community to put its fast-evolving theories 
on complex peacekeeping into practice. A senior UN official at the time 
famously Somalia as a “laboratory for all types of peacekeeping”.20 The lack 
of a central Somali authority and the widespread violence throughout the 
country, exacerbated by severe drought, precipitated human suffering on an 
enormous scale. According to the UN, “[b]y 1992, almost 4.5 million people, 
more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with 
starvation, malnutrition and related disease”.21  
 
The second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was deployed in May 1993, 
mandated with a maximum strength of 28,000 military and police personnel 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish 
a secure environment for humanitarian assistance throughout the country,  to 
revive national and regional institutions, and to establish civil administration.22 
Following an attack on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 2003 by the forces 
of Somali faction leader General Mohamed Farah Aideed, US Rangers serving 
with UNOSOM launched an operation on 3 October aimed at capturing several 
of Aideed’s key aides. During the course of the operation, Somali militia shot 
down two US helicopters. Overall, eighteen US soldiers were killed and 75 
were wounded. The effect of the notorious ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident on the 
                                            
20 Weiss, T. (1997), ‘Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention’, in Clarke, W. and 
Herbst, J. (eds), Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian 
Intervention, Westview Press: Oxford, p.211. 
21 United Nations, 1996, p.287. 
22 Adebajo and Landsberg (2000), p.171-2. 
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attitude of US government was immediate and absolute: on 6 October, 
President Bill Clinton announced that US personnel would withdraw from 
Somalia by 31 March 1994. Without US support the mission struggled to 
survive, and by March 1995, UNOSOM had been withdrawn completely with 
its mission largely unaccomplished. 
 
According to Wilkinson, the failure of the  combat-capable UNOSOM was 
down to its inability to understand the peace enforcement doctrine. In 
response to Aideed’s ‘spoiling’ tactics, UNOSOM effectively adopted a war-
footing, as peacekeepers came to regard Somalis as ‘enemies’ to be 
defeated.23 This jarred with the mission’s other mandated objectives, which 
ultimately were intended to support humanitarian and peacebuilding goals. 
Within a peacekeeping context, Wilkinson contends that force should have 
been be used to coerce compliance by the parties with the terms of the peace 
agreement and the mandate of the operation, not to achieve military victory 
over an opponent.24 
 
The fallout from Somalia had a knock-on effect in New York, which was soon 
tragically felt in Rwanda when the Security Council to decided to withdraw UN 
peacekeepers despite increasing evidence of the scale of the disaster that was 
unfolding in the country. 
 
                                            
23 Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, 
London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 254. 
24 Wilkinson, P. (2000) ‘PSO Under Fire: Lessons from Sierra Leone’, ISIS Briefing on 
Humanitarian Intervention, No.2. 
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The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed in October 
1993 to support the Arusha Peace Accords of August that year. UNAMIR was 
originally essentially a traditional operation, mandated to oversee a ceasefire 
between the (mainly Hutu) Armed Forces of the Government of Rwanda, and 
the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). But at that time there were 
already indications suggesting the imminent disaster:25 as early as a week 
after the signing of Arusha, a UN report outlined massacres and many other 
serious human rights violations taking place in the country, and speculated 
whether the term ‘genocide’ was applicable.26  
 
However, this report was largely ignored by key actors within the UN 
system,27 as were subsequent warnings by UNAMIR itself of the need for a 
larger and more robust force to tackle the scale of human rights abuses 
taking place – including the infamous telegram sent to New York by UNAMIR 
Force Commander Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire on 11 January 1994, 
which warned of Hutu plans to exterminate all Tutsi in the capital, Kigali. The 
reply from UN HQ in New York demanded caution, and forbade UNAMIR from 
taking any decisive action.28 On 21 April 1994 the Security Council voted to 
reduce UNAMIR from 2,500 to 450: effectively, a withdrawal.29  
                                            
25 Melvern, L. (30 April 2001), The History of the Genocide and the Role of the West, Talk 
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26 United Nations (11 August 1993), Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
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28 United Nations (16 December 1999). 
29 Dallaire, R. A. and Poulin, B. (Spring 1995), ‘UNAMIR Mission to Rwanda’, Joint Forces 
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In May 1994, as the genocide was accelerating and the number of dead had 
already reached horrific proportions, the Security Council eventually agreed to 
approve a second, more larger mission – the 5,500-strong UNAMIR II – which 
was also provided with a more robust mandate.30  
 
However, by 25 July, UNAMIR was still only 550-strong. By this time, there 
could be no doubt as to the scale of the disaster, as the UN itself was then 
warning that several hundreds of thousands had already been killed.31 
Meanwhile, France’s belated intervention, Opération Turquoise, mandated by 
the Security Council in late June, arrived only after the Tutsi had regained 
military ascendancy.32  
 
The UN’s failure to respond to the human rights and humanitarian disaster in 
Rwanda in 1994 spearheaded a more general withdrawal of UN Security 
Council support for peacekeeping over the rest of the decade: the overall 
number of uniformed personnel serving with UN operations dropped from 
over 78,000 in 1994, down to 31,000 the next year. By 1999, it had 
plummeted to 12,000. 
 
Reform 
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A corollary of the UN’s experiences in Rwanda was to spur review and reform 
of UN peacekeeping. The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions 
of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, released by the 
UN in December 1999, highlighted fundamental problems in the UN system, 
including lack of preparedness for early and rapid deployment. In August 
2000, The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi Report’) 
stressed the importance of clear and robust mandates for peacekeeping 
operations, including clearly defined tasks and performance, and of “a robust 
force posture and a sound peacebuilding strategy” as key conditions for 
success.33 It acknowledged the limitations of UN missions to use force (“the 
United Nations does not wage war”), asserting that this requirement “has 
consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States”.34 In 2005, the 
Outcome Document of the UN World Summit stressed the need to mount 
“[peacekeeping] operations with adequate capacity to counter hostilities and 
fulfil effectively their mandates”, and urged the “development of proposals for 
enhanced rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations 
in crises”.35 
 
In 2008, the UN updated its thinking on peacekeeping through the release of 
the ‘Capstone Doctrine: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles 
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and Guidelines’.36 Capstone acknowledged UN peacekeeping operations 
required genuine commitment by the parties on the ground to resolve the 
conflict through a political process: without this, a peacekeeping mission risks 
becoming paralysed or drawn into the conflict. It further asserted that a 
mission’s mandate must be realistic, reflecting accurately the level of 
resources that contributing nations are able and willing to provide, in terms of 
finance, military and police personnel, and political support.37 
 
Other significant institutional developments at the UN have included the 
establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 –  which seeks to 
marshal the various resources at the disposal of the international community 
for post-conflict recovery and to propose integrated strategies for 
peacebuilding – and in 2007 to restructuring of the Department for 
Peacekeping Operations (DPKO) by establishing a separate Department for 
Field Support (DFS).38 
 
Burden-sharing in Africa 
 
Driven by operational failures in the mid-1990s and the increasing costs and 
demands of complex peacekeeping, the UN has increasingly looked elsewhere 
for partners to share peacekeeping responsibilities. This has been an 
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important development in Africa, where most peacekeeping operations are 
deployed, but where strategic global interest is generally weakest. 
 
The 2000 Brahimi report encouraged UN cooperation with regional and sub-
regional organisations, recognising that the breadth and scale of demands of 
complex peacekeeping imply a range of implementing different bodies and 
agencies.39 The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document further 
recognised: 
 
the important contribution to peace and security by regional 
organizations as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter and the 
importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements 
between the United Nations and regional organizations, and noting in 
particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance of a strong 
African Union.40 
 
In Africa, the phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’ has become 
synonymous with African regional bodies assuming increasing responsibility 
for African peace and security issues. Outside Africa, the success of the AU is 
seen as reliant on its ability to deliver effective security. Regionalisation in the 
African context brings major problems in relation to capacity,41 as Africa 
comprises among the poorest countries in the world. Many African countries 
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have also traditionally held fast to principles of non-interference in each 
others’ affairs – at least until the establishment of the AU in 2002. 
 
The UN has worked with a number of agencies in Africa, including regional 
organisations, ad-hoc coalitions of states, and bi-lateral partners. Latterly, the 
Security Council has authorised a “hybrid” peacekeeping operation in Darfur, 
in which UN and AU elements are deployed as part of the same operation, 
acting under joint leadership.42 
 
The responsibility to protect 
 
The principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged from a long-
standing practice and debate of ‘humanitarian intervention’.43 Since the 
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international state system was established in the mid-17th century, 
governments have repeatedly intervened in other sovereign states, often 
justified on humanitarian grounds. The end of the Cold War appeared to 
create a new set of possibilities for collaborative global security and 
humanitarian action:44 from the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish 
region in Northern Iraq in 1991, to the US-led international intervention in 
Somalia in 1992, to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
 
In 2001, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) attempted to redefine the humanitarian intervention 
debate.45 It sought to reconceptualise sovereignty as conditional: autocratic 
leaders should not be able to invoke sovereignty as a licence to repress their 
own citizens, but rather that: 
 
[S]overeign states have the primary responsibility for the protection of 
their people from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder, rape, 
starvation – but when they are unable and unwilling to do so, that 
responsibility must be borne by the wider community of states.46  
 
As Gareth Evans has described, R2P tries to  
                                            
(eds.) 2006, Resetting the rules of engagement: trends and issues in military– 
humanitarian relations, HPG Report 21 (London: Overseas Development Institute. 
44 Mepham, D, and Ramsbotham, A (2007), Safeguarding civilians: delivering on the 
responsibility to protect in Africa, London: ippr. 
45 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The 
Responsibility to Protect Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 
46 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), 
The Responsibility to Protect Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre, VIII. 
 39
 
turn the whole weary debate about the ‘right to intervene’ on its head, 
and to recharacterise it not as an argument about the right of states to 
anything, but rather about their responsibility … the relevant 
perspective being not that of prospective interveners but those needing 
support.47 
 
The ICISS report has been controversial. For instance, Chandler challenges 
the ICISS claim to substitute rights with responsibility, asserting that it merely 
shifts entitlement to the individual human rights of the victim. These are then 
used trump sovereign rights, and so states’ rights of intervention are 
maintained, although now the onus of justification for intervention is shifted 
from the intervening states to the recipients.48  
 
R2P suggests a range of responses – from the persuasive to the coercive – 
available to policymakers faced with situations of acute vulnerability for 
civilians. But military intervention remains the most contentious dimension of 
the R2P agenda, and the most relevant to complex peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. The ICISS conceded that the norm of non-intervention must 
remain a cornerstone of international relations. But there are extreme 
situations when breaching it is deemed to be justified. Therefore, the ICISS 
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devised six criteria to judge when military intervention is justified, largely 
developed from Just War theory: right authority; just cause; right intention; 
last resort; proportional means; and reasonable prospects.49 
 
The ICISS report has been highly influential, and R2P has found a steadily 
growing international audience. The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome 
Document took much of it on board, declaring that: 
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity… The international community, through the United Nations, 
also has [this] responsibility… In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.50 
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However, the Outcome Document did not include ICISS’ criteria for 
intervention.51 
 
R2P in practice: civilian protection and UN peacekeeping 
 
Civilian protection is aimed at securing the immediate safety of vulnerable 
civilians. It can be seen as the ‘operational arm’ of R2P as it similarly focuses 
on individual (human) rather than collective security. Civilian protection has 
gained increased prominence and traction at the UN. Within the UN 
Secretariat, the Secretary-General began publishing reports specifically on 
“the protection of civilians in armed conflict” in 1999. The first report argued 
that civilian protection can be provided by international legal mechanisms and 
humanitarian action. But it also suggested that “the Security Council can 
promote the protection of civilians in conflict … by peacekeeping or 
enforcement measures under Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the Charter”.52 The 
report listed a number of tasks that peacekeepers could carry out to support 
civilian protection, including the following: 
 
• discouraging abuses of civilian populations;  
• providing stability and fostering a political process of reconciliation; 
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• supporting institution-building efforts, including in such areas as human 
rights and law enforcement 
• protecting humanitarian workers; 
• delivering humanitarian assistance; 
• maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps, including 
separation of combatants and non-combatants; 
• maintaining “safe zones” for the protection of civilian populations; and   
• deterring and addressing abuses including through the arrest of war 
criminals. 
 
The report supported the use of “humanitarian zones, security zones and safe 
corridors” to protect civilians as a “last resort,” provided the zones were 
demilitarised”.53 It further addressed the potential need for enforcement 
action to protect civilians, stating that: 
 
In situations where the parties to the conflict commit systematic and 
widespread breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
causing threats of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the 
Security Council should be prepared to intervene under Chapter VII of the 
Charter…. I recommend that the Security Council… [i]n the face of massive 
and ongoing abuses, consider the imposition of appropriate enforcement 
action.... The protection of civilians…is fundamental to the central mandate 
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of the Organization. The responsibility for the protection of civilians cannot 
be transferred to others.54 
 
In 2009, a report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict – which marked the tenth anniversary of the  consideration by 
the Security Council of civilian protection as  a thematic issue – emphasised 
“enhancing protection through more effective and better resourced  United 
Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions” as a core challenge.55 
 
The Brahimi Report also acknowledged the increasing trend in mandates for 
UN peacekeeping missions to identify the protection of civilians as a key 
operational objective. It welcomed: 
 
“[T]he desire on the part of the Secretary-General to extend additional 
protection to civilians in armed conflicts and the actions of the Security 
Council to give United Nations peacekeepers explicit authority to 
protect civilians in conflict situations…. Indeed, peacekeepers – troops 
or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed 
to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic 
United Nations principles and, as stated in the report of the 
Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, consistent with “the perception and 
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the expectation of protection created by [an operation’s] very 
presence”.56 
 
Civilian protection has also been increasingly conspicuous on the Security 
Council’s agenda. The Council has approved a number of resolutions and 
presidential statements under that title and has held semi-annual open 
briefings on the subject. The Security Council first passed a resolution in 
September 1999 on “the protection of civilians”, which expressed its 
“willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are 
being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately 
obstructed, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at 
the Council’s disposal.”57 Resolution 1296 in April 2000 declared Council’s 
intention to provide peacekeeping operations with mandates and resources to 
protect civilians, and it also called on peacekeepers to consider the use of 
“temporary security zones for the protection of civilians and the delivery of 
assistance in situations characterised by the threat of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes against the civilian population”.58 
Resolution 1296 established as a “threat to international peace and security”, 
“the deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons 
and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict”. And it began to use more explicit language to guide to 
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peacekeepers, calling on peacekeepers to ensure the security of refugee 
camps, and to prevent sexual violence. It further reaffirmed the Council’s 
practice of including provisions for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping 
mandates, proposing that “such mandates include clear guidelines as to what 
missions can and should do to achieve those goals,” and that measures to 
protect civilians be “given priority in decisions about the use of available 
capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in 
the implementation of the mandates”.59 
 
Since 1999, the Security Council has also referred directly to civilian 
protection under Article VII of the UN Charter in resolutions approving the 
mandates of peacekeeping operations. For instance, resolution 1270 on the 
UN Mission in Sierra Leone, included the following language:  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that 
in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to 
ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within 
its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the 
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.... 
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UNSCR 1706 of August 2006 authorised the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use “all necessary means…. to 
protect civilians under threat of physical violence”.60 
 
Promoting civilian protection in practice is difficult and specialised. 
Peacekeepers are mostly equipped to address comparatively small-scale, 
localised forms of violence; they rely on a reasonable level of stability existing 
in the mission area, and are often neither configured nor resourced to 
challenge more intense levels of fighting, or to stabilise highly volatile conflict 
zones.61 In practice complex peacekeeping missions are neither designed nor 
deployed as pure civilian protection operations, and so civilian protection must 
compete with myriad other objectives and tasks. Also, peacekeeping 
mandates seldom clearly define civilian protection functions.62  
 
A major challenge relates to doctrine and training for peacekeeping 
operations: civilian protection implies specific tasks which peacekeepers need 
to be well prepared for. Military doctrine and training need to translate the 
concepts of civilian protection into effective military activities, such as 
protecting and demilitarising camps, establishing safe havens, forcibly 
disbanding and disarming militias, or intervening on behalf of threatened 
civilians. But existing French, British, American and NATO doctrines do not 
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include a detailed breakdown of the requirements of civilian protection. Nor is 
civilian protection a clear priority in most military training programmes 
internationally. 
 
The UN is developing training on civilian protection that builds on traditional 
roles for peacekeepers to support human rights, the rule of law, and 
international humanitarian principles. But UN training modules do not address 
how countries should interpret mandates to protect civilians under imminent 
threat. And they do not instruct military forces in how to prepare for civilian 
protection missions.63 
 
Berkman and Holt have criticised complex peacekeeping operations’ capacity 
to deliver on R2P and civilian protection. They outline the practical 
requirements for effective, non-consensual military intervention to safeguard 
civilians, arguing that a military intervention designed expressly to protect 
civilians from mass killing is qualitatively different from a peace operation 
tasked with protecting civilians from much lesser risks. As they put it, 
“[h]alting violent actors in their tracks might require operations more akin to 
combat and entail coercion to prevent harm to civilians”.64 
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Berkman and Holt note that such operations are unlikely to be led by the UN, 
which lacks the capacity or political stomach for these types of missions, and 
are more likely to be led by militarily competent states with sufficient 
capacity. 
 
Despite the commitment of the world’s governments to R2P, Berkman and 
Holt see little evidence that the world’s militaries and their political masters 
are developing the necessary capacity, doctrine, training and rules of 
engagement for such missions. They suggest that addressing this shortfall 
should be a priority for Africans and the wider international community if they 
are serious about the responsibility to protect in Africa and elsewhere.65 
 
Berkman and Holt have distinguished four primary challenges to 
operationalising R2P for military peacekeepers, which are summarised 
below:66  
 
1. Military peacekeepers may have limited or unclear authority to act to 
protect civilians. Most peacekeepers are deployed with at least the 
presumed consent of the parties, and on the understanding that the host 
nation retains responsible for the protection of its citizens. In places like 
Darfur or DRC, the host government is often responsible for many of the 
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abuses against civilians. But few peacekeepers are given the authority of 
the Security Council to use ‘all means necessary’ to protect civilians. 
2. Many states lack the willingness to contribute troops for operations that 
may use force to protect civilians.  
3. Peacekeeping missions often lack capacity to act decisively. For instance, 
the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) lacks the “size, equipment, mobility, 
funding, and coordination” to protect civilians in Darfur.  
4. Military peacekeepers lack the operational guidance and military 
preparation for protection. Forces must need to be able to make tactical 
and strategic judgements regarding how to react to threats of abuse 
against civilians, such as whether to defeat abusive groups, whether to 
establish broad security in a specific area, or to promote long-term 
security once mass killing is brought to a halt. 
 
Pouligny cites a number of situations during operations in Bosnia and Sierra 
Leone which have highlighted the “impotence of heavily-armed forces in the 
face of groups continuing war by other means, including organised crime and 
terrorism”.67 Deploying heavy weaponry for deterrent purposes can prove 
counter-productive, and can, in fact, alienate the local population. Heavily 
armoured tanks have little impact on snipers or militia, who may not be 
visible, but may still control the territory. For the local population, the 
contradiction between the deployment of heavy weaponry and the insecurity 
that they continue to suffer has serious consequences. It can have a doubly 
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negative impact on their perception of peacekeepers, as they are left to 
wonder: “if these strangers are not here to protect us, what hidden reason is 
there behind their presence?” This perception was prevalent among much of 
the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.68  
 
There are some situations where the restoration of order requires resort to 
armed force. But force must be used in the right way. This means appropriate 
training and equipment. But it also relates to the “actual conditions of 
recourse to armed force”.69 In the context of a complex peacekeeping 
operation comprising multiple national contingents: 
 
“The large variety of actors and logics, their volatile behaviour 
(permanently passing from the confrontation register to that of 
cooperation or else that of dodging), the possibility that Blue Helmets 
may be in a position of having to protect human lives – all this makes it 
necessary to look at the possible use of force in a new way”.70 
 
Despite challenging the premise of the peace enforcement doctrine on the 
basis that any use of force by a peacekeeping mission risks it being seen as 
oppressive, Pouligny nevertheless supports the UN Secretary-General’s 1999 
                                            
68 Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, 
London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 253. 
69 Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, 
London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 254. 
70 Pouligny, B (2006), Peace operations seen from below, UN missions and local people, 
London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 254. 
 51
report on protecting civilians, and notes that UN troops require firmer rules of 
engagement for the purpose of protection.71 
 
Protecting civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1999 presented a very 
difficult operational environment for peacekeeping. It is a huge territory: the 
size of Western Europe. The conflict has been very violent, with an estimated 
four million civilians killed as a result of violence since the war began in 1998. 
And the parties’ commitment to the July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
was tenuous at best. 
 
In November 1999, the Security Council agreed to establish the UN Operation 
in the DRC (MONUC), with 5,500 peacekeepers supporting a broad range of 
tasks relating to human rights and humanitarian affairs. The MONUC mandate 
also included a specific Chapter VII commitment “to protect civilians under 
imminent threat”.72 
 
But MONUC was far too weak and poorly configured to attempt any 
meaningful civilian protection. MONUC peacekeepers were neither equipped 
nor trained for the task. There was no common understanding of mandate 
and rules of engagement for civilian protection, nor consistent willingness to 
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use force to protect those at risk. And interpretation of rules of engagement 
was left to individual political and military commanders of national 
contingents, leading to a highly erratic approach to civilian protection. In 
reality, MONUC continued to operate closer to a traditional Chapter VI 
peacekeeping operation, using force only in self-defence.73 
 
Many of MONUC’s problems were played out in the Ituri province in eastern 
DRC, which was the scene of some of the worst atrocities of the war. 
Massacres of civilians were a recurrent feature of violent clashes between 
Hema and Lendu ethnic militias in the region. Attacks on civilians were 
sometimes carried out in clear view of MONUC personnel. But MONUC’s 
response was to concentrate primarily on self-protection, and it largely 
abandoned its mandate to protect Congolese civilians.74 
 
In response to an appeal by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 
France agreed to deploy an international force under the auspices of the EU, 
within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Operation Artemis comprised 1,400 troops, deployed to promote security in 
the town of Bunia in Ituri, from July through to September 2003. Artemis 
adopted a very aggressive approach towards civilian protection. It used light 
armoured vehicles, observation helicopters, and French air support from 
Mirage 2000 fighter jets stationed in neighbouring Uganda. It was able to 
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establish itself quickly in Bunia, enforcing a weapons-free zone and 
responding rapidly and decisively to armed challenges to its authority. Artemis 
cut off shipments of arms into Bunia by monitoring airstrips and running 
vehicle patrols. Thousands of displaced people returned to Bunia between 
June and August 2003.75 
 
As well as establishing humanitarian space within Bunia, Artemis enabled 
MONUC to build up in the region. Around 5,500 combat-capable UN troops 
were re-deployed to Ituri, supported by heavy armaments, armed personnel 
carriers and combat helicopters. This did not mean that MONUC was instantly 
transformed into an effective operation capable of stopping atrocities in Ituri. 
Serious MONUC military operations against Congolese militia in Ituri were still 
many months away. 
 
How much the combined UN-EU presence in Bunia provided direct protection 
to civilians is difficult to gauge. In many instances, peacekeepers failed to 
prioritise civilians. On 7 August 2003, for instance, a scuffle broke out 
between MONUC peacekeepers and armed men from the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC) guarding the home of UPC leader, Thomas Lubanga. French 
Artemis troops were immediately deployed alongside MONUC troops. Local 
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inhabitants stressed the contrast between the lack of concerted physical 
presence when their safety was threatened.76  
 
In mid-2005, by which time MONUC was the UN’s largest peace operation 
with around 16,500 troops, critics were complaining that the Security Council 
had still not learnt a key lesson from Sierra Leone: that MONUC needed the 
authority and the obligation to act pre-emptively to oppose threats to 
civilians.77 More recently, its operations against Rwandan Hutu rebels, the 
remnants of the 1994 genocide, have been very limited and have had little 
effect.78 
 
But over time the reconfigured UN troops developed a clearer focus on civilian 
protection, including a preparedness to use force to guarantee it. UN forces in 
DRC have conducted highly assertive actions, including aggressive cordon-
and-search operations, direct confrontation of armed groups threatening 
violence against civilians, the setting up of buffer zones between combatants 
and safe areas, patrols and overflights in unstable areas, and provision of 
humanitarian escorts.79 
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In 2005, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best 
Practices Unit commissioned an external survey, undertaken by BERCI 
international, an independent Congolese research organisation, to assess The 
Perception of the Population in DRC to MONUC.80 BERCI dispatched teams of 
researchers to all 11 provincial capitals of the DRC in June and July 2005. This 
period was significant because June 2005 marked the end of the first period 
of political transition in DRC, and the start of preparations for national 
elections in 2006.  
 
In eastern provinces, where MONUC has a more significant presence and 
which suffered most from violence, he population felt most strongly that the 
presence of MONUC made them “feel safer”:  
 
Katanga  48% - yes – 28% - no 
Maniema  74% - yes – 23% - no 
North Kivu  50% - yes – 32% - no 
South Kivu  41% - yes – 34% - no 
Orientale  36% - yes – 33% - no  
 
However, in the western provinces, the perception that the presence of 
MONUC made people feel safer was noticeably less.81 
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Conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 has developed understanding of the evolution and requirements of 
civilian protection as a component of complex peacekeeping operations in 
Africa. Providing civilian protection in the tough operational environments of 
African crises requires significant and specialised capability: capacity, 
mandates, doctrine and training. The consequences of getting things wrong 
are well-documented. But even having these in place is no guarantee t of 
effectiveness - although the Congolese opinion survey cited above suggests 
that the presence of peacekeepers can make populations feel safer in certain 
circumstances, when peacekeepers are deployed heavily in vulnerable 
locations. 
 
A key function of Chapter 2 has to provide an analytical framework to 
underpin this thesis’ other two research questions: 
 
• is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping 
operations? 
 
• can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to 
the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment? 
 
Chapter 2 has shown that, driven by operational developments in complex 
peacekeeping and by political influences both inside and outside Africa, 
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responsibility for the peacekeeping burden in Africa is attempting to shift 
away from New York towards Africa itself – primarily to the AU and Regional 
Economic Communities. It has further established that civilian protection is 
becoming an increasingly prominent mandated objective of peacekeeping 
operations, presenting serious operational challenges that peacekeepers on 
the ground have struggled to realise in practice. How capable is the AU of 
responding to these challenges? The AU is comparatively weak in terms of 
finances and resources for peacekeeping and must rely on external support as 
it develops its own capacity. The next chapters of this thesis look more 
specifically at the AU as a peacekeeping and civilian protection agency, and at 
the AU’s relationship with donor partners.
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3 The African Union 
 
Chapter 3 outlines reviews the AU peace and security architecture (APSA). 
First, it outlines the AU’s normative and a constitutional commitment to 
deliver peacekeeping and civilian protection. The AU has stated that the 
transformation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) represents a 
fundamental policy shift for African continental politics, from an attitude of 
‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of states, to one of ‘non-indifference’ 
in situations of gross human rights abuses and war crimes.82  
 
Second, chapter 3 describes the AU’s institutional commitment to provide 
peacekeeping and civilian protection. It concentrates primarily on the African 
Standby Force (ASF), the APSA’s operational arm for peacekeeping, outlining 
the fundamental structure of the ASF, the types of mission it is designed to 
undertake, and the evolution of its establishment. 
 
Third, this chapter looks at the development of the regional components of 
the ASF – its ‘building blocks’. These are essentially based on the AU’s five 
Regional Economic Communities in north, south, east, west and central Africa, 
although clear regional demarcation has proved difficult to realise in practice. 
ASF regional brigades discussed here include: the ECOWAS Standby Force 
(ESF); the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); the Eastern African Standby 
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Brigade (EASBRIG); the ECCAS Standby Force (EASF); and the North Africa 
standby force. 
 
Fourth, this chapter looks at the clarity of the AU/UN relationship, in particular 
the concept of a ‘layered response’ between the two institutions. The UN is 
still by far the primary peacekeeping agency in Africa, and virtually all African 
regional peacekeeping missions are deployed with some form of UN 
operational involvement in mind. Especially in view of the scarcity of African 
capacity, it is very important that the development of an AU capability 
considers how this fits with that of the UN. This ties with former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s vision of “an interlocking system of 
peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with 
relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships”.83 Two 
interconnected strands to AU/UN collaboration are discussed here: 1) the 
constitutional relationship; and 2) the operational partnership.  
 
This chapter helps to clarify understanding of what sorts of gaps remain in 
the AU’s peacekeeping capability to deliver civilian protection. This provides 
the analytical foundation for subsequent chapters, which explore international 
support for African peacekeeping. 
 
The AU and civilian protection: constitutional commitment 
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Today, there is much discussion in Africa on issues of intervention, 
peacekeeping and civilian protection. At the rhetorical level, at least, much of 
the peace and security discourse in Africa focuses on upholding the rights and 
interests of the individual where these are threatened. 
 
Many African policymakers are now much more sympathetic to the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda, and to various forms of intervention to 
uphold its key principles. And the AU has consequently been developing 
institutional architecture that can support intervention for protection of 
civilians’ human rights, within the context of complex peacekeeping.  
 
Organisation of African Unity 
 
While the issue of intervention within a state’s borders was taboo at the UN 
until the end of the Cold War, it had been even more polemic in Africa, and 
did not feature formally in pan-African political discourse for another decade. 
Until the early 21st century and the demise of the OAU, African states’ 
maintained strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, respecting 
this maxim above and beyond any demands for intervention justified on any 
grounds.84 The legacy of the struggles of de-colonisation meant that African 
states were particularly sensitive to the issue of the inviolability of national 
boundaries. Fragile and contestable borders – a colonial legacy of arbitrarily 
demarcated of state borders – combined with widespread national fragility, 
                                            
84 Mwagiru, 1996, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Manageemnt of Internal 
Conflcit in Africa, International Studies, Vol. 33, No.1 p.4. 
 61
generated serious concern amongst African leaders over internal political 
vulnerability and irredentism.  
 
Disagreement the stability of individual states was evident in debates about 
the shape and function of the OAU at the time of its inauguration in May 
1963. More radical African heads of state, like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, 
Julius Nyerere in (former) Tanganyika, and Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt were 
pressing for the OAU be tightly unified politically. Nyerere argued that the 
borders separating African states were “nonsensical”, since they had been 
decided by Europeans during the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth 
century.85 However, more conservative leaders refused such a step, choosing 
instead to retain their existing levels of national independence, however 
tenuous. As a result, the OAU was not able significantly to exercise influence 
national policies, to monitor the internal behaviour of Member States, or to 
intervene to curb abuses of human rights.86 
 
Non-interference was embodied constitutionally in Articles III (2 and 3) of the 
Charter of the OAU, by which Member States declared their adherence to 
“non-interference in the internal affairs of States”, and their commitment to 
“[r]espect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence”. Accompanying the principle of 
non-interference was the implicit assumption that an incumbent government 
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must retain legitimate authority, irrespective of that state’s domestic situation. 
Thus, the OAU was also constitutionally bound to uphold the existing status 
quo within states, notwithstanding the specifics of individual circumstances.  
 
The dearth of African interventions was less conspicuous during the Cold War 
era, where African conflicts took place within the broader context of bi-polar 
geopolitics, and where international discourse on conflict management tended 
to focus on inter-state violence. Where African intervention did take place, 
legitimisation of it tended to be implicit rather than explicit. For instance, 
although most African leaders privately approved of President Julius Nyerere’s 
Tanzanian intervention to remove Idi Amin Dada from power in Uganda, 
Presidents Jaafar Nimeiri of Sudan and Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria 
nevertheless publicly criticised Nyerere at the OAU summit in July 1979.87 
 
However, after the end of the Cold War the hugely destabilising impact of 
conflict in Africa became increasingly apparent. Combined with the failure of 
the international community to respond to African crises effectively, this 
progressively chipped away at African states’ absolute respect for non-
interference. Early examples of post-Cold War intervention include the 
ECOMOG peacekeeping initiatives in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s, and OAU recognition of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia. In December 
1996, then Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere explicitly described the 
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embargo placed on Burundi by its neighbouring states that year as 
representing a shift in the enduring African principle of non-interference.88  
 
A number of mechanisms were set up by the OAU during the 1990s, to try to 
expand its capability for intervention. In 1993, it established a Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR). Mwagiru states 
that this development “made … progress in stepping in where the ‘old’ OAU 
would have feared to tread, namely into situations of internal conflict”.89 
MCPMR’s primary emphasis was on preventive or peacemaking initiatives. The 
OAU continued to stress it would look to the UN for more muscular 
intervention,90 and Mwagiru stresses that “the reasons why some member 
states objected to peacekeeping [...] is because it would interfere in ‘sensitive’ 
internal matters”.91  
 
In practice, however, the MCPMR made little obvious headway. A Central 
Organ, comprising selected OAU Member States, was set up to direct MCPMR 
activities, and its membership displayed a familiarly conservative attitude. 
Also, MCPMR still surrendered absolute authority to Article 3(2) of the OAU 
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Charter, legally restricting its ability to work in situations of internal conflict.92 
Nevertheless, the MCPMR provided a basic model on which later to base some 
of the more progressive peace and security structures of the AU. Indeed, the 
significance of the MCPMR was officially recognised at the 37th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held 
in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001, at which African leaders decided 
to: 
 
“[I]ncorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, 
in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
and, in the regard, requested the [OAU] Secretary-General to undertake a 
review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central 
Organ”.93 
 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of MCPMR, the 1990s offered some 
indications of a more interventionist OAU stance. For instance, Yoroms and 
Aning suggest that the 1997 OAU summit in Harare sent strong signals that 
the OAU was developing institutional norms denouncing the violent overthrow 
of democratically elected governments, which they interpret as an indication 
of  
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“‘revolutionary’ change from [the OAU’s] traditional posture: from placid 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states - even in the 
face of the most repugnant atrocities by some African governments - to 
principled resolute defence of democracy”.94 
The gradual erosion of the norm of sovereignty that began in the early 1990s 
in Africa can be seen as forming part of an on-going deliberative process 
among major African states and leaders. This process was more pronounced 
some regions, specifically in West Africa where the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia in 1990, purportedly on 
humanitarian grounds. ECOWAS subsequently formalised this new ‘right of 
intervention’ in its Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999.95 
 
African Union 
 
The shift in African attitudes to intervention was ratified officially with the 
establishment of the AU in 2002.96 While the OAU was seen as a club for 
heads of state, the founding documents of the AU placed a new emphasis on 
                                            
94 Yoroms and Aning, 1997, West African Regional Security in the post-Liberian conflict era, Centre for 
Development Research Working Paper 97.7, November, pp.21-2. 
95 Gandois, H (2008) Sovereignty as Responsibility: Theory and Practice in Africa, Paper 
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 
March. 
96 ECOWAS in West Africa pre-empted the AU. Its 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security authorises 
the organisation to “intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore 
life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.” Economic Community of 
West African States (1999), Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Lomé: ECOWAS, 10 December, 
Chapter V. ECOWAS is discussed in more detail belolw. 
 66
the rights of Africa’s peoples – rights that were not necessarily trumped by 
the claims of national sovereignty. The AU is, therefore, focused on the 
interests of local populations and communities, at least constitutionally. 
 
Indeed, constitutionally, the AU has gone further than any other institution in 
challenging the inviolability of sovereignty. Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive 
Act establishes the Union’s right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.97 The Constitutive Act also 
allows for consensual intervention, i.e. when requested by Member States to 
restore peace and security, under Article 4 (j). 
 
Ben Kioko, senior legal advisor to the AU, has noted that: “Article 4(h) was 
adopted with the sole purpose of enabling the African Union to resolve 
conflicts more effectively on the continent”.98 The Constitutive Act establishes 
a parallel mechanism to the UN Security Council. It is empowering 
institutionally, as it provides an explicit legal basis for the AU to launch 
humanitarian interventions. The existence of these mechanisms is also 
acknowledged in the UN definition of the responsibility to protect.99 
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Ambassador Said Djinnit, former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, 
notes that the founding of the AU represented a shift away from the OAU’s 
policy of non-interference, to a new policy of ‘non-indifference’. He states that 
this transformation mirrors the ideas of conditional sovereignty and the 
‘responsibility to protect’ that were developed in the ICISS report in 2001. 
Djinnet believes that both Africans and non-Africans are responding to the 
same failures, not least the monumental failure to prevent genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994.100 It is also noteworthy that some sub-Saharan African 
states, including Rwanda and South Africa, were particularly supportive of the 
responsibility to protect language that appeared in the UN Summit Outcome 
Document agreed at the UN World Summit in 2005, and that they lobbied 
intensively for its incorporation.101 
 
The AU’s constitutional commitment to intervention promotes elements of the 
responsibility to protect/civilian protection agenda, as well as some of the 
core objectives of complex peacekeeping. The AU’s peace and security 
architecture (APSA) is discussed in more detail below. But here, it is useful to 
outline selected constitutional elements of the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), which is the primary organ within the APSA.  
 
The PSC was established in 2002 as a 
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“standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts … a collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and 
crisis situations in Africa”.102  
 
The PSC takes broad view of security. According to Article 3 (a) of the 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union, a primary objective of the Council is to 
 
“promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee 
the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of 
the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of 
conditions conducive to sustainable development”.103 
 
The preamble of the Protocol notes that the PSC is intended to implement the 
decisions taken in the areas of “conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace 
support operations and intervention, as well as peacebuilding and post-
conflict reconstruction”.104 
 
Among the key principles of the PSC is the “right of the Union to intervene in 
a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
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circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”, in 
agreement with Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act.105  
 
The Protocol further articulates how the objectives of Article 4 (h) of the 
Constitutive Act can be operationalised, and here we see a clear correlation 
between intervention to protect people’s human rights and complex 
peacekeeping. Article 6 of the Protocol lists as one of the key the functions of 
the PSC the deployment of “peace support operations and intervention, 
pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act”.106 The Protocol 
further commits the AU to establish an African Standby Force (ASF), “in order 
to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with 
respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention 
pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act”.107 And it further 
states that the ASF shall comprise “multidisciplinary contingents”, including 
“civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for 
rapid deployment at appropriate notice”.108 
 
Also, a May 2003 policy paper by African Chiefs of Defence Staff recognised 
the multidimensional aspects of African conflict. It called for a multi-
disciplinary peacekeeping capability encompassing NGOs, humanitarian 
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assistance, human rights, gender, political and legal dimensions of peace 
operations, as well as the civilian police and security sector components.109  
 
The AU institutional commitment to protect civilians 
 
Constitutionally and normatively, therefore, the AU appears committed to 
support the ‘local’ interests of vulnerable African civilians, at least in terms of 
their fundamental human rights, when these are threatened. But to what 
extent are the AU’s peace and security structures supporting this ambition in 
reality? This section looks at the potential of the AU peace and security 
architecture (APSA) as an effective mechanism for peacekeeping and civilian 
protection. 
 
The departure point for the APSA is the AU Constitutive Act, adopted in 2000 
and endorsed at the inaugural AU meeting in South Africa in July 2002. 
 
Box 1 The Organs of the African Union110 
 
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AU, comprising heads of state 
and government or accredited representatives of AU member states. The 
Assembly’s functions include: determining the common policies of the AU; 
considering requests for membership and establishing any organ of the AU; 
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110 House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
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adopting the AU budget; and directing the Executive Council on the 
management of conflicts and other emergencies. 
 
The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly and is composed of 
ministers or authorities designated by the governments of member states. 
 
The Permanent Representatives Committee is responsible for preparing 
the work of the Executive Council. It is composed of permanent 
representatives of AU member states. 
 
The principle AU organ for peace and security is the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), which is designed to serve as a standing decision-making 
organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The 
Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union 
entered into force on 26 December 2003. Article 5 of the Protocol defines the 
Council’s composition: 15 elected Members; 10 to serve for two years; and 5 
for three years. Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act defines other bodies to 
support the work of the PSC, including a Panel of the Wise (POW), a 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), a 
Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and a Military Staffs 
Committee (MSC). 
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The Pan-African Parliament is intended to promote the participation of 
African peoples in governance, development and economic integration at the 
continental level. 
 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) performs an 
advisory function. It is composed of different social and professional groups of 
AU Member States. 
 
A Court of Justice of the AU is to be established, to be merged with the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
 
The AU Financial Institutions comprise the African Central Bank, the 
African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. 
 
The Commission plays a central role in the day-to-day management of the 
AU, elaborating draft common positions of the AU, preparing strategic plans 
and studies for the consideration of the Executive Council, and co-ordinating 
AU programmes and policies with those of the RECs. The Commission 
comprises the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and 
additional staff members. Each Commissioner is responsible for a portfolio, 
arranged as follows: 
 
Peace and security—conflict prevention, management and resolution, and 
combating terrorism; 
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Political affairs—human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral 
institutions, civil society, humanitarian affairs, refugees, returnees and 
internally displaced persons; 
 
Infrastructure and energy—energy, transport, communications, infrastructure 
and tourism; 
 
Social affairs—health, children, drug control, population, migration, labour 
and employment, sports and culture; 
 
Human resources, science and technology—education, information technology 
communication, youth, human resources, science and technology; 
 
Trade and industry—trade, industry, customs and immigration matters; 
 
Rural economy and agriculture—rural economy, agriculture and food security, 
livestock, environment, water and natural resources and desertification; and 
 
Economic affairs—economic integration, monetary affairs, private sector 
development, investment and resource mobilisation. 
 
As outlined in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act, maintaining continental peace 
and security is a primary aim of the AU – although by no means the sole 
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objective. The AU Commission (the Commission) is divided into eight 
portfolios, including a Directorate for Peace and Security, currently led by 
Ambassador Saïd Djinnit (Algeria). Various AU bodies are in the process of 
being set up to implement the organisation’s peace and security ambitions. 
The principle AU organ for peace and security is the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC). 
 
The PSC is designed to serve as a standing decision-making organ for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC Protocol was 
inaugurated in December 2003 and Article 5 of the Protocol defines the 
Council’s composition: 15 elected Members; 10 to serve for two years; and 5 
for three years. Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act defines other bodies to 
support the work of the PSC as well as the Commission, including a Panel of 
the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African 
Standby Force (ASF), a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) 
and the Military Staffs Committee (MSC): 
 
• The POW is to comprise five highly respected African personalities for 
three year periods, appointed by the Assembly according to regional 
representation. 
• The CEWS is to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and recommend 
appropriate responses. It will comprise a Situation Centre, linked to similar 
bodies in the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as 
the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies. 
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• The ASF is to comprise standby multidisciplinary contingents from the five 
RECs, with civilian and military components stationed in their countries of 
origin and ready for rapid deployment. Meetings of African Chiefs of 
Defence Staff and Defence Ministers through 2003/4 have been 
developing the terms of the ASF. 
• In February 2004, African leaders adopted a Solemn Declaration on the 
CADSP which commits AU Member States (MSs) develop a common 
understanding of defence and security issues. 
• The MSC comprises the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the PSC membership to 
advise assist the Council in military and security matters. 
 
Box 2 Structure of the African Standby Force111 
Mandate 
 
The African Standby Force shall, inter alia, perform functions in the following 
areas: 
 
 a. observation and monitoring missions; 
 
 b. other types of peace support missions; 
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 c. intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or 
 at the  request of a Member State in order to restore peace and 
 security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; 
 
 d. preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict 
 from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to 
 neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after 
 parties to a conflict  have reached an agreement.; 
 
 e. peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and 
 demobilization; 
 
 f. humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian 
 population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major 
 natural disasters; and 
 
 g. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security 
 Council or the Assembly. 
 
In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where 
appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other 
relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with 
national authorities and NGOs. 
 
 77
The detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for 
each authorized mission shall be considered and approved by the Peace and 
Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission. 
 
Chain of Command 
 
For each operation undertaken by the African Standby Force, the Chairperson 
of the Commission shall appoint a Special Representative and a Force 
Commander, whose detailed roles and functions shall be spelt out in 
appropriate directives, in accordance with the Peace Support Standing 
Operating Procedures. 
 
The Special Representative shall, through appropriate channels, report to the 
Chairperson of the Commission. The Force Commander shall report to the 
Special Representative. Contingent Commanders shall report to the Force 
Commander, while the civilian components shall report to the Special 
Representative. 
 
Military Staff Committee 
 
There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security 
requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in 
Africa. 
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The Military Staff Committee shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of 
the Members of the Peace and Security Council. Any Member State not 
represented on the Military Staff Committee may be invited by the Committee 
to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient 
discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities. 
 
The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on 
matters referred to it by the Peace and Security Council. 
 
The Military Staff Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of 
Defence Staff of the Members of the Peace and Security Council to discuss 
questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion 
and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Chiefs of Defence Staff 
shall submit to the Chairperson of the Commission recommendations on how 
to enhance Africa's peace support capacities. 
 
The Chairperson of the Commission shall take all appropriate steps for the 
convening of and follow-up of the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of 
Members of the Peace and Security Council. 
 
Training 
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The Commission shall provide guidelines for the training of the civilian and 
military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and 
tactical levels. Training on International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and 
children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel. 
 
To that end, the Commission shall expedite the development and circulation 
of appropriate Standing Operating Procedures to inter-alia: 
 
 a. support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and 
 programmes for national and regional schools of excellence; 
 
 b. coordinate the African Standby Force training courses, command 
 and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises. 
 
The Commission shall, in collaboration with the United Nations, undertake 
periodic assessment of African peace support capacities. 
 
The Commission shall, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, 
assist in the co-ordination of external initiatives in support of the African 
Standby Force capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, 
communications and funding. 
 
Role of Member States 
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In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated under the present Protocol: 
 
 a. troop contributing countries States shall immediately, upon request 
 by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and 
 Security Council or the Assembly, release the standby contingents with 
 the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged under Article 9 
 (3) of the present Protocol; 
 
 b. Member States shall commit themselves to make available to the 
 Union all forms of assistance and support required for the promotion 
 and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent, 
 including rights of passage through their territories. 
 
The ASF design was developed on the basis of six possible mission scenarios 
(see Table 1): 
 
Table 1 ASF Mission scenarios112 
Scenario Description 
1 AU/Regional military advice to a political mission. 
2 AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.   
3 Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.   
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4 AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive 
deployment missions (and peacebuilding).   
5 AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level 
spoilers. 
6 AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the 
international community does not act promptly.   
 
The ASF mission scenarios distinguish between “complex, multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions”, and “intervention” in situations of genocide. But to 
date there have been no international military interventions in Africa with the 
primary purpose of civilian protection. And the AU is a long way from 
developing such capacity. AU policy suggests that a scenario 6 intervention 
should be able to deploy in 14 days. This can only be achieved by forces that 
are “ready, assembled, fully equipped and exercised with transport available 
on immediate call and with logistic supplies pre-packed and ready for delivery 
by air”.113 But the ASF is both multinational and standby in character. 
Multinational forces are more difficult to train and operate, and are slower to 
deploy. Only forces based on a lead nation are disposed to sufficient high 
readiness for a scenario 6 intervention. 
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Indeed, although the original ASF rationale was ‘never to allow another 
genocide like Rwanda’, today it is largely accepted that the AU should deploy 
in advance of the UN, such as in Darfur and in Somalia. Most practitioners 
acknowledge that ASF forces will be deployed into a situation as part of the 
“peacemaking process at an earlier stage than UN forces would be allowed to 
engage”. Thus, the primary function of the ASF is to help to “create the 
conditions on the ground that could lead to a comprehensive peace 
agreement and the deployment of UN forces”. Precedents for this division of 
labour have been set in Burundi (with the AU and UN), and with ECOWAS and 
the UN in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Transition to a UN mission 
has, therefore, effectively become an exit strategy for ASF operations.114 
 
The final ASF concept provided for five standby brigade level forces in each 
AU Regional Economic Community (REC). These would be supported by 
civilian police (CivPol) and other capacities. Ultimately, the ASF will comprise 
standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components 
based in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment.  
 
The ASF is to be established in two phases, although the timelines have 
lapsed from their initial design, and are likely to lapse still further: 
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Phase 1) Up to 30 June 2006: establish a strategic/continental level 
management capacity for scenarios 1-3, while the regions would complement 
the AU by establishing forces up to brigade level strength for scenario 4.  
 
Phase 2) By 30 June 2010: develop full scenario 5 and 6 capacities at 
continental level.  
 
Development of the ASF requires the establishment of effective management 
and planning systems at the AU headquarters, sub-regional and national 
levels. At the continental level, the AU Commission is expected to develop a 
Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability and a 15-person 
Planning Element (PLANELM), which goal of developing standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), doctrine, a continental command and communication 
system, a continental training concept, a continental standby system.115 
 
Serafini questions whether the ASF will be able to achieve effective peace 
enforcement. Weaknesses include poor logistical support for mission 
preparation, deployment and execution, a weak organisational structure 
lacking unity of command, and under-trained and inexperienced personnel.116 
As at March 2008, commentators assert that it is highly unlikely that the AU 
will be able to meet more than nominal targets set out above, unless AU 
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Member States devote far greater capacity to the ASF, and demonstrate much 
greater leadership and action at AU level.117 
 
In late 2006, the AU Commission of the AU was able to report progress on the 
development of much of the ‘baseline documentation’ for the ASF, relating to 
doctrine, the logistic concept, guidelines for training and evaluation, C3IS and 
various ASF SOPs (note that this does not mean that all were completed). 
Progress continued more slowly in 2007, when the ASF tools and concept of 
operations were consolidated, capabilities for deployment in the period up to 
2010 were identified, and progress was made to develop ASF civilian 
dimensions. 
 
Africa Standy Force regional brigades 
 
ECOWAS 
 
ECOWAS’ original main objective was to promote regional integration in 
economic, social and cultural activities. The peace and security dimension 
evolved later as it became clear that regional instability was a severe 
impediment to achieving this ambition.118 
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The supreme ECOWAS institution is the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government of Member States (the Authority). It is responsible for the 
general direction of ECOWAS and leads on all actions to realise the 
organisation’s objectives. Below the Authority sits the ECOWAS Council of 
Ministers (the Council), which consists of Member States, Ministers of 
ECOWAS Affairs and other relevant Ministers, with responsibility for the 
development of the Community. 
 
The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, based in Abuja, Nigeria, manages the 
overall running of the organisation and the implementation of Authority 
decisions. The Executive Secretary, elected for four-year terms, has four 
deputies, responsible for different thematic Departments. The Current Deputy 
Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security is General 
Cheick Oumar Diarra. At the 1999 ECOWAS Summit, a Protocol for the 
Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, Peace and Security was agreed. The institutions of the Mechanism 
include the Authority, the Executive Secretariat and a Mediation and Security 
Council comprising 10 Member States. The Mediation and Security Council 
supervises four additional ECOWAS organs: 
 
• The Defence and Security Commission. 
• The Council of Elders. 
• The Early Warning Observation and Monitoring Centre. 
• The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 
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The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) comprises a number of elements. The ESF 
brigade (ECOBRIG) will be 5,000-strong, which will be ready to deploy within 
90 days. There will also be an ESF task force: a 2,750-strong rapid 
deployment force, at 30 days’ readiness, based on Nigeria as lead nation. The 
ESF already has a task force chief of staff, has established a task force HQ in 
Abuja and has an operational PLANELM. Its concept of operations, doctrine 
and SOPs are also complete.119 
 
SADC 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the primary 
southern African regional body. It was formally instituted in the early 1990s, 
having developed from a more informal regional process began with the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference 
(SADCC) in the early 1980s. SADC’s main aims are to promote development 
and economic growth, alleviate poverty and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration. The SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation (the Organ) is responsible for promoting 
regional peace and security. It reports to the SADC Summit and is headed by 
a Troika, comprising a Chair, as well as the Incoming and Outgoing Chairs.120 
 
                                            
119 Cilliers, J (2008), The African Standby Force: an update on progress, ISS Occasional Paper 160, 
March. 
120 Ramsbotham, A, Bah, A, and Calder, F, ‘Enhancing African peace and security capacity: a useful 
role for the UK and the G8?’, International Affairs, 81.2 pp.72-73. 
 87
A major SADC priority is promoting confidence-building measures that can 
support regional integration. Regional exercises/mechanisms in peace and 
security capacitybuilding can help this process and so encourage regional 
cooperation more broadly. Political issues that challenge integration among 
SADC Member States, as a result of legacies of the apartheid era and so on, 
are still dominant within the region and progress is being made to counter 
them. In the meantime, regional politics are very sensitive. Regional decisions 
tend not be made official until political problems have been resolved to avoid 
upsetting the delicate political regional balance. Well-directed donor support, 
with an emphasis on SADC leadership (from both the Secretariat and Member 
States), flexibility and a pragmatic approach to realities on the ground, can 
help to facilitate confidence-building among SADC Member States.121 
 
In July 2004, modalities for the establishment of a SADC Standby Brigade 
(SADCBRIG) were approved by SADC Chiefs of Defence Staff and Police 
Chiefs. But SADCBRIG was not inaugurated officially until August 2007. As at 
March 2008, the SADCBRIG PLANELM was operational, based with the SADC 
secretariat in Gabarone. The Brigade HQ was also established, as were 
pledged forces and elements, although neither civilian components nor details 
of a logistic concept and depot had yet been finalised, although doctrine, 
operational guidelines, SOPs and logistic concept had been completed.122 
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IGAD 
 
Unlike other sub-regions such as West Africa with ECOWAS and Southern 
Africa with SADC, Eastern Africa does not have an equivalent Regional 
Economic Community (REC) that brings together all member states from the 
sub-region. The East African Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania, one of the oldest and most viable regional organisations in the 
area, is limited by its narrow membership; while COMESA stretches from 
North to Southern Africa. Consequently, the Inter- Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), which, consists of several countries from the Horn to 
East Africa is viewed as the most appropriate forum for dealing with regional 
issues of peace and security.123 
 
The severe droughts and other natural disasters that plagued the sub-region 
starting from the mid-1970s to 1984, led to the establishment in 1986 of the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). Based 
on the realities that informed its creation, IGADD’s mandate was to primarily 
address issues of drought and other ecological challenges that confronted 
Member States. However, with persistent conflicts, in March 1996 IGADD 
Member States agreed to establish the Intern- Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), with a broader mandate to allow IGAD to venture into 
the complex and often fractious dynamics of politics and security in the sub-
region. 
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The newly established organisation identified three core areas as its priorities: 
conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs; 
infrastructure development; and food security and environmental 
protection.124  
 
Since there was no suitable regional arrangement, progress in establishing 
the Eastern African standby force has been delayed. IGAD was eventually 
mandated to coordinate the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in 
2004. However, non-IGAD Eastern African states protested, and the council of 
ministers approved the establishment of an independent EASBRIG 
Coordination Mechanism’ (EASBRICOM) to assume coordination of EASBRIG. 
After lengthy negotiations, it was agreed to co-locate EASBRICOM with the 
EASBRIG PLANELM in Nairobi. Today, membership of the Eastern Africa 
Standby Force includes Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Burundi has requested to leave the 
central African region and join Eastern Africa. But Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Tanzania, which had previously been members, are now operative in 
Southern Africa, while Eritrea is currently not engaged with EASBRICOM. 
EASBRICOM has proposed that the Eastern African standby force will be 
structured within a regional peace and security mechanism. It is proposed 
that this will provide political oversight and strategic decision-making relevant 
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to multidimensional, complex peacekeeping missions, in accordance with 
article 16 of the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC of the AU.125 
 
Central Africa 
 
The membership of the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) overlaps with the membership of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Central Africa has struggled to produce 
a meaningful response to the severe peace and security problems within its 
region.126 ECCAS comprises 11 member states, namely Angola, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São 
Tomé et Príncipe.  
 
Substantive progress in developing the ECCAS Standby Force (EASF) began in 
2006. Rwanda was part of the EASF from the beginning, and Burundi has also 
applied to join. Angola and the DRC are members of both the central and 
southern standby forces. ECCAS has approved a structure for the regional HQ 
and the EASF PLANELM. However, realising the EASF in practice still faces 
many technical challenges, specifically a severe lack of resources in the 
secretariat and over-reliance on external support.127  
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North Africa 
 
On 17 February 1989 at the Maghred Summit held in Marrakech, Morocco, the 
five Heads of State signed the Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU). AMU Member States comprise Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia. The AMU has not met at the level of heads of state since April 1994, 
hamstrung by the dispute over the status of Western Sahara.128 Libya was 
eventually nominated as the regional coordinator, and North Africa has 
established the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) to develop the North 
Africa standby force. This includes Egypt, which is not a member of AMU. The 
brigade headquarters is to be located in Libya, and the PLANELM in Egypt.129 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was adopted at the 
July 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia,130 although it has subsequently 
been subsumed within the framework of the AU. As the name suggests, the 
main focus of NEPAD is on issues of development, and it is designed to 
present a comprehensive and integrated development plan for Africa, 
addressing major African social, economic and political concerns. NEPAD 
                                            
128 House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, 34th Report of Session 2005-6, 7 July, p.28. 
129 Cilliers, J (2008), The African Standby Force: an update on progress, ISS Occasional Paper 160, 
March. 
130 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001), October, 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/Primary/NEPAD200110.pdf 
 92
represents a commitment by African leaders to African people and the 
international community to achieve sustainable growth and to promote 
Africa’s integration into the global economy. But NEPAD also cites peace, 
security, democracy and good governance as preconditions for sustainable 
development and promotes a system of voluntary peer review and adherence 
to codes and standards of conduct. NEPAD is also seen as a key partner by 
many external agencies seeking to support Africa. It is worth, therefore, 
summarising NEPAD’s key features briefly here, including its relationship with 
the AU.  
 
African heads of state attending the 38th (and final) Summit of the OAU in 
Durban in July 2002 agreed a NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Good Governance.131 The Durban meeting also 
approved the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).132  
 
Box 3 NEPAD Structures 
 
NEPAD is a programme of the AU intended to meet its development aims. The 
highest authority of the NEPAD implementation process is the AU Summit. 
NEPAD’s Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) 
comprises three states for every REC and reports to the AU Summit on an 
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annual basis. The Steering Committee of NEPAD comprises the personal 
representatives of the NEPAD heads of state and government and oversees 
projects and programme development. The NEPAD secretariat coordinates 
implementation of projects and programmes approved by the HSIC. 
 
The NEPAD strategic framework document arises from a mandate given to 
the five initiating heads of state (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa) by the OAU to develop an integrated socio-economic development 
framework for Africa. The 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001 formally 
adopted the strategic framework document. 
 
NEPAD’S key priority areas for action are: 
 
• operationalising the African Peer Review Mechanism; 
• facilitating and supporting implementation of the short-term regional 
infrastructure programmes covering Transport Energy, Water and 
Sanitation; 
• facilitating implementation of the food security and agricultural 
development program in all sub-regions; 
• facilitating the preparation of a coordinated African position on market 
access, debt relief and ODA reforms; and 
• monitoring and intervening as appropriate to ensure that the MDGs in the 
areas of health and education are met. 
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There are a number of challenges facing NEPAD: its internal organisation, 
financing, institutional capacity and relation to African people have all been 
cited as problematic. However, its biggest challenge is that of expectations. 
The UN regards NEPAD as the framework for achieving the MDGs, whilst the 
EU Strategy for Africa itself emphasises the importance of NEPAD in its 
section on governance. One of the EU’s challenges will be to assist in building 
the capacity of NEPAD to meet these challenges. 
 
Box 4  The Institutional Relationship between the AU and NEPAD  
 
At the first NEPAD Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, held in South Africa on 22–23 
October 2004, opening statements made by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of 
Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal 
underlined the importance of a close relationship between NEPAD and the AU, 
emphasising that NEPAD is the socio-economic development programme of 
the AU.133 
 
The plan to integrate NEPAD into the AU as a specialised agency in 2006 
demonstrates the desire that the two institutions should work closely together 
as complementary pan-African institutions to promote peace and security, 
good governance and development in Africa. 
 
                                            
133 Summary report of the first NEPAD multi-stakeholder dialogue, South Africa, 22–23 October 2004: 
www.uneca.org/unregionalconsultations/documents/report_multistakeholder.htm. 
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Promoting good governance is a guiding principle for both institutions. AU 
resources that can support its governance function include a political mandate 
as part of the AU Constitutive Act;134 the role of the RECs as regional building 
blocks for the work of the AU; and dedicated organs that incorporate input 
from citizens, such as ECOSOCC and the Pan-African Parliament. NEPAD’s 
primary mechanism for promoting good governance is the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). 
 
However, there has been some tension between the AU and NEPAD. Critics 
have observed that the divergent approaches adopted by officials from each 
institution in presenting initiatives to African governments and civil society 
groups have given an impression that the AU and NEPAD are competing for 
supremacy in promoting democratisation and economic integration in Africa. 
The decision to integrate NEPAD formally into the AU by 2006 should help to 
mitigate rivalry between the two institutions.135 
 
Myles Wickstead, former Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for 
Africa, has noted some tension between NEPAD based in South Africa and the 
AU based in Addis Ababa over what should be the key priorities to support the 
overall development of Africa.136 Bob Dewar, the United Kingdom’s Permanent 
Representative to the AU, acknowledged this friction, but drew attention to 
                                            
134 African Union (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union, Appendix Five. 
135 The African Union and NEPAD, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa: 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/?id=202 
136 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 78, 2 February. 
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commitments made at the Khartoum AU Summit to integrate NEPAD fully into 
the AU over the next two to three years.137  
 
Clarity of the AU/UN relationship and layered response 
 
Cilliers states that building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does not 
represent building an alternative to UN peacekeeping.138 Rather, what needs 
to be built was what Kofi Annan’s In larger Freedom report referred to as an 
interlocking system of peacekeeping,139 in which the AU can help establish a 
comprehensive ceasefire and can then handover to a UN mission. The UN 
then represents the exit strategy for AU peacekeeping operations. However, 
the practicalities of fitting diverse peacekeeping components together remain 
a key challenge. At this point it is useful to review two interconnected strands 
to AU/UN collaboration, first the constitutional and normative relationship, 
and second the operational partnership.  
 
The constitutional relationship between the AU and the UN is a key 
determinant of the legality and legitimacy of peacekeeping deployments in 
Africa. The AU has, to date, emphasised the importance of operating within 
the terms of the UN Charter, and under the over-arching authority of the UN 
Security Council. It seems likely that the constitutional relationship will 
                                            
137 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 343, 30 March. 
138 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 122, 8 February. 
139 United Nations (2005) In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human 
 rights for all, 21 March, A/59/2005, www.un.org/largerfreedom/ 
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persevere on these terms for the foreseeable future, as the AU remains to a 
large extent operationally reliant on the UN.  
 
Were the AU to develop a more self-sufficient peacekeeping capability, 
however, or to develop stronger operational links with other external 
partners, Addis Ababa’s determination to seek prior UN approval would be 
likely to be less dependable. At this point, the recommendation of the UN 
High-Level Panel on threats, Challenges and Change might become more 
material, which advises that: “Authorization from the Security Council should 
in all cases be sought for regional peace operations , recognizing that in some 
urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have 
commenced”.140 
 
The emergence of African sub-regional bodies with independent intervention 
capacity adds another dimension to this question; indeed, ECOWAS previously 
intervened in Liberia in the early 1990s without the approval of the UN 
Security Council. How the relationship between the UN Security Council and 
the AU Peace and Security Council develops is of key significance here.  
 
Regarding the AU/UN operational partnership, UNDPKO states that the design 
of the African Standby Force (ASF) looks promising for good cooperation with 
                                            
140 United Nations (2004) A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 21 March, para 272 (a), 
www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf 
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the UN.141 It sees the concept of the ASF as consistent with the lessons of the 
Brahimi Report, as it focuses on developing coherent brigade groups. 
EASBRIG (the ASF component for East Africa, as described in more detail 
above) is designed to be ready for the ASF and UN operations; ECOWAS is 
developing capacity along similar conceptual lines.  
 
However, DPKO warns that the operational demands on AU peacekeeping 
capabilities are overwhelming and unsustainable. As the major peacekeeping 
agency in Africa, with an increasing large field presence on the continent, the 
UN stresses the need for clarification of the roles of the UN and the AU. This 
extends to improving the relationship between the UN and the AU/RECs at 
the political/constitutional level in terms of legitimacy and legality, as well as 
to enhancing the partnership at the technical/military level. 
 
A lesson of UN operational experiences that is useful for African bodies as 
they develop their capacity is the need for a flexible response capability: a 
range of other actors have filled gaps that have emerged from constraints on 
UN rapid response capacity. The UN states that the ASF concept has so far 
failed to consider explicitly scenarios where the ASF might be an interim force, 
for instance for only 120 days before being subsumed within a UN operation. 
This is close to actual current operational practice. Definite thinking on these 
lines would greatly facilitate and clarify operational planning for the ASF, 
                                            
141 Ramsbotham, A,  Bah, A, and Calder, C (2005), The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to 
Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of current G8 
and African activities and potential areas for further collaboration, Chatham House, pp. 3-4 
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giving a finite timeline for Africans regarding logistics and so on, and a much 
clearer exit strategy. 
 
DPKO stresses the need for greater clarity of what is meant by ‘African 
ownership’, in relation to the full spectrum of operational peacekeeping 
responsibilities, and the scale of demand for peacekeeping in Africa. An AU ‘all 
or nothing’ attitude that rejects hybrid operations and a realistic division of 
labour is not helpful given operational realities. The AU/UN mission in Darfur 
suggests progress in this area, although negotiations over the details of this 
mission were difficult and drawn out. 
 
The UN further suggests that AU operations seem most likely to be ‘bridging’ 
missions, which would subsequently be ‘re-hatted’ as UN deployments. It 
urged that there should be more candid and clearer thinking on the 
mechanics and implications of this. Clarity is also needed over what capacity 
is being built for; for instance, the UN has the only access to multidimensional 
post-conflict capacity in Africa. Attempts by the AU to replicate this risks 
spreading its net too wide, rather than building functioning capacity in 
selected key areas. 
 
The UN suggests that the function of the ASF should be clarified in relation to 
the UN and other actors. Key themes include the use of force and Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, and multidimensional peacebuilding responses and 
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prioritising components of AU/African PSO capacity-building. Best practice 
lessons could be learned from ECOWAS/UN experiences in West Africa. 
 
DPKO recommends that consideration should be given to relevant 
recommendations in relevant reports by the UN Secretary-General, such as In 
Larger Freedom, Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capabilities, and the UN 
High-level Panel Report.142 Key recommendations identified by DPKO include 
extending UN assessed contributions to pay for AU operations; and exploring 
what lessons can be shared/learned between the ASF and UN Standby 
Arrangements System, for instance over interoperability. 
 
The UN has sought to share standardisation of generic training modules 
through seminars such as the senior management and UN Training Assistance 
Team seminars. DPKO suggests that it could also assist in training HQ staff 
officers from the AU and regions through the following practices: 
 
• rapid deployment and planning exercises conducted by DPKO; 
• arranging exchange programmes for AUC staff in New York; and 
• conducting training programmes for middle-level African police managers 
from African countries with a view to preparing them for managerial and 
policy-making positions in peacekeeping operations. 
 
                                            
142 United Nations (2004) A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 21 March, www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf; 
United Nations (2005) In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights 
for all, 21 March, A/59/2005, www.un.org/largerfreedom/ 
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Conclusion 
 
There have been major advances in strengthening AU peacekeeping 
capability, including to protect civilians. The blueprint for the African Standby 
Force (ASF) supports the development of a complex, multidimensional 
peacekeeping capability. The AU peace and security architecture (APSA) 
stresses the importance of a robust capability to protect the human rights of 
the individual, where those are threatened by gross abuse. 
 
But a number of key challenges remain. AU Member States must be prepared 
to support the AU institutionally and politically, including authorising and 
resourcing missions in situations where the security of African civilians is 
under threat.  A major challenge relates to capacity. Resources are severely 
limited in Africa and there is a long way to go to develop a functioning African 
peace and security capability. Experts have suggested that building the AU 
into a credible and solid institution is a 15 to 20-year project, and the AU has 
failed in its ambition to have the ASF operational by 2010.143  
 
A pattern has emerged for African regional peacekeeping, whereby the AU 
and ECOWAS have both played useful and effective roles as ‘bridging’ forces 
in advance of the deployment of UN missions.144  This corresponds with 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s vision of an interlocking system of 
                                            
143 House of Lords European Union Committee (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, 34th Report of Session 2005-6, 7 July, para. 346. 
144 This is discussed in more detail in chapter 11 
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peacekeeping capacities, in which different international agencies provide 
various components for peace operations, playing to their relative 
strengths.145  
 
But this pattern is not built into the design and construction of the APSA. At 
present, the plan for the APSA is very comprehensive, covering almost all 
aspects of a complex peacekeeping capability. This is ambitious, and risks the 
net being spread too wide. Building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does 
necessarily not mean building an alternative to the UN, but could be planned 
around more specific and specialised components relevant to Kofi Annan’s 
interlocking system. 
 
Another key question relates to the extent to which the ASF will pinpoint the 
specific requirements of civilian protection. Previous chapters have highlighted 
the importance of mandates, training and doctrine, to link peacekeepers’ 
objectives and actions to the requirements of civilian protection. ASF doctrine 
and training are still under discussion. But these are dynamic and evolving 
concepts and practices, and the requirements of civilian protection can be 
built in to them as they are developed. 
 
Critics have accused some international partners of the AU have seized on the 
ASF concept “to such a degree that it sometimes undermines African 
                                            
145 United Nations (2005), In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human 
 rights for all, 21 March, A/59/2005, www.un.org/largerfreedom/ 
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ownership”.146 Seconded officers from donor countries sometimes outnumber 
African compatriots. Embedded international ‘advisors’ often control much 
larger resources than the African commanders they nominally report to, are 
paid much larger salaries and can play a decisive role through their direct 
access to even larger national purses. As Cilliers warns,  
 
“it is … not uncommon to find middle ranking expatriate officers from 
European countries effectively in control of key aspects of ASF 
preparations, and exerting considerable influence on the concepts, 
standards and decisions taken at every level”.147 
 
Meanwhile, the AU’s chronic lack of capacity means that it will remain 
dependent on external partners for a long time to come. Since the AU is so 
reliant on external support both to build its indigenous peace and security 
capacity, and to deploy peacekeeping operations, how the relationship 
between the AU and its external partners is designed and managed is 
extremely significant. 
                                            
146 Cilliers, J (2008), The African Standby Force: an update on progress, ISS Occasional Paper, 160, 
March, p. 18. 
147 Cilliers, J (2008), The African Standby Force: an update on progress, ISS Occasional Paper, 160, 
March, p. 18. 
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4  The Africa-EU Partnership 
 
Discussion of the EU-Africa partnership focuses on the EU’s ‘Strategy for 
Africa’: The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, which was 
adopted by the European Council in December 2005.148 The Strategy maps 
the key areas in which the EU could support African efforts to build a 
“peaceful, democratic and prosperous future”.149  
 
The Strategy seeks to promote “African ownership and responsibility”,150 by 
working with African countries to achieve mutually agreed goals, rather than 
by imposing European values on them.151 These goals are outlined under six 
headings: Peace and Security; Human Rights and Governance; Development 
Assistance; Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade; 
Investing in People; and The Future: an EU Partnership with Africa. The 
Strategy stresses the importance of developing a comprehensive strategy 
“encompassing security, development and human rights”,152 and it highlights 
the importance of working with civil society in order to promote and protect 
human rights.153 
 
                                            
148 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05. 
149 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 1. 
150 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 3.  
151 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 3.  
152 General Affairs and External Relations Council (2005), Council Conclusions, Brussels 22 
November, Council of the European Union 14172/05. 
153 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 3. 
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For structural clarity, analysis of the EU-Africa partnership is divided into two 
chapters. Chapter 4 traces the history of the relationship, outlining its key 
structures, and it examines Europe’s capacity to deliver on its commitments to 
Africa. Chapter 5 then looks more specifically at EU support for African 
peacekeeping. It reviews various structures and processes through which the 
EU is seeking to provide support to African peace and security activities and 
structures, and it assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise these in 
practice. These chapters appraise the capacity of the EU Strategy for Africa to 
develop a functioning peacekeeping relationship between the EU and Africa.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are based largely on extensive, face to face interviews with 
a number of European and African experts in London and Brussels – as 
outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. This chapter analyses a number of key 
components of the EU-Africa relationship. First, this chapter reviews the 
history of European and EU relations with Africa. This analysis incorporates 
European collaboration with other multilateral institutions – including the UN, 
International Financial Institutions, and the G8 and the Africa Partnership 
Forum. This section of the chapter then examines the specific development of 
the EU-Africa Partnership, including: the background to the Partnership; the 
EU’s interlocutors in Africa; and the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Cotonou 
Agreement). Finally, this section looks at the latest manifestation of EU-Africa 
relations: the development of the Strategy for Africa, including its joint 
implementation matrix, as well as monitoring and review. 
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Second, this chapter assesses Europe’s capacity to deliver on the 
commitments it has made to support African peace and security, focusing 
primarily on coordination and coherence. It looks at policy coherence. And it 
examines institutional divisions within the EU, including within the 
Commission; within the Commission’s external representation; between the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat; and Coordination with – and 
between – Member States. It examines regulatory and financial divisions; the 
different cooperation agreements; and the financing structure. 
 
European and EU relations with Africa 
 
EU policy seeks to adopt an integrated approach to preventing conflict in 
Africa, drawing on all the instruments at its disposal: development, trade, 
economic, diplomatic, political and military. The EU’s focus is ‘organisation to 
organisation’; i.e. continental/regional, rather than bilateral.154 
 
2005 can be seen, internationally, as the ‘year of Africa’. Five years after the 
adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),155 Africa was 
falling behind in its efforts to climb out of poverty, in comparison with Europe, 
Asia and the Americas. In 2004, Africa enjoyed its highest regional growth for 
almost a decade. But its overall economy failed to achieve the 7% growth 
                                            
154 Ramsbotham, A, Calder, C and Bah, A (2005), The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 
Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey 
of current G8 and African activities and potential areas for further collaboration, 
London: Chatham House, p. 27. 
155 See Box  XX. 
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seen as necessary to achieve the first MDG of halving poverty by 2015.156 The 
Commission for Africa Report, the G8 and UN World Summit sought to raise 
Africa up the international political agenda. The EU, under the UK Presidency 
during the second half of 2005, played a significant role in boosting Africa’s 
international political profile. 
 
The then Secretary of State for Development, Hilary Benn, stressed the 
importance of delivering on commitments made to support Africa: “It is about 
political commitment, and I cannot remember in my life when the world and 
UK politics has talked more about Africa. The question now is how do we turn 
that commitment into practical expressions of support”.157 Jakkie Cilliers 
stressed that the EU’s ‘Strategy for Africa’ (the Strategy) should form the 
basis of a strategic partnership between Europe and Africa, and saw it as “an 
extremely welcome development”.158 
 
The geographic proximity of Africa and Europe has ensured a close 
relationship between the two continents for many centuries, even if this 
relationship has been highly volatile. Significant trade links between the two 
continents existed long before the systematic colonisation of Africa in the 19th 
century, and there has also been a history of the exchange of cultural ideas 
and developments. Colonialism imposed European dominance on Africa, but 
also cemented mutual relations between specific states, for instance in the 
                                            
156 Economic Commission for Africa (2005), Economic Report on Africa, p 25,.  
157 House of Lords (2005), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 49, 29 
November.  
158 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 122, 8 
February. 
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use of common languages such as English and French. State independence 
movements in the mid-20th century did not deter several Western European 
countries, such as Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, from maintaining 
close links with their former colonies. 
 
European trade and investment has remained highly significant to Africa. The 
EU is the main trading partner for almost all African countries.159 And the 
majority of investment in Africa originates from Europe, led by investors from 
France, the Netherlands and the UK. Along with South Africa and the United 
States, these countries account for more than 50% of inflows of foreign direct 
investment into Africa in 2004.160 Economic links imply that European 
governments and businesses have a direct interest in promoting sustainable 
development, not least in regard to investment in infrastructure and 
governance initiatives, which help to create a stable investment climate. 
 
But European interest in African development is not exclusively based on 
economics. There is increasing acknowledgement that Europe’s security 
interests linked closely related to those of its neighbours. For example, the EU 
Security Strategy asserts that Europe now faces threats which are diverse, 
hidden and unpredictable, including terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure 
and organised crime.161 
 
                                            
159 europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm 
160 World Investment Report 2005, United Nations, Overview, p 13. 
161 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy Council of the European 
Union, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
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Historical ties between Europe and Africa, combined with trade links and 
shared security interests, have encouraged a political preparedness to work 
together. The Strategy reflects this willingness. But the levels of aid donated 
by the EU Member States provides a more concrete demonstration: together, 
EU Member States provide around 55% of global overseas development 
assistance (ODA).162 This is noticeably larger than either the US or Japan, the 
next two largest contributors.163  
 
The role of the EU 
 
Although some European countries have longstanding relations with Africa, 
not all EU Member States agree that Africa is an external relations priority. 
EU-Africa relations have been fragmented, in terms both of policy formation 
and of implementation, and the Strategy seeks to tackle this fragmentation. 
 
The EU has established links with Africa through the Yaoundé Convention,164 
and through the Lomé Convention,165 as well as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership.166 Conventions dating back to 1963 established the framework 
for relations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states 
                                            
162 European Commission (2002), The Reform of the Management of the European 
Community’s External Assistance: An Overview, European Commission Report 
October 2002 p 2. 
163 European Commission (2002), The Reform of the Management of the European 
Community’s External Assistance: An Overview, European Commission Report 
October 2002 p 2. 
164 The first Yaoundé Convention between the Associated African and Malagasy States 
(AAMS) and the EEC of the six original Member States was signed in 1963. 
165 The first Lomé Convention between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the 
EC was signed in 1975. 
166 This agreement between north African and Middle East countries and the EU was signed in 
1995. 
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– since 2000 this framework has taken the form of the Cotonou 
Agreement).167 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was agreed in 1995 and 
lays out the political, economic and social relations between the EU and 
southern Mediterranean partners.  It relates to African countries north of the 
Sahara, as well as other Middle Eastern states.168 Both agreements 
incorporate trade and political dimensions, including promoting good 
governance. The potential for tension between the two frameworks, and the 
implications of this a complementary partnership between the EU and Africa, 
are considered in more detail below. The EU has, more recently, been 
developing links with African regional and continental organisations, notably 
the African Union.  
 
EU cooperation with other multilateral institutions169 
 
The United Nations 
 
The UN is the overarching multilateral organisation for promoting international 
peace and security, and the European Security Strategy seeks to strengthen 
the UN in order to equip it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively.170 
The EU contributes to the UN in two especially significant ways: first, together 
EU Member States pay 38% of the UN’s regular budget, 40% of its 
                                            
167 For the full text of the Agreement see:  
ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100 
168 The 10 non-EU members of the Partnership are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
169 EU cooperation with the G8 is examined in Chapter XX. 
170 Council of the European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World: European 
Security Strategy Council of the European Union, Brussels, 12 December. 
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peacekeeping budget and approximately 50% of voluntary contributions to 
UN funds and programmes;171 second, the EU is a key supporter of UN 
peacekeeping and crisis management capabilities.172  
 
The UN World Summit in September 2005 sought to develop an action plan 
for promoting international security and for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs – see Box 5). The World Summit Outcome 
Document (the Summit Outcome) reaffirmed the Member States’ commitment 
to addressing the special needs of Africa, including encouraging the initiatives 
of the African Union to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts.173 However, 
some observers complained that the Summit Outcome contained few concrete 
commitments of relevance to Africa, apart from the following: an agreement 
to establish a Peacebuilding Commission; recognition of the principle of the 
‘responsibility to protect’; and the reform of the Human Rights Commission.174 
All of these have potential to have a beneficial impact on conflict and 
instability in Africa.175  
 
Box 5 The Eight Millennium Development Goals 
 
                                            
171 House of Lords (2005-6), European Union Committee, 11th Report (HL 35),  paras 17-
18.  
172 House of Lords (2005-6), European Union Committee, 11th Report (HL 35),  paras 19-
21.  
173 United Nations (2005), General Assembly, 65th Session, resolutions adopted, paragraph 
68, published 24 October: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenEle
ment 
174 United Nations (2005), General Assembly, 60th Session, 2005 World Summit Outcome 
United Nations, 24 October 2005, A/Res/60/1. 
175 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006, p. 15. 
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1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women 
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental stability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development 
 
Box 6 Principal UN Agencies Working in Africa 
 
Specialised Agencies: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO); 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); World Health 
Organisation (WHO). 
 
Commissions: Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the High 
Commissioner; Commission for Sustainable Development; Commission for 
Population and Development; Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 
 
Programmes and Funds: Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); UN Development 
Programme (UNDP); UN Population Fund (UNFPA); Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); UN 
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Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT); World Food Programme 
(WFP). 
 
Institutions governing the global economy 
 
Although not of direct relevance to promoting African peace and security, 
Africa’s economic development is linked to continental stability and links 
between development and conflict are well established (see below). 
Institutions governing the global economy have a significant impact on African 
economic development. Endowments provided by the World Bank are 
important sources of income for many African states. World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules govern African states’ capacity to manage their 
imports and exports. And even the OECD is committed to promoting global 
market economies, which has an impact on Africa. The EU acts as a trading 
bloc in the WTO, with the potential to take Africa’s development needs into 
consideration when deciding its trade policies. The institutions governing the 
global economy are summarised in Box 8. 
 
Box 7 Institutions Governing the Global Economy 
 
The International Finance Institutions 
 
The IFIs are owned by Member States. They provide multilateral funding to 
support development projects and to help resolve difficulties caused by 
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international indebtedness. The most prominent are the ‘Bretton Woods’ 
institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. 
 
The IMF comprises 184 Member States. It was set up to promote 
international monetary cooperation, to encourage economic growth and to 
supply temporary financial assistance to help ease countries’ balance of 
payments adjustments.176 
 
The World Bank also comprises 184 Member States. It supplies low-interest 
loans, interest-free credit and grants to developing countries for education, 
health, infrastructure and other purposes.177 
 
Several regional banks support development in Africa. The African 
Development Bank provided US$53 billion between 1967 and 2004. On 19 
April 2006 it annonced that it had approved debt cancellation for 33 African 
countries equal to US$8.54 billion.178 
 
Export credit agencies (ECAs) are state-based public agencies, which provide 
loans, guarantees and credit to domestic private corporations to do business 
abroad, especially in the developing world. 
 
                                            
176 See the IMF website for more details: http://www.imf.org. 
177 See the World Bank website for more details: http://www.worldbank.org. 
178 See the African Development Bank website for details: http://www.afdb.org. 
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The World Trade Organisation 
 
The WTO controls international trade rules between countries. Its main stated 
aim is to remove trade barriers by using multilateral agreements.179 The Sixth 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held in Hong Kong in December 2005, 
stressed the importance of development in the on-going round of negotiations 
adopted at Doha, and so was of especial significance to African states. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
The OECD includes 30 member countries with a common commitment to 
democratic government and market economics. It works with 70 other 
countries and with civil society to promote good governance in the economy, 
public services and corporate activity. Its cooperation with non-members is 
mainly with transition and emerging economies, but includes some developing 
countries.180 
 
The Commission for Africa 
 
The Commission for Africa was launched in February 2004 by the then UK 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair. It comprised 17 Commissioners from the public 
and private sectors across Africa and Europe. The Commission’s Report was 
                                            
179 See the WTO website for more details: http://wto.org 
180 See the OECD website for more details: http://oecd.org. 
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published on 11 March 2005.181 The Commission for Africa Report covered 
key areas of governance, peace and security, investing in people, poverty 
reduction, trade and resources. It stressed the importance of the different 
areas being treated as a coherent package.182 Many of the report’s 
recommendations were adopted by the EU, the G8, which agreed to increase 
resources, and the UN, which secured further commitments from the 
international community, including on the creation of the Peacebuilding 
Commission.  
 
Building the EU-Africa Partnership 
 
Background to EU-Africa Relations 
 
The first EU-Africa Summit took place in Cairo in April 2000. This was the first 
time that Africa as a whole engaged in dialogue with the EU, and it sought to 
develop the regional groupings of the ACP and the Barcelona into a coherent, 
strategic, pan-African partnership. The EU portrayed this regional integration 
as a significant advance towards integrating Africa into the global economy. 
 
The Summit adopted the ‘Cairo Plan of Action’, which defined the key goals of 
Africa-EU dialogue as follows: 
 
• to strengthen political, economic and socio-cultural EU-Africa relations; 
                                            
181 Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa 2005.  
182 Commission for Africa Report, Executive Summary, p 13. 
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• to eradicate poverty and attain the Millennium Development Goals in 
Africa, as well as to implement commitments made in international 
conferences; and 
• to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Africa. 
 
A second Summit, originally due to be held in Lisbon in April 2003, was 
suspended indefinitely due to discord over the position of Zimbabwe. 
European Member States denied President Robert Mugabe entry into Europe 
on the basis of Zimbabwe’s human rights record, and urged African States to 
support their embargo. But African heads of state maintained their 
commitment to pan-African solidarity and insisted that all African states must 
be represented at the Summit. The conditions surrounding the holding of the 
second Summit in 2007 are examined later in this chapter.  
 
In 2003, the EC produced a Communication entitled ‘The EU-Africa Dialogue’, 
which explored options to continue the dialogue outside the EU-Africa Summit 
process.183 It described mechanisms for more flexible dialogue between Africa 
and Europe, outlining possible means for reinforcing institutional linkages 
between the EU and the AU as follows: 
 
• at senior official level; 
• in bi-regional working parties; 
                                            
183 European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council: The 
EU-Africa dialogue, [COM(2003) 316 final], http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0316en01.pdf 
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• between the AU and the EU Heads of Mission based in Addis Ababa; 
• between the Brussels-based African Heads of Mission; and 
• between the AU/EU Commissions. 
 
The Communication acknowledged the problems associated with different 
agreements between the EU and the various parts of Africa, for instance 
Cotonou and the Barcelona process, in particular hampering European 
responses to pan-African or regional initiatives. It agreed that Europe should 
“consider practical measures that would build bridges between the different 
agreements”.184  
 
Two Ministerial Troika meetings preceded the EU-Africa Dialogue, in October 
2001 and December 200,185 both of which assumed a second EU-Africa 
Summit in Lisbon in 2003. Subsequent troika meetings reiterated the need for 
a solution to the Zimbabwe problem, but for several years avoided relying on 
a second Summit taking place, instead focusing on substantive issues such as 
peace and security, governance, regional integration and development.186 
                                            
184 European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council: The 
EU-Africa dialogue [COM(2003) 316 final], Section Two: Treating Africa as One, 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0316en01.pdf  
185 Council of the European Union (2001)m, Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial 
Conference, 11 October, 12762/01; Final Communiqué: Africa-Europe Ministerial 
Meeting 28 November 2002, Ouagadougou. For both the EU and the AU, the Troika is 
a body comprising the President of the Commission, the President of the Council and 
a high-ranking member of the Secretariat (in the EU’s case this is Javier Solana, the 
High Representative for the CFSP). 
186 Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Dialogue Ministerial Troika Meeting 10 November 2003, 
Rome; Communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial 1 April 2004, Dublin; Communiqué: 
Africa-Europe Dialogue 4 December 2004, Addis Ababa; European Union-Africa Union 
Ministerial Meeting Final Communiqué 11 April 2005, Luxembourg; links to these 
documents can be found at:  
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/oauintl.htm The latest two meetings 
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The Ministerial Troika meetings were the highest level of dialogue between 
the EU and the AU until the Second Summit, but there has also been a 
significant level of cooperation at lower levels, as envisaged in the 
Commission’s earlier Communication. The Commission itself has been the 
leading proponent of this cooperation holding regular meetings with 
counterparts within the AU Commission, at the level of both Commissioners 
themselves and officials.187 Tim Cole, former Head of the Pan Africa Policy 
Unit FCO, believed that “an interesting synergy” had arisen between the two 
Commissions regarding the developmental support which each was giving to 
the other.188 Informal discussions with the UK Permanent Representation in 
Brussels confirmed the significance of the relationship between the two.189  
 
Dialogue at all levels has sought to ensure that EU policy towards Africa has 
been developed in consultation with Africans, particularly with the AU. This 
has been intended to enhance European understanding of the challenges 
facing Africa, and to increase African awareness of the support which the EU 
is able to offer. However, James Mackie of the European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECPDM), suggested that the Commission-
to-Commission dialogue has been by far the most effective, adding that there 
                                            
were: Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting 2 December 2005, Bamako; and 
Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting 8 May 2006, Vienna, Council 
of the European Union 9333/06. 
187 Representatives of the Commission confirmed this during informal discussions in Brussels, 
March 2006. 
188 House of Lords (2004), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 1, 29 
April. 
189 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006 p. 22. 
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remained room for improvement in communication between the two 
Parliaments, and amongst civil society.190  
 
The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement) 
 
The Cotonou Agreement stresses the significance of political dialogue, of 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, of respect for human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law, of good governance, and of a 
participatory approach to ensure the involvement of civil society and links 
between ACP and EU actors. Dialogue under the Agreement takes place 
principally through the ACP Summits, which are the highest organ of the ACP 
Group’s institutional structure and are responsible for defining the ACP’s 
primary policy guidelines instructing the Council of Ministers on their 
implementation. Summits are held annually, each hosted by a different 
member country. 
 
Cotonou provides for three joint institutions for EU-ACP cooperation. First, the 
Council of Ministers which meets annually and is responsible for initiating 
political dialogue, adopting political guidelines and taking decisions required 
for the implementation of the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. Second, 
the Committee of Ambassadors which comprises a permanent representative 
of each EU Member State, a Commission representative and a head of mission 
                                            
190 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 77, 2 
February. 
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for each ACP state and is designed to assist the Council of Ministers. Third, 
the Joint Parliamentary Assembly which acts in an advisory capacity. 
 
Developing the Strategy for Africa 
 
In June 2005, the European Council called on the Council of Ministers to 
create a long-term global strategy for Africa. This was to derive from the UN 
World Summit Outcome commitments, and was intended to be adopted by 
the European Council in December 2005.191 The Council embraced “the 
increase in dialogue and cooperation between the EU and all the African 
Countries, made possible by the affirmation of the African Union (AU) as the 
political framework able to put forwards African responses to the challenges 
of development,” and sought “to continue supporting the development of the 
African continent in compliance with the principles of equality and African 
ownership”.192  
 
The Commission then produced a Communication entitled ‘EU Strategy for 
Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development’.193 
This prioritised Africa’s development needs, focusing on the MDGs. But it 
acknowledged peace and security, as well as good and effective governance, 
as a pre-requisites for achieving the MDGs. 
                                            
191 Council of the European Union (2005), Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16–17 June, 
10255/1/05, para 75. 
192 Council of the European Union (2005), Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16–17 June, 
10255/1/05, paras 70 and 74. 
193 European Commission (2005), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, SEC (2005) 
1255 
 122
 
The Commission considered three approaches for coordinating EU policies 
within the EU-Africa strategy: 
 
1. Retaining the existing approach, where individual Member States and the 
Commission develop and implement their own policies and strategies 
towards all African sectors, countries and organisations.  
2. Adopting a centralised policy, which would need common guidelines for all 
EU Member States and the Commission in all areas; and 
3. a balanced approach between a total integration of aid policies and the 
absence of strategic coordination. 
 
The Commission considered that the third option would yield the most 
positive results in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and consistency: the first 
approach implied that the EU-Africa policy would remain fragmented or create 
duplications; the second approach risked failing to reach unanimous 
agreement in such detail for all sectors concerned, and losing specific value 
added to the process by key players in specific sectors or regions. 
 
Following on from the Commission Communication, the High Representative 
for the CFSP, Javier Solana, produced a paper focusing on the peace and 
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security aspects of the global strategy for Africa, highlighting the contribution 
that the EU’s CFSP and ESDP could make.194 
 
In November 2005, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) concluded that a comprehensive Strategy “encompassing security, 
development and human rights which covers all African countries” should be 
presented to the December European Council.195 It detailed the commitments 
to be found in the eventual Strategy, categorising them under the following: 
headings peace and security; human rights; governance; economic growth 
and regional integration and trade; environment; development assistance; 
investing in people; migration; and follow-up.  
 
In the second half of 2005, the UK held the EU Presidency and so was tasked 
with preparing the eventual Strategy. During this preparation period, the then  
UK Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, argued that 
the Strategy was: 
 
“based on some very important principles: playing to the strengths of 
individual Member States, recognising that the Commission has got 
things that it does particularly well, but what it does in individual 
                                            
194 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006 p. 30. 
195 General Affairs and External Relations Council (2005), Council Conclusions, Brussels 22 
November, Council of the European Union 14172/05. 
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countries is going to depend on circumstances so there needs to be 
flexibility”.196 
 
Developing the joint implementation matrix 
 
On 2 December 2005, the fifth Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU 
Troïkas met in Bamako. Ministers attending the meeting welcomed the draft 
EU Strategy for Africa and agreed to develop an action plan for its 
implantation. Senior European officials were mandated to submit 
recommendations for such an action plan to the next Ministerial Troika.197 
African officials also presented a monitoring matrix for overseeing the 
dialogue, and it was further agreed to look into developing a joint matrix at 
the next meeting.  
 
Following the adoption of the EU Strategy at the December 2005 European 
Council, a Joint Implementation Matrix of Commitments arising from the 
Africa-EU dialogue was presented to an AU-EU experts’ meeting in Addis 
Ababa on 13-14 February 2006. The Matrix covers issues of peace and 
security, governance, trade and integration and key development issues. It 
takes a tabular form, assessing what efforts the AU and EU have made to 
implement commitments and what progress has been made, and identifying 
ways forward.  
                                            
196 House of Lords (2005), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 48, 29 
November. 
197 Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial meeting, Bamako (Mali), 2 December 2005, 
http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5420_en.htm 
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According to Bob Dewar, the Matrix reflects the new, joint way that Africa and 
the EU are trying to work together. The Matrix is detailed in terms of specific 
actions to achieve implementation, and it represents the first time 
commitments by both Africa and the EU have been laid out together, rather 
than having separate EU and African programmes for action. It was 
negotiated between the Troikas in Addis Ababa, as well as through the wider 
Brussels machinery.198  
 
The joint implementation matrix was endorsed at the EU-African Troika 
meeting in Vienna on 8 May.199 The Strategy committed the EU to "review 
progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and 
at least every two years thereafter". It pledged that Ministers of EU Member 
States "will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and 
monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed 
jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat".200 Representatives of the 
Belgian government stated their preference for an annual review as a much 
better framework for ensuring effective implementation.201 The joint 
implementation matrix could also be used as a framework for developing a 
schedule for implementation, to specify precisely who is doing what in the EU 
                                            
198 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 355, 30 
March. 
199 Council of the European Union (2006), Final Communiqué: EU-Africa Ministerial Troika 
Meeting, 8 May, Vienna, 9333/06. 
200 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 9(a).  
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in terms of implementing the Strategy, and when the work of the different 
bodies and institutions will be delivered.202  
 
The meeting in Vienna on 8 May requested that the Troika Ambassadors 
present progress reports on the matrix at the bi-annual Troika meetings, with 
their first meeting on the matrix scheduled for June 2006. The EU further 
committed itself to incorporate into the matrix information on EU Member 
States' bilateral aid activities at pan-African level. Observers suggested that 
this would help to determine how bilateral aid can be used to fulfil the 
commitments made in the EU Strategy, and to help present a clearer view of 
the overall funding situation.203 
 
The EU’s capacity to deliver 
 
This section assesses the EU’s capacity to deliver on the commitments it has 
made to support African peace and security. It focuses primarily on 
coordination and coherence, reviewing the following issues: policy coherence 
for development; institutional divisions within the EU and the Commission; the 
Commission’s external representation; the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat; coordination with – and between – Member States; regulatory 
and financial divisions; the different cooperation agreements; and the 
financing structure. 
                                            
202 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006 p. 32. 
203 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
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The EU is an intergovernmental organisation in which the European 
Community institutions and the Member States convene together. The EU’s 
Strategy for Africa requires action to be taken by the Commission, the Council 
and the Member States individually. Although there are constitutional and 
practical limits to what each of these institutions can achieve, it is evident that 
a significant degree of coordination is necessary for the goals of the Strategy 
to be achieved. This section examines tensions within the Strategy, and 
between actors that are tasked with implementing it.  
 
Policy Coherence 
 
The Strategy for Africa is based on the concept that its various components 
will converge to promote sustainable development. Peace and security, 
governance and human rights are advocated as desirable in themselves. But 
they are also promoted as the basis for building a stable economy. For 
instance, the Strategy asserts that the EU will enhance support for post 
conflict reconstruction as a means of securing enduring stability and 
development. But the question nevertheless remains: behind the rhetoric, are 
EU policies genuinely coherent? 
 
On paper, the Strategy appears to be a valuable example of an attempt by 
the EU to coordinate its various policies in development, security and 
economic growth, in order to achieve the MDGs. However, critics suggest that 
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it fails to specify how this level of coherence will actually come about in 
practice.204 
 
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) commits the EU to ensuring that its 
external activities are coherent.205 In the run up to the UN World Summit in 
September 2005, the European Commission delivered a Communication 
spelling out how it intended to ensure policy coherence for development.206 
On 24 May 2006, the Council welcomed the Communication and agreed to 
take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all of its policies 
that are might affect developing countries.207  
 
Institutional Divisions within the EU 
 
It is not always clear who is responsible for the implementation of particular 
EU policies. And the Strategy for Africa does not specify the means by which 
its aims should be achieved. Action needs to be taken by the Commission, the 
Council and individual Member States. The following section examines how 
capable these various institutions are of implementing the Strategy, in view of 
both internal divisions, and of the complex relations between them. 
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Two Directorates-General within the Commission hold primary responsibility 
for implementing the EU Strategy for Africa. DG Development, headed by 
Commissioner Louis Michel, has responsibility for the sections of the Strategy 
related to development assistance and humanitarian aid. DG External 
Relations (RELEX), under Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has a 
broader responsibility for the external relations components of the Strategy. 
The division is effectively geographical: DG Development retains responsibility 
for sub-Saharan (ACP) countries; RELEX retains responsibility for the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with countries north of the 
Sahara.  
 
Some themes cross DGs within the Strategy, thereby making policy coherence 
even more difficult. Although a major theme of the Strategy is governance, it 
lacks detail as to what the EU is trying to promote in terms of good 
governance. Without coordinating mechanisms between the different DGs, 
countries north and south of the Sahara may be required to prioritise different 
reforms. Consultation with African partners could help to minimise this. The 
EU could ensure that basic governance reforms are applied throughout Africa 
by agreeing standards with the AU and with NEPAD.208 A range of 
mechanisms have been developed by the Commission to promote policy 
coherence.209  
 
                                            
208 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006 p. 33. 
209 The Inter-Service Quality Support Group, country teams, policy coherence working groups, 
and impact assessment process. 
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The EU’s Strategy for Africa demands significant cooperation between the 
Commission and the Council – including both the Member States and the 
Secretariat. There is significant scepticism about the relationship between the 
two.210 The Council Secretariat is headed by the High Representative, Javier 
Solana, and has responsibility for implementing parts of the Strategy relating 
to the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As a result, peace and security is largely 
overseen by the Member States. But it is not clear where responsibility lies for 
some other parts of the Strategy, such as governance, as both the 
Commission and the Council have competence and will be able to act under 
the Strategy.  
 
The Joint Implementation Matrix could be a useful forum for clarifying the 
division of responsibilities for implementing the Strategy. It could specify in 
relation to each commitment who exactly within the EU is responsible for its 
implementation, and where there is joint responsibility between the 
Commission and the Council, it could elaborate details as to what action each 
institution will take.211 
 
Coordination with and between Member States 
 
                                            
210 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership: written 
evidence, pp 152, 157. 
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There is potential for significant division between the Commission and the 
Member States. Many of the Strategy's headings incorporate considerable 
scope for contradictory actions to be taken by the EU institutions and the 
Member States. For example, peacekeeping missions fall under the ESDP, but 
they could continue to be organised unilaterally by countries such as France 
and the UK. 
 
Member States have individual policies on development and foreign affairs. 
Some Member States have special relationships with specific African 
countries, which can lead to preferential policies with examples of poor 
governance, and even human rights abuses, being overlooked. Agreeing the 
Strategy implied a political ‘buy-in’ to it by the Member States. But some 
states have a much greater involvement in Africa than others. The UK and 
France, in particular, are seen as being "key Member States" in playing an 
active role in Africa.212 
 
Regulatory and Financial Divisions 
 
Although setting a common vision for the whole of Africa, the Strategy does 
not directly address the institutional and financial mechanisms which remain 
in their existing form. Will these mechanisms prevent the pan-African 
dimension of the Strategy being realised? 
 
                                            
212 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 85, 2 
February. 
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The Different Cooperation Agreements 
 
Relations between the EU and African countries are regulated by either the 
Cotonou Agreement (sub-Saharan Africa), the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA – South Africa) or the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy (North African countries). 
The existence of these different agreements poses a number of challenges. 
First, they all have different sources of funding, which makes it hard to 
determine where funding will come from for the Strategy as a whole. Second, 
the agreements establish different dialogue partners. This reduces the 
probability of achieving a coherent view from African states on the continent's 
needs. Third, the agreements are aimed at regions with differing levels of 
economic development and with different priorities. This is not necessarily a 
significant problem in itself, as it would be important to tailor policy towards 
different countries and regions within Africa whether these agreements 
existed or not. And the policy areas of the different cooperation agreements 
are similar. Sustainable economic growth, human rights and democracy are 
prioritised in all three agreements, and these same themes are found within 
the Strategy for Africa.  
 
But perhaps the biggest challenge posed by the Cotonou Agreement and 
Euro-Med Partnership/ENP is that they include non-African states. Middle East 
states within Euro-Med have security concerns which focus on that particular 
region. And states within the ACP group are unified by their desire to promote 
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policy coherence for development; it has a combined negotiating power which 
would be reduced were Brussels to begin to treat the six regions within it as 
separate elements. Given the Strategy's emphasis on listening to African 
partners, observers have suggested that African members of the Euro-Med 
and ACP Partnerships should decide whether those agreements need to be 
revised in order to promote an effective EU-Africa partnership.213 
 
The Financing Structure 
 
Since both the Strategy for Africa and the EU’s Future Financial Perspectives 
were both agreed at the December 2005 European Council, it is not surprising 
that the Strategy contains little in the way of specific financial commitments, 
since it was not when it was being drafted where the necessary funds would 
be found.  
 
As is discussed in more detail below, the Africa-EU strategic Partnership, 
agreed at the second EU-Africa Summit in 2007, attempted to be more 
specific, listing a number of sources of funding under various priority areas for 
action. For instance, Peace and Security Priority 1, to “Enhance dialogue on 
challenges to peace and security”, promises to source funding from the 
following:  
 
• AU Peace Fund;  
                                            
213 House of Lords (2006), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, European 
Union Committee, 34th Report of Session 2005–06, July 2006 p. 39. 
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• Appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope 
and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity 
and eligibility criteria, such as 10th EDF, Africa Peace Facility (APF), the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), Instrument for Stability (IfS), CFSP-Budget;  
• Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African states.  
 
This is a potentially useful development. However, there is no mention of how 
much each source is expected to contribute, nor which funding body will 
finance each particular activity under the relevant heading, such as “[raising] 
awareness through campaigning involving African and European NGOs on 
mainstreaming human rights, gender issues, and children affected by armed 
conflict”.214 This lack of clarity still demonstrates uncertainty about the extent 
to which the EU is really prepared to deliver on the commitments made in the 
Strategy.  
 
The EU has made significant commitments of aid to Africa, and there should 
be sufficient funding available for implementation of the Strategy. Yet it would 
appear that even the Joint Implementation Matrix agreed at the 5 May 2006 
ministerial Troika meeting did not allocate these funds. This section examines 
where the money to implement the Strategy will come from.  
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The European Development Fund (EDF) is seen by many as the main source 
of funding for the Strategy for Africa.215 The European Development Fund 
(EDF) is the primary financing instrument of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. 
It exists outside the main EU budget.216 Member States fund it through direct 
contributions, and they make all substantive decisions as to the overall 
amount of the EDFs, timeframes etc. The EDF is managed by the European 
Commission on behalf of the Member States, subject to provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement which sets out the roles, responsibilities and 
implementation procedures which the EU and ACP must adhere to. The 10th 
EDF was agreed for 2008-2013 with an allocation of €22.682 billion. Germany, 
France and the UK are the largest shareholders, providing 20.5%, 19.5% and 
14.82% of the total, respectively. The Africa Peace facility is financed through 
the EDF. 
 
Financing the Strategy from the EDF risks undermining the Strategy’s pan-
African approach. In particular, it is questionable why dialogue initiatives and 
capacity-building for the African Union should come exclusively from the EDF, 
when additional instruments are available to the EU for financing of external 
relations.217  
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The MEDA programme is the principal source of funding for the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Between 1995 to 2003, MEDA committed €5,458 
million in cooperation programmes, projects and other supporting activities, 
with the regional activities making up approximately 15% of this budget.218 
The other significant financial instrument is the European Investment Bank, 
which has lent €14 billion for developing activities in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partners since 1974. Apart from these specific funds, several other financial 
instruments exist which the Commission can use in relation to Africa. Some of 
these, such as MEDA, are geographical, while others are thematic, including 
spending on humanitarian relief, crisis management and development.219  
 
As part of the new Financial Perspectives, the Commission suggested a series 
of six new financial instruments to simplify the budget funding structure.220 
These were designed in part to establish a clearer distinction between the 
political and security policies included within the ENPI and the stability 
instrument, and development policy located within the Development 
Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument. But there is still a clear 
developmental component to the neighbourhood policy which will be financed 
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through the ENPI and which will apply to a number of African countries. The 
Commission’s new simplified structure would not, therefore, allow for 
oversight of development funding within the EC budget through one single 
instrument. Commentators suggest that this places a considerable emphasis 
on the need for transparency.221 
 
In addition to the budget for external relations, funding is also allocated to 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to which Member States 
contribute according to a specific formula. CFSP funding is used especially for 
civilian and military missions under the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). These are becoming increasingly significant in Africa. According to 
the Athena funding mechanism, Member States pay their own costs for any 
personnel whom they contribute.222 The Athena mechanism was set up in 
2004 to administer the common costs for military operations. 
 
The CFSP budget is comparatively small. There is considerable demand for it 
to be spent on strategically significant regions such as the Western Balkans, 
limiting the extent to which it can be spent on African programmes. 
Furthermore, CFSP decisions are taken by the Council individually, and so 
there is limited scope for their inclusion within the Joint Implementation 
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Matrix, which requires those consulting with African partners to decide upon 
future commitments.  
 
The last, but perhaps most significant, source of funding for the Strategy will 
be through bilateral development assistance provided by the Member States. 
It is beyond the competence of the Commission to commit Member States’ 
funds, and Member State funding does not have to cohere with EC funding. It 
is also not clear how individual Member State funding could be used for pan-
African initiatives such as building the capacity of the African Standby Force 
(APF).223 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU’s relationship with Africa and the AU is longstanding and 
comprehensive. Today, both Brussels and Addis Ababa largely understand the 
partnership as being mutually beneficial, are broadly keen to extend and 
deepen it, through such mechanisms as the EU Strategy for Africa and its 
more recent evolution, the Africa-EU Partnership. The Strategy provides a 
useful political commitment by the EU to consolidate its relationship with 
Africa.  
 
There are some existing structural issues that undermine smooth relations. 
Poor internal European coordination remains a serious stumbling block across 
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a range of areas, which has not been addressed effectively to date. The fact 
that Brussels sees Africa as administratively separate north and south of the 
Sahara continues to be problematic, especially when the Strategy is a plan 
“for the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa”.224 Moreover, internal EU 
relationships – between the Commission, the Council and the Member States, 
and within all three of these bodies – often overlap and compete. 
                                            
224 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels 19 December, 15961/05, para 1.  
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5 EU Support for African Peacekeeping 
 
Chapter 5 looks at EU support for African peace and security capability, in 
particular peacekeeping and civilian protection. The first section looks at EU 
support for the promotion of good governance and human rights, including 
through Cotonou, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Governance 
Initiative, and EU monitoring missions. Section two reviews EU operational 
involvement in Africa. It examines various mechanisms that the EU uses to 
promote peace and security on the continent, including within the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Common Position concerning conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in Africa. This section then explores 
the potential role of EU Battlegroups as the EU’s primary operational arm for 
supporting peacekeeping in Africa, as well as EU coordination with other 
organisations. Finally, this section examines EU actions in practice in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in order to contextualise EU 
operational activity within an applied analytical framework. 
 
The third section of this chapter then examines the African Peace Facility, the 
primary EU tool for supporting African peace and security and peacekeeping. 
It explores EU perspectives on capacity-building for the African Standby Force 
(ASF), as well as EU conflict prevention activities, post-conflict activities, and 
EU efforts to support the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Lastly, this section 
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outlines EU perspectives on potential tensions between direct operational 
support and capacity-building. 
 
The fourth and final section of this chapter assesses the effectiveness of 
efforts to realise the EU-Africa Partnership in practice. This evaluation 
includes: initiatives to create a broad-based dialogue; the role of African 
governments and institutions, and African Civil society; the AU’s capacity to 
deliver; the EU’s capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa; the significance of 
the second EU-Africa Summit; and the development of a joint EU-Africa 
strategy. 
 
Human rights and governance 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa commits the EU to: "Work with the African Union 
(AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and 
mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the 
peace in their own continent."225  
 
More specifically, the Strategy commits the EU to: 
 
• promote and protect human rights, to help to end impunity, including 
through the International Criminal Court, and to promote fundamental 
                                            
225 Council of the European Union (2005), EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 
(15961/05), 19 December, para 4 (a), http://europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_5499_en.htm 
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freedoms and respect for the rule of law, including through capacity-
building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil 
society organisations; 
• support good governance programmes at country level and to help build 
the capacity of the AU and RECs in this regard; 
• enhance African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including 
through support for NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); and 
• support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and 
organised crime and promote transparency.226 
 
The promotion of good governance is primarily the responsibility of African 
states. However, African institutions such as the AU, NEPAD and the RECs 
have an important role in assisting and overseeing this process, and the EU is 
well placed to provide support at national, sub-regional and continental levels. 
 
The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance has been 
one of the eight priority themes of the EU-Africa dialogue, which has 
supported relevant African institutions, such as the emerging African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the establishment of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Much of the EU's assistance for 
enhancing African governance capacity has taken place within the context of 
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the APRM, while European initiatives in this area have been supported by the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDH).227 
 
Human rights 
 
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of 
law. The EU Strategy for Africa pledges: to promote and protect human 
rights, including the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups; 
to help end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court; and 
to promote fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law in Africa, 
including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human 
Rights Commissions and civil society organisations.228 
 
A number of African institutions directly related to the promotion of human 
rights are in various stages of formation, such as the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the AU Court of Justice. In July 2004, the AU 
Assembly decided that these two institutions should be integrated into one 
Court.229 
 
                                            
227 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Website:  
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228 Council of the European Union (2005), EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, 
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The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been operational 
since the 1980s and has recently shown some encouraging developments. 
The Commission is mandated to ensure the promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights throughout the African continent. It comprises 
eleven members elected by the AU Assembly for six-year renewable terms. It 
is headquartered in Banjul, the Gambia. 
 
On 5 December 2005, at its 38th session, the Commission adopted resolution 
condemning the human rights situation in and calling on the government of 
Zimbabwe to act urgently to improve the situation. At its Khartoum Summit in 
January 2006, the AU failed to endorse the resolution, but gave Zimbabwe 
three months to respond. 
 
The issue of human rights is highly sensitive in Africa, and African responses 
to gross abuses of human rights still tend to be more ‘behind the scenes’ than 
overt. The African preference not to make public denunciations in relation to 
gross human rights abuses has had decidedly mixed results. The failure to 
reach consensus within the AU over the situation in Zimbabwe is very 
challenging for the continent, as reflected and in the fact that the AU’s weak 
response lay at the heart of complications to agree a second EU-Africa 
Summit. 
 
On the other hand, the Commission’s response to the situation in Zimbabwe is 
more hopeful because – despite the initially half-hearted reaction from Addis 
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Ababa – the Commission does have buy-in from the AU and has 
demonstrated the robustness to issue a harsh declaration against Harare that 
more central mechanisms of the AU have so far not been able to do.230 
 
Governance 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa pledges to support good governance programmes 
in Africa at state level and to help build the capacity of the AU, sub-regional 
and national institutions.231 
 
The promotion of good governance is seen as a key factor in achieving 
progress in development in Africa, and many AU Member States face severe 
governance challenges. Alex Vines, Head of the Africa Programme for 
Chatham House, asserted that governance remains at the heart of many 
problems in Africa, and he described the ‘governance deficit’ as a challenge 
that remains a consistent theme on the continent. Alex Vines stated that the 
establishment of accountable, better managed government structures would 
have a significant impact on poverty alleviation, and he stressed that the EU 
can make a significant difference in this area.232  
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At the same time, Africa has taken significant strides to improve governance, 
as a number of powerful African leaders have championed good governance 
as a key continental policy objective. The European Commission’s October 
2003 Communication on governance and development further acknowledged 
the significance of the contribution of new African institutions, in particular 
the AU and NEPAD.233 
 
Defining good governance 
 
There are a number of fundamental conceptual and practical problems 
hampering efforts to improve governance in Africa. In the first instance, there 
is a lack of consensus over a definition of what it specifically involves. For 
instance, major differences exist in approaches to governance between Africa 
and Europe. Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies in 
South Africa, stated that Africans tend to focus on the need to build capacity 
to be able to take the governance and human rights agenda forward, whereas 
Europeans see progress on good governance, human rights and democracy 
as prerequisites for development.234 
 
Alex Vines considered that ‘[t]here is no African view on good governance’, 
stating that some African countries have a similar understanding to the UK’s 
view of what might constitute good governance, whereas for others, support 
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for good governance is largely symbolic, used primarily for the benefit of 
donors.235 
 
The lack of a clear, internationally agreed, definition of good governance 
complicates how the EU could, in practice, determine criteria for conditionality 
based on governance that would be broadly recognised and accepted. 
Cotonou provides clarification of the essence of good governance, describing 
it as  
 
“the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, 
economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and 
sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at 
the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, 
the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources 
and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures 
aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption”.236 
 
Nick Grono, Vice-President for Advocacy and Operations, International Crisis 
Group, pointed out that many African states such as South Africa already 
have excellent records on governance, while NEPAD outlines a clear 
understanding of governance standards that African countries should be 
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aiming for. They also emphasised practical problems in implementing 
governance reforms in Africa as the fundamental challenge.237 
 
African and European consensus on what constitutes good governance, within 
the context of a broader international understanding, would facilitate 
initiatives to enhance governance in Africa. 
 
African Peer Review Mechanism 
 
International efforts to support the promotion of good governance in Africa 
have, in recent years, focused on supporting the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM). The EU Strategy for Africa, for instance, commits EU 
Member States to enhance “African efforts to monitor and improve 
governance, including through supporting the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD)’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)”.238 
 
The APRM provides a mechanism through which the AU can take 
responsibility for coordinating support for good governance and, as such, 
provides a key institutional mechanism to promote African-owned dialogue on 
issues of governance and human rights at the pan-African level. 
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The APRM was agreed at the 8 July 2002 OAU Summit in Durban, South 
Africa239 and is open to all AU Member States. Membership is voluntary and is 
contingent upon signing up to the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance,240 as well as on agreement to 
participate in periodic peer reviews. Members of the APRM further concede to 
follow agreed parameters for good governance. 
 
Both NEPAD and the APRM set high standards for African states to aspire to, 
and peer example by influential African reformist leaders is an important 
African-led model for progress in governance in Africa. 
 
The significance of the APRM was highlighted by Myles Wickstead, Former 
Head of the Secretariat for the Commission for Africa, who anticipated that 
the international community would increasingly support those countries 
participating in the APRM that either receive a clean bill of health or are 
determined to take action to remedy identified challenges.241 
 
A key challenge as the APRM process develops relates to the practical 
implementation of its ideals. Implementation of reforms recommended by the 
APRM serve as an important indicator of African states’ commitment to good 
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governance. This is particularly relevant to EU support for the APRM, as 
European development assistance for Africa is based on principles of 
partnership and trust.242 
 
Representatives of the Belgian government supported this view, urging that 
the EU encourage the APRM process through the provision of programmes 
and support for countries participating in the APRM process, both as part of 
the reporting process and in terms of support for the implementation of 
recommendations made.243 
 
Referring to implementation challenges, however, Jakkie Cillers conceded the 
difficulties for the APRM in delivering tangible results, but downplayed the 
significance of implementation, highlighting rather the ‘subtext’ of the APRM 
as symbolic of a genuine African commitment to promoting good governance 
on the continent.244 
 
A positive indication of the practicability of the APRM as a mechanism to 
promote good governance in Africa has been the release of its first two peer 
review reports, relating to Ghana and Rwanda. Also, twenty-six countries had 
signed up to the APRM as at May 2007. The fact that the APRM is supported 
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by powerful African leaders is also a significant indication of its potential to 
play a positive governance role. 
 
However, obstacles to the successful establishment of the APRM should not 
be underestimated. Many African countries face very severe governance 
problems, in a number of cases exacerbated by instability, which presents a 
very heavy workload for the APRM. At the same time, the APRM is a new 
institution which is still finding its way, and also is severely lacking in 
resources. 
 
Another major challenge for the APRM is the fact that the governance issues 
that it seeks to address remain highly politically sensitive in Africa, and, 
despite the support that it enjoys from influential African leaders, a significant 
number of African countries remain extremely wary of allowing the APRM to 
become too powerful. Garnering support from AU Member States for the 
promotion of good governance as part of the AU’s mandate, where the AU 
can hold Member States to account for their actions within the APRM 
framework, remains a serious challenge and requires considerable support 
from Europe. 
 
Participation in the APRM is voluntary, which developed at least in part from a 
need to balance the political sensitivity of peer review with Africans’ genuine 
desire to improve governance. Questions emerging from the voluntary basis 
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of the APRM illustrate tensions between its potential effectiveness and the 
challenges that confront it. 
 
The voluntary basis of participation in the APRM is key to its effectiveness. In 
practical terms, many observers have stressed that the fact that African 
governments are free to decide whether or not to join the APRM was the first 
guarantee of their willingness to cooperate with the review process.245  
 
A particular challenge relates to EU support for the APRM. On the one hand, 
tying European aid too directly to African participation in the APRM risks 
undermining African ownership of an indigenous African process. This would 
weaken its credibility and encourage dissension from those African countries 
that are opposed to the APRM process as being too intrusive. It would also 
help to persuade African states to join the APRM primarily as a means to 
receive aid, with little or no genuine commitment to the review process. 
 
At the same time, European states have a responsibility to ensure that their 
taxpayers’ money is used to promote good governance in African countries 
and is not abused. Therefore, EU seeks to establish its engagement with the 
APRM on the basis of partnership and mutual accountability, where EU 
assistance is made available to support African states’ own programmes to 
promote good governance through the APRM within EU principles, or is held 
back for states that are not fulfilling their obligations. 
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Cotonou and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
Existing European processes for engagement in Africa provide useful 
frameworks for European support for the promotion of good governance, 
primarily the Cotonou Agreement the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
 
The Cotonou Agreement commits states parties to engage in political 
dialogue, including regular assessments, in particular through the framework 
of the ‘essential elements’ and ‘fundamental elements’ of the Agreement. 
Essential elements relate to issues of human rights and the rule of law. In a 
concession to ACP countries' opposition to the incorporation of good 
governance as an essential element, it was deemed a ‘fundamental’ element. 
The distinction between fundamental and essential is significant in that the 
latter's violation could lead to the suspension of cooperation, whilst the 
former cannot. However, the real value of the essential and fundamental 
elements is in providing a framework for dialogue and cooperation on these 
issues.  
 
The vague position of governance within Cotonou provides a potential source 
of confusion. Although dialogue is important, corrective measures (including 
sanctions as a last resort) can more effectively be applied under the terms of 
the essential elements. Furthermore, the EU’s record in promoting governance 
is not yet established, and EU Member States have not always found it easy 
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to reach agreement on specific cases, given differences of practice, of 
principles and of geo-strategic interest.  
 
The ENP builds on the Barcelona Process. It was developed in the context of 
the enlargement of the EU in 2004, within the policy framework of a 
privileged relationship between the EU and its neighbours, and the 
development of a mutual commitment to common values of democracy and 
human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and 
sustainable development. 
 
The ENP seeks to strengthen political dialogue between partners to make the 
relationship more effective. Issues for enhanced dialogue will be identified in 
bilateral Action Plans agreed between the EU and partner countries which set 
out an agenda for political and economic reforms. A 24 November 2005 
progress report on the ENP further suggested the establishment for the first 
time of sub-committees to launch regular discussions on democracy, human 
rights and governance.246 The EC has also established a Governance Facility 
as an instrument within the ENP framework specifically to encourage progress 
on governance reform. 
 
Major differences between African states’ governance records and approaches 
represent a serious challenge for efforts to support good governance in Africa 
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and require a case-by-case approach. Alex Vines cited the scale of variability 
of conception and capacity of governance across north African countries as a 
major weakness undermining the effectiveness of the ENP, which has tended 
to assume a commonality which does not, in fact, exist.247 
 
EU Governance Initiative 
 
Ministers attending the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in Bamako, Mali on 2 
December 2005 endorsed the proposal for an EU Governance Initiative aimed 
at supporting the reforms triggered by the APRM process. The EU Strategy for 
Africa committed Member States to support the Governance Initiative. 
 
EU Monitoring Missions in Africa 
 
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union clearly states that the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are 
fundamental European values. 
 
Support for election processes has become a key component of the EU’s 
external relations policy. The EU is in a strong position to contribute to 
election monitoring through its global outreach. 
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In 2005, the EU Election Monitoring Missions (EOMs) were deployed to a 
number of African countries, including Guinea Bissau, Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 
The role of the AU in promoting governance 
 
The AU is an essential enabling mechanism for revitalising governance in 
Africa, and it has made a number of constitutional commitments to promote 
good governance on the continent. Implementation instruments in this regard 
include: the Durban Declaration on Elections, Democracy and Governance; 
the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance; the Protocol on the Rights of Women; the Lomé Declaration on 
unconstitutional changes of government; and the African Common Position on 
the review of the MDGs. 
 
As well as NEPAD and the APRM, AU resources that can support its 
governance function include: a clear political mandate within the AU 
Constitutive Act;248 the RECs and specific organs that can facilitate the 
engagement of African citizens, such as ECOSOCC and the Pan African 
Parliament. 
 
Togo provides a specific example of the AU’s progress in promoting 
governance. In response to the unconstitutional changeover of power in Togo 
                                            
248 African Union (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/african-union/constitution.htm 
 157
following the death of President Étienne Eyadéma in February 2005, AU 
pressure proved highly influential in persuading the Togolese authorities to 
hold presidential elections – although the results of these elections 
themselves proved controversial. 
 
The AU has, however, had a mixed record in responding to those challenges. 
The then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, 
asserted that the AU’s response to developments in Togo has been 
encouraging, while its responses to the situations in Ethiopia, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe have been less so.249 
 
Weak institutional and financial capabilities remain major impediments to the 
AU’s capacity to implement, monitor and evaluate its governance function in 
practice. The failure of the AU to demonstrate a consistent approach to 
governance issues is also a major challenge. 
 
The issue of the AU Presidency for 2006 illustrates both the AU’s weaknesses 
and its potential strengths regarding governance. The Sixth Ordinary Session 
of the Assembly of the AU took place in Khartoum from 23-24 January 2006 
and it is customary for the hosts of the AU Summit to assume the Chairship. 
The AU was able to demonstrate the political strength to suspend Khartoum 
from assuming the Chairship of the AU, in view of concerns over the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. However, Sudan’s presidency was only 
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suspended for a year, while the interim Chairship was assumed by the 
Republic of Congo, the human rights record of which is not exemplary. In 
2007, Khartoum was again denied the presidency. 
 
Alex Vines saw the Congolese solution as a reasonable compromise under the 
circumstances.250 Jakkie Cillers stressed that, although an imperfect solution, 
the fact that African heads of state had been able to engineer Sudan’s 
Presidency represented a major step forward and a remarkable shift from 
what would have been possible five or six years previously.251 
 
It is important that Africa-wide governance standards are developed which 
are compatible with international standards. However, the impetus has to 
come from Africa. The Secretary of State stressed the notion of partnership in 
supporting good governance in Africa, asserting that “we are serious about 
our commitment to help finance development being matched by commitment 
on the part of our partners to good governance, to peace and security, to 
uphold human rights”.252 
 
African ownership of capacity-building for governance is essential, as 
attempts to export European governance standards risk undermining the 
value of the exercise. In order to promote sustainable programmes for good 
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governance in Africa, therefore, it is vital that external assistance focuses on 
support for the development of African national, sub-regional and continental 
mechanisms and structures. 
 
The role of national governments  
 
A number of powerful and influential reformist African leaders have shown 
strong leadership in supporting the development of the AU's governance role. 
South Africa is the foremost example of such leadership, but other countries, 
such as Rwanda and Nigeria, have also demonstrated a commitment to 
democracy, the rule of law and accountability.  
 
National governments do not only have a role within their own countries, 
however. It is possible for good practices to be shared, especially amongst 
neighbours. This process could be expanded through APRM or REC 
mechanisms which would enable closer cooperation between state 
governments without undue interference of one state directly in the affairs of 
another.  
 
The role of parliamentarians  
 
The role of national parliamentarians in the promotion of good governance 
must not be underestimated since it is in their interests to ensure 
accountability and transparency within their own state governments. 
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However, in young democracies there can be a lot of suspicion amongst 
different political parties, so it is often difficult to get cross-party consensus 
on holding government to account. EU and Member State parliamentarians 
can assist by speaking directly to African parliamentarians about their role and 
experiences.  
 
A strong oversight role also depends on adequate access to information. 
There is a need to develop an information and communication strategy, 
possibly through NEPAD, to address the problem of how African 
parliamentarians can make informed decisions.  
 
The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) also has an important part to play in this 
process. It opened in 2004, under the auspices of the AU and through the 
particular encouragement of Thabo Mbeki, to promote democracy throughout 
Africa. It has 256 members – five from each member state – and an annual 
budget of £12.5 million.  
 
However, the Pan-African Parliament has faced possible potential bankruptcy 
due to lack of funds.253 Many Member States fail to pay their dues at all, or on 
time, including some of Africa's wealthiest states such as Libya, Nigeria, 
Algeria, Egypt and South Africa. Further problems include the fact that its 
representatives are unelected and that there appears to be a notable lack of 
political will in following through on commitments made.  
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Though the EU cannot address these problems directly, it should be willing to 
support the Pan-African Parliament as part of its encouragement of 
democracy within Africa.  
 
The role of civil society 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa stresses the involvement of civil society 
organisations in promoting human rights and good governance in Africa.254 
 
James Mackie, Director of The European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, noted that civil society has been involved in discussions on the 
EU Strategy for Africa, and that the EU has been supporting programmes to 
build capacity for this. They described how civil society groups are 
increasingly being involved in mainstream discussions on development and 
cooperation with Europe. In this context, Europe refers to ‘non-state actors’, 
encompassing the private sector in this definition. However, civil society 
groups have been disparate in terms of focusing on the Strategy and the 
most dialogue has been between the AU and European Commissions.255 Myles 
Wickstead believed that African civil society was likely to feel largely excluded 
from consultations on the Strategy. (Q?)256 
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Interviewees stressed the importance of engaging with African civil society. 
BOND and Saferworld were sceptical of the prospects for dialogue with 
African civil society, considering that it was unlikely that such dialogue would 
be influential in the implementation of the Strategy.257 Myles Wickstead 
agreed that it was important to explore ways to deepen the dialogue with 
African civil society.258  
 
Peace and security 
 
EU involvement in peace and security in Africa predates the EU Strategy for 
Africa. EU involvement in African peace and security is partly a response to 
the desire of certain EU Member States to avoid charges of colonial 
interference. It is partly a response to the lack of capacity of most EU Member 
States individually to deal with Africa's internal conflicts.  
 
France in particular has, over the past decade, been reducing its direct 
presence in Africa. Though it has more troops in Africa than any other outside 
nation (14,700 at the end of 2005),259 the country is hesitant to act 
unilaterally, as demonstrated recently by its involvement in the DCR only 
through the EU, and its presence in Ivory Coast alongside UN forces and 
under UN mandate. In October 2005 newspaper reports cited the French 
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Minister of Defence talking of a Paris-Brussels-London axis,260 whilst the 
French Foreign Minister has been quoted as saying that France would no 
longer be "the gendarme of Africa”.261 Given the unwillingness of Member 
States to act unilaterally, it is particularly important to implementation of the 
EU Strategy that the EU fulfils its commitments under the peacekeeping and 
security chapter.  
 
The European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU’s Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM) come within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and 
have been supporting a broad range of peacebuilding activities in Africa, 
including mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts, and initiatives for 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and child soldiers. The 
EU Council Secretariat provides support for building African peace and 
security capacity, operating within and on the basis of its coordinating 
mandate for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
 
On 3 March 2005, the Council of the European Union agreed the Common 
Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in 
Africa.262 The Common Position supports the notion of ‘African solutions to 
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African problems’ that has been promoted by NEPAD and the AU, noting that 
Africans maintain primary responsibility for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts in Africa. It acknowledges that the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts in Africa have been the subject of 
dialogue with the OAU and, subsequently, the AU, and that the AU and 
African sub-regional organisations constitute the central actors in the 
achieving these aims. 
 
Battlegroups  
 
In 2004, the EU decided to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities by agreeing 
to establish 13 Battlegroups. A Battlegroup is based on a battalion-sized force 
of 1,500 troops, formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition 
of EU Member States. Each Battlegroup is to be associated with a Force 
Headquarters and pre-identified transport and logistics elements. It is 
intended that decisions to launch an operation are to be taken within five 
days of the approval by the Council. In response to a crisis or to an urgent 
request by the UN, the EU envisages developing the capacity to undertake 
simultaneously two Battlegroup-size operations sustainable for a maximal 
period of 120 days, with forces on the ground no later than ten days after the 
EU decision to launch the operation. Full operational capability was initially 
scheduled to be reached in 2007.  
                                            
Security in Africa, and also its 13 December 2004 Guidelines for implementing this 
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Security Strategy, adopted on 12 December 2003. 
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The ‘Battlegroups’ concept is, at present, the primary operational tool for EU 
military interventions. They are designed to be compatible with UN Chapter 
VII mandates, and will, in most instances, be deployed in response to a 
request from the UN. They are intended to be capable of robust peace 
enforcement on a limited scale, such as local suppression of hostilities, 
separation of parties and prevention of atrocities. The EU plans to be able to 
undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations 
simultaneously.263  
 
On paper, Battlegroups appear to be highly relevant to rapid military 
interventions for humanitarian protection purposes in Africa. The Strategy 
pledges to deploy operations ‘involving EU Battlegroups’ to promote African 
peace and security.264 However, Battlegroups have not been configured for 
the specific tasks of civilian protection, and no framework nations or 
multinational coalition members have made clear commitments to deploy 
them to crises in Africa.  
 
Discussions between the EU and NATO have reached broad agreement that 
Battlegroups will be mutually reinforcing with the larger NATO Response 
Force (NRF). Standards, practical methods and procedures for Battlegroups 
are designed to be compatible with those defined within the NRF, so that 
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there should be considerable potential for synergy between the two 
initiatives.265 
 
EU coordination with other organisations 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa notes "the importance of working more closely with 
Africans in multilateral fora, and in co-ordination with multilateral partners”.266 
The EU has for some time been developing its relationship with the UN, and 
with NATO, both of which have been active operationally in Africa—although 
UN engagement has been on a much greater scale and over a much longer 
period of time than either the EU or NATO. The EU also has relationships with 
a number of bilateral partners.  
 
In September 2003, the EU and the UN agreed a Joint Declaration on EU-UN 
co-operation in Crisis Management, which identified tracks to implement EU 
commitment to support the UN. A joint consultative mechanism (the Steering 
Committee) was subsequently established at working level and regular 
meetings have been held between staffs from both organisations. Two main 
practical mechanisms for cooperation have been identified: the provision of 
national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation; or an EU 
operation in answer to a request from the UN. 
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On 16 December 2002, the EU and NATO agreed a joint declaration for closer 
cooperation in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention, 
outlining political principles for EU-NATO cooperation and giving the EU 
assured access to NATO’s planning and logistics capabilities. The Berlin plus 
agreement of March 2003 strengthened the institutional dimension of the 
relationship, allowing the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and assets 
to carry out military operations. The EU has liaison cells in place at NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters in Brussels. Attempts at 
EU-NATO cooperation in Darfur have revealed difficulties in managing the 
relationship in practice, however as disagreement between the institutions 
over who should lead airlift assistance to AMIS led to delays. 
 
EU actions in the DRC 
 
The EU has also increasingly been developing an operational capacity to 
support African peace and security on the ground. The first autonomous EU-
led military operation outside Europe was deployed within the framework of 
the ESDP to the Ituri region in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) in summer 2003 to support the UN peacekeeping mission in the 
country (MONUC). 
 
The EU’s Operation Artemis was discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis, 
specifically in relation to its support for MONUC. But it is helpful very briefly to 
revisit some key points of the Artemis mission here. A key function of Artemis 
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was to provide civilian protection in Bunia during its deployment between July 
and September 2003. Artemis was able to help establish humanitarian space 
within Bunia, and it facilitated the reinforcement of MONUC in the region, so 
that MONUC was better equipped to safeguard vulnerable civilians. But it is 
unclear the extent to which Artemis serving local needs and interests, and 
Artemis troops were accused of prioritising the security of international 
peacekeepers and Congolese politicians above that of local civilians. 
Nevertheless, a public opinion survey in DRC suggested that vulnerable local 
populations felt safer in areas were there was a strong international 
peacekeeping presence. 
 
In late 2004, the EU agreed to launch a 30-strong Police Mission in Kinshasa 
(EUPOL KINSHASA) to assist the DRC’s establishment of an Integrated Police 
Unit (IPU). Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU 
decided to establish an EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform 
in the DRC (EUSEC - R.D. CONGO). The mission was launched on 8 June 2005 
to cover a period of 12 months. The mission provides advice and assistance to 
the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion 
of policies that are compatible with human rights and international 
humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public 
management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. 
 
Box 8 EU Military Deployment to the DRC (2006) 
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In April 2006, the EU agreed to deploy a small military operation to DRC to 
support the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC).267 The proposal had been 
delayed due to Member States not being willing to provide sufficient troops 
for the mission: Germany had agreed to lead the operation but had spent a 
number of weeks in negotiations to ensure the provision of additional troops. 
Delays also occurred in waiting for UN Security Council authorization for the 
deployment. The UK will provide a minimal contribution of personnel to the 
mission, but will provide an estimated €2.9 million financial support. 
 
The EU operation involved the deployment of an advanced element to 
Kinshasa of 400-450 military personnel and the availability of a battalion-sized 
‘on-call’ force ‘over the horizon’ outside the country, but quickly deployable. 
 
It provided support to MONUC during elections in the DRC, although it was 
not deployed to act as a substitute for MONUC, nor to operate in areas where 
MONUC already had sufficient resources. The mission was withdrawn four 
months after the date of the first round of elections in the DRC. 
 
The African Peace Facility 
 
The primary European institutional mechanism for supporting African peace 
and security is the African Peace Facility (APF). The Strategy for Africa 
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pledges to "strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, 
flexible, sustainable funding”.268 
 
The APF evolved from a request made at the AU Heads of State Summit in 
Maputo, Mozambique, in July 2003,269 asking that the EU explore modalities 
for setting up a Peace Support Operation Facility (PSOF) to fund peace 
support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the 
AU, thereby enhancing the AU’s capacity to carry out its role in promoting 
continental peace, security and stability. 
 
The APF was established in 2004, representing a €250 million commitment 
from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support African-led peace 
operations and to enhance the institutional peace and security capacity at the 
AU and in sub-regional organisations. The APF has been built around three 
core principles of African ownership, solidarity and partnership between Africa 
and Europe and is one of the most concrete aspects of EU AU cooperation. 
The Strategy for Africa pledges to ‘strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with 
substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding.’270 
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The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), at its meeting of 
10 April 2006, agreed that the APF would continue to be funded from the 10th 
EDF for three years from 2008, amounting to €300 million for the three year 
period of the EDF. In addition, it was agreed that the Commission should 
propose a short-term replenishment for 2006-2007 of up to €50 million to pay 
for the extension of EU support for AMIS. The GAERC agreed to review the 
APF in 2010 in relation to sources of funding and modalities for the facility. 
 
The APF is financed from resources allocated to African ACP countries under 
existing cooperation agreements with the EU, initially supplemented by an 
equivalent amount of unallocated EDF resources. Funding the APF through 
the EDF allows the AU greater control over spending than if funds came from 
the CFSP/ESDP, or the EU budget instruments. This arrangement supports the 
AU principle of ownership. 
 
The APF strategy is based around dual objectives of supporting African 
peacekeeping operations, and building African institutional capacity to run 
efficient operations itself. Of the €250 million APF budget, €35 million is ring-
fenced for long-term capacity-building, as distinct from €215 million for 
operational support. The funds can be accessed by the AU after a request has 
been endorsed by the EU Council at the working group level. RECs can also 
access APF funding, with the condition in principle that the AU approves the 
REC’s request. 
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A significant amount of APF funds have gone to support AMIS. As at May 
2006, €162 million had been spent on the mission. The 10 April 2006 GAERC 
further agreed that the Commission should propose a short-term 
replenishment for 2006-2007 of up to €50 million to pay for the extension of 
EU support for AMIS.  
 
The terms and conditions of the APF state that peace operations supported by 
it must be consistent with UN principles and objectives, and that endorsement 
in the broadest sense should be sought from UN institutions in accordance 
with the UN Charter; in this context peace enforcement operations require a 
UN mandate. The legal basis for the APF derives from Article 11 of the 
Cotonou Agreement. The fact that the APF is drawn from European 
development funding places restrictions on what type of support it can 
provide. Notably, the APF cannot fund direct military assistance, but rather 
has to concentrate on personnel and logistical needs. Analysts have 
suggested that this complicates the AU's capacity to use the APF effectively to 
support peacekeeping operations.271 
 
Javier Solana saw the APF as creative because its financial design meant that 
it used money that already belonged to the countries of the region, 
representing a deal between donors and recipients. He stressed the 
significance of the flexibility of the fund, stating that that it was important 
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that the money was available quickly in response to demand, since the value 
of late money is greatly reduced.272 
 
Representatives of the Belgian government supported keeping APF funding 
within EDF, in order to avoid diverting resources away from the under-funded 
CFSP, and to ensure that the EC remains fully involved in the process, thereby 
maintaining a coherent approach between the different European institutions 
and the EU Member States.273 Observers also have also stated that the CFSP 
budget is too small to support the minimum level of funding required for an 
effective APF.274  
 
James Mackie maintained that it is important to establish a number of key 
principles for continued EU financial support to African-led peace support 
operations, including: ownership, sustainability, longer-term funding, 
predictability and the value of an integrated approach.275 
 
Assessments of the effectiveness of the APF have broadly been very positive. 
Jakkie Cilliers stated that the APF has made a remarkable contribution to 
building peace in Africa, adding that the AU had not previously embarked on 
anything of the scale of the Darfur operation, and that the only reason why it 
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was able to mount a relatively credible mission in the region was because of 
EU support, in particular.276  
 
Capacity-building and the African Standby Force 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa states that the EU will "help develop African [peace 
and security] capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and will 
build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, 
technical, planning and logistical support”.277 
 
Ministers attending the 8 May 2006 EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting in 
Vienna welcomed progress made by the AU and sub-regional organisations in 
developing the African peace and security architecture. Ministers underlined 
the importance of capacity-building, and expressed their appreciation for the 
progress made in the establishment of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) and 
the co-operation between the AU and the EU and other donors.  
 
The EU informed the meeting that it was in the process of elaborating a 
framework for support to Africa's conflict prevention, management and 
resolution (CPMR) capabilities. Before being finalised, this framework was to 
be discussed with the AU and the relevant sub-regional organisations. 
Ministers attending the meeting acknowledged the necessity to harmonise any 
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support by the international community for regional training centres and 
centres of excellence for the ASF, and also the importance of continuing to 
support the African Centre on the Study and Research for Terrorism.  
 
Notwithstanding the progress made in developing the AU's CPMR capacity, 
the severe problems experienced by the AU in deploying AMIS underscore the 
major capacity-building shortfalls that the AU faces across the breadth of its 
peace and security architecture.278  
 
Witnesses suggested that building the AU into a credible and solid institution 
is a 15 to 20-year project. NicK Grono was sceptical of the AU's ability to have 
the ASF operational by 2010, which leaves a lack of capacity to intervene in 
conflicts like the DRC and Darfur in the meantime, as demonstrated by the 
"re-hatting" of AMIS to a UN mission in autumn 2006.279 
 
Human resource shortfalls are a particular problem in African institutions and 
they continue seriously to undermine African strategic management capacity 
at the continental and sub-regional levels, hampering both African ownership 
of capacity-building processes and African capability to absorb donor 
assistance. 
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Javier Solana’s 21 November 2005 Contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa 
noted that a lesson to be learned from supporting AMIS has been the 
challenge of working with an institution like the AU which is only at the 
beginning of its capacity-building process. Solana urged, therefore, that 
capacity-building for the AU and sub-regional organisations be put at the 
heart of EU policy in Africa, including in relation both to military and civilian 
capacity-building and decision-making, mediation, early warning and planning 
in Headquarters.280 
 
AU member states' attitudes to capacity-building at the AU have been mixed. 
A number of influential African leaders are strongly committed to achieving 
major progress in establishing an effective AU. However, a significant number 
of African countries are wary of the implications of the development of a 
powerful institution.  
 
A number of interviewees suggested that long-term donor commitments to 
support institutional capacity-building with minimal conditions would deliver 
the most sustainable progress in this area. They saw developing the capability 
and credibility of the African Commission as a particularly important 
component of the capacity-building process, as well as identification by the 
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AU of areas in which it can add most value in relation to the activities of other 
African institutions.281  
 
Support for building the AU's peace and security capacity is key component of 
the EU's engagement with Africa. Although it is important to support capacity-
building across the breadth of the AU's CPMR capability, development of the 
ASF is a particularly significant facet of the capacity-building process, as the 
ASF is a fundamental implementing mechanism for the whole African peace 
and security architecture.  
 
Despite the scepticism noted above of the AU's ability to have the ASF fully 
operational in the near future, AMIS has demonstrated the important 
peacekeeping role that the AU can play in Africa, as part of the broader 
international architecture. AMIS has been significant both in terms of its 
capacity to support stability in Darfur, but also in its role as a catalyst for 
encouraging external support.  
 
A key challenge in developing the ASF is to pinpoint its precise function in 
relation to the broader international peace and security architecture, including 
the respective operational roles of the EU and the UN. The Millennium Review 
Summit recognised the contribution to peace and security by regional 
organisations and the importance of establishing predictable partnerships and 
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arrangements between the UN and regional regional bodies, highlighting the 
importance of a strong African Union.  
 
Careful analysis of exactly how and where the ASF can add most value to an 
integrated system of peacekeeping will help to maximise the effectiveness of 
the capacity-building process. The transferral of AMIS to a UN operation and 
other examples of African missions being "re-hatted" as blue helmet 
operations indicate the relevance of thinking about the ASF in a wider 
context.  
 
Jakkie Cilliers stated that building the peacekeeping capacity of the AU does 
not represent building an alternative to UN peacekeeping. Rather, what needs 
to be built was what Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change referred to as an interlocking system of peacekeeping, in which 
the AU can help establish a comprehensive ceasefire and can then handover 
to a UN mission; in this way, the UN represents the exit strategy for AU 
peacekeeping operations. However, the practicalities of fitting diverse 
peacekeeping components together remain a key challenge.  
 
Conflict prevention 
 
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Peace and Security 
Directorate of the AU Commission both have a mandate for conflict 
prevention. The primary AU conflict prevention instruments are the Panel of 
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the Wise (POW) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). When 
fully functional, POW comprises five highly respected African personalities for 
three year periods, appointed by the AU Assembly according to regional 
representation. The POW meets regularly to assist the PSC in the promotion 
and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent, particularly 
focusing on preventive actions.  
 
The CEWS will advise the PSC on potential conflicts and recommend 
appropriate responses. It will comprise a Situation Centre, linked to similar 
bodies in the RECs, as well as the UN and other international bodies.  
 
The RECs also have a preventive function. For instance, the 1999 ECOWAS 
Summit agreed a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. The institutions 
of the Mechanism include the ECOWAS Authority; the Executive Secretariat; 
and a Mediation and Security Council.  
 
Civil society has a major role to play in conflict prevention in Africa. 
Saferworld argued that the EU should ensure effective civil society 
participation in human security-related projects funded by the Commission for 
the period 2007-2013, and in projects in all African country and regional 
strategy papers. Saferworld complained that the APF and the donor 
community placed too much emphasis on peacekeeping and intervention, at 
the expense of preventive measures, peacebuilding and human security. 
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Saferworld further urged stronger support for non-military efforts to prevent 
conflicts in Africa.282 
 
Jakkie Cilliers also stressed that the types of resources that the AU could offer 
favoured prioritising support for its conflict prevention capacity, whereas the 
APF primarily concentrates on intervention and reconstruction. However, he 
added that conflict prevention is about issues of governance, democracy and 
human rights, which are also the most difficult areas for a politically weak 
organisation like AU and African countries to address, because they deal with 
sensitive issues of sovereignty and interference in the domestic affairs of 
African countries.283 Interviewees further argued that a significant percentage 
of the APF should be devoted to capacity-building, technical assistance and 
preventive action.  
 
Despite the obstacles, conflict prevention remains an area where the AU can 
add real value to peace and security in Africa. And the EU is well placed to 
provide institutional support to build the AU's preventive capacity and can 
promote capacity-building programmes that support the preventive 
components of the African peace and security architecture, paying particular 
attention to civilian and police elements.  
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Tension between direct operational support and capacity-building  
 
The EU Strategy for Africa pledges to "help develop African capabilities" and 
to  
 
"[p]rovide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to 
promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, 
including potential deployment of EU Battlegroups".284 
  
Balancing the provision of direct, operational support with support for building 
African capacity presents a challenge for the EU. AMIS illustrates the tensions 
between these two priorities, as the scale of the AU's operational 
commitments in Darfur has tended to overwhelm the organisation and its 
efforts to develop its institutional capacity. At the same time, however, the 
comparative effectiveness of AMIS has been seen by many donor partners as 
indicative of the AU's competence as the primary African agency.  
 
The European Centre for Development Policy Management stressed that, for 
the EU, it should not be a question of choosing between operational support 
or capacity-building, but rather simultaneously balancing the two. It added 
that there is still some way to go before there was a synergy between indirect 
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support and direct support, provided by the EU through the APF and through 
the CFSP/ESDP, as well through bilateral assistance.285  
 
Interviewees identified institutional capacity-building for human resources at 
the AU and sub-regional organisations as the weaker of the two policy 
priorities of the APF. Nick Grono stressed that the AU's lack of capacity 
underlined the importance of EU and Western operational support for African 
interventions where appropriate.286  
 
As with EU efforts to help build the ASF, so EU direct operational support 
should acknowledge other peacekeeping elements within a broader system, 
and should work to develop a more coherent international structure. Better 
ways are needed to integrate the comparative advantages of the different 
organisations involved in peace and security activities in Africa. The AU might 
have a greater capacity to provide troops, for instance, but it has less 
capability in terms of logistics or in civilian expertise than the EU. The EU 
could also provide rapid response, while NATO can support logistical aspects 
and no-fly zone enforcement. The UN is still the lead player in deploying 
multidimensional peacebuilding operations.  
 
One area identified in which the EU could play a more active role was in 
supporting security sector reform in Africa. Nick Grono stressed that tackling 
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the root causes of conflict needs to involve addressing the security apparatus 
of countries affected by instability, which requires direct involvement in 
security sector reform. This embraces a variety of issues which the EU 
supports strongly, including in relation to the rule of law, but also 
incorporates other essential areas where the EU has traditionally been more 
wary of involvement, such as supporting the development of effective, 
responsive military chains of command.287  
 
Post-conflict activities and EU efforts to support the Peacebuilding 
Commission  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction in states emerging from war and instability 
involves a major input of resources and finances. Peacebuilding missions are 
multidimensional and complex, requiring the involvement of a wide range of 
actors over an extended period of time.  
 
Effective peacebuilding presents a huge challenge for the AU, which will 
continue to require considerable interaction and assistance in this area, from 
the EU, the UN and elsewhere. This in turn presents major challenges of 
coordination, and of sustaining international political interest in the longer-
term.  
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The High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change identified a key 
institutional gap at the UN in responding to the challenges of 
peacebuilding.288 In response to a recommendation by the Panel, in 
December 2005 the UN General Assembly and Security Council formally 
established the new UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), as agreed by 
heads of State attending the Millennium Review Summit.289 As discussed in 
previous chapters, the Peacebuilding Commission is intended to marshal 
resources and offer advice on post-conflict recovery, bringing together UN 
capacities in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, human rights, the 
rule of law, humanitarian aid, reconstruction and long-term development. It is 
further hoped that the Commission will help to maintain international political 
interest over longer periods in relation to peacebuilding operations.  
 
Javier Solana's October 2005 Contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa 
recommended that EU policy towards Africa should be solidly based on UN 
principles and should aim for a trilateral partnership between the EU, the UN, 
and the AU in Africa, with the UN Peacebuilding Commission becoming an 
important tool in this respect.290  
 
Realising the EU-Africa Partnership  
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This section assesses the effectiveness of efforts to realise the EU-Africa 
Partnership in practice. This includes: initiatives to create a broad-based 
dialogue; the role of African governments and institutions, and African Civil 
society; the AU’s capacity to deliver; the EU’s capacity to engage in dialogue 
with Africa; the significance of the second EU-Africa Summit; and the 
development of a joint EU-Africa strategy. 
 
The EU Strategy for Africa commits the EU to developing the Strategy "in 
partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners, 
respecting the principles of African ownership, the importance of working 
more closely with African in multilateral fora, and in co-ordination with 
multilateral partners”.291  
 
These principles can all be undermined by the various major challenges: the 
need for better coordination; rationalisation of institutions; and lack weak 
institutional capacity, on both the European and African sides.  
 
Creating a broad-based dialogue  
 
Implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa through the use of dialogue 
raises the question of with whom this dialogue should be held. A number of 
possible dialogue partners for the EU are discernible: these range from the 
                                            
291 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 2005 15961/05, paragraph 9(a).  
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pan-African institutions such as the AU and NEPAD, the RECs, individual state 
governments, and civil society.  
 
Myles Wickstead argued that whilst there had been "a mindset change that 
has happened over the last year or two where the international community 
has now determined to support what Africa puts forward" there remain 
"different layers of what Africa wants".292  
 
One of the most important challenges for the EU is the split between the 
countries north and south of the Sahara. In terms of developing a pan-African 
approach, the pan-African institutions, in particular the AU and NEPAD will be 
the primary partners for the EU. Lord Triesman argued that these were 
"critical institutions that are developing across Africa which take no account of 
[the regional] division whatsoever”.293  
 
National level implementation is also important to the EU Strategy but many 
African states are weak and have limited capacity. Chatham House suggested 
that the EU should work closely with anchor countries in African who can be 
champions in their respective regions on issues such as good governance, 
conflict resolution, democracy and economic intervention.294  
 
                                            
292 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 78, 2 
February. 
293 House of Lords (2005), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 53, 29 
November. 
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The EU's capacity to engage in dialogue with Africa  
 
The EU Strategy for Africa identifies the African Union as the principal 
institution for EU engagement with Africa.295  This places a major 
responsibility on the AU and its capacity to deliver. The competence of the AU 
is discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis. Here, we look specifically at the 
AU in terms of engagement with the EU, in particular in reference to the 
Strategy for Africa.  
 
At a general level, it is important to recognise the inherent tension between 
African ownership and EU support for capacity-building. The International 
Crisis Group stated that it is not possible to have African ownership without 
African capability, and that developing African capability requires extensive 
support.296 
 
The EU needs to provide support for breadth of the AU's responsibilities, 
including financial assistance and technical expertise. However, the EU must 
be careful not to swamp the AU with European personnel, as this undermines 
African ownership, and fails to acknowledge and incorporate African expertise.  
 
Given the size and funding of the EU, it is fair to assume sufficient capacity 
for dialogue. Certainly there is no shortage of officials in Brussels willing to 
                                            
295 Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic 
Partnership, Brussels, 19 December 15961/05, paragraph 9(b). 
296 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 270, 21 
March. 
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talk to the AU. But, given the limited capacity of the AU, it is important that 
the EU is fully represented in Addis Ababa, in order that it can engage in 
dialogue regularly and consistently. Bob Dewar stated that there is a very 
large diplomatic community based in Addis Ababa because it is the principal 
point of contact with Africa for many countries and that a significant part of 
the work of those on the ground in Addis is on the pan-African agenda.297 
 
EU and Member States representation in Africa takes three forms: 
Commission delegations; Special Representatives acting under the High 
Representative Javier Solana; and national diplomatic services.  
 
Commission delegations have been subject to criticism. The delegations have 
potential to play an important role in ensuring that programmes and 
strategies are coherent with those of the partner countries. However, Elmar 
Brok, Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, 
argued that delegations were weak, under-resourced, poorly qualified and 
lacking diplomatic training. He argued that secondment to national diplomatic 
service would help to strengthen the delegations and increase their 
knowledge and skills.298 
 
Bob Dewar was more optimistic in his assessment of the delegation based in 
Addis, stating that he had been impressed by the officials based there: "I 
                                            
297 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 346, 30 
March. 
298 House of Lords (2006), Minutes of Evidence, Examination of Witnesses, Question 247, 21 
March. 
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have felt that they have spent a lot of time and good effort in their 
engagement”.299 However, even he conceded that "there is an issue in terms 
of the skill base for the evolving Strategy" amongst Commission staff.300  
 
He also noted the need for increased coordination in individual African 
countries between the delegations and Member State missions. The United 
Kingdom mission in Addis has benefited from having a regional conflict 
advisor and a specialist specifically for engagement with the AU.301 This is a 
level of expertise not held by the Commission delegation. He stressed that 
there was, accordingly, a real benefit to be had through sharing expertise and 
working together with the Commission in a joined-up way: 
 
"It is important that we do take harmonisation seriously … There could 
be scope for sharing of experiences between African Union missions 
should one have more experience in one domain than another and that 
is the way to go”.302 
 
The Head of Cabinet to Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, in evidence given to 
the House of Commons International Development Committee, acknowledged 
that the Commission still needs to work on the institutional relationship 
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between the EU foreign policy machinery and national diplomatic services. 
President Barroso and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner were both very keen to 
develop a more ambitious two-way exchange programme involving staff in 
the delegations and staff working in national diplomatic services.303  
 
Finally, interviewees stressed "the utter lack of coordination" between the 
Commission delegations and the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs).304 The 
International Crisis Group, in a report on Afghanistan, for example, had found 
that there were no regular meetings in Kabul between the EUSR and the 
delegation based there.305 Having drawn attention to it in their report weekly 
meetings are now being held. They considered that this situation was 
common in those places with a Special Representative.306  
 
The development of a joint EU-Africa strategy would clearly benefit from 
political buy-in at the highest level: i.e. endorsement from a second EU-Africa 
Summit to follow the Cairo Summit in 2000. In 2006, the United Kingdom was 
very clear on the prospects for holding a second summit. Lord Triesman 
acknowledged the desirability of such a summit, but stated that, "so long as 
that summit is going to be held in Europe and so long as the African Union as 
a whole is prepared to support Robert Mugabe's attendance representing 
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Zimbabwe then it will not happen”.307 He added that, although not all EU 
Member States supported this position completely, the EU nevertheless 
remained cohesive on the issue and the EU would continue to pursue dialogue 
through the ministerial Troika meetings in the meantime.308 
 
Representatives of the Belgian government were more sceptical of the 
capacity of the Troika meetings to deliver progress on the Strategy, asserting 
that the gap since the first summit was beginning to takes its toll on the 
relationship between the EU and Africa. They added that, while dialogue at 
ministerial and lower levels has its place, as long as there is no event that 
marks the moment where the Strategy commitments are evaluated by both 
partners at the highest level, it will be very difficult to proceed.309 
 
The AU-EU Ministerial Meeting at Bamako, Mali, on 5 December 2005 made 
commitments to explore creative ideas to bring about the holding of an Africa-
EU Summit as envisaged in the Cairo Plan of Action, and mandated senior 
officials to submit concrete proposals for consideration at the subsequent 
ministerial Troika meeting in Vienna on 8 May 2006. The outcome of the 
second Summit in Lisbon in 2007 is discussed below.  
 
The development of a joint EU-Africa strategy  
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Aligning EU policies with African objectives has the potential to make a major 
impact on the effective implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa: the 
"underlying philosophy" of the Strategy stresses "African ownership and 
responsibility".310 The ultimate objective of this rationale is the development 
of a genuine joint EU-Africa strategy.  
 
Bob Dewar pointed out that there was consultation with Africans on the drafts 
of the EU Strategy. He stressed that the Strategy is an EU initiative, but that it 
was welcomed in Africa. However, he added that Africans were likely to have 
views which they would want to put forward if there were ever to be a truly 
joint EU-Africa strategy.311 
 
At the 8 May EU-African Troika meeting in Vienna, the two sides reiterated 
the agreement reached in Bamako to transform the EU Strategy for Africa into 
a joint strategy.312 They agreed that this should be "a focused, political 
document, setting out a vision of EU African relations in the decade ahead, 
and building on a dialogue that should be flexible, deeper, more frequent and 
include new areas of common interest”.313 The joint strategy will be 
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structured in four clusters: peace and security, human rights and governance, 
trade and integration and development.  
 
The matrix is useful in specifying particular steps towards implementation of 
the Strategy, but it does not specify how much will be spent on each step, nor 
does it address the larger issue of rationalisation of European and African 
institutions and instruments. Whilst many of the Strategy's aims can be met 
without such rationalisation, ultimately a joint EU-Africa strategy, as 
envisaged by the ministerial Troikas, will require that this question be properly 
addressed.   
 
EU-Africa Summit 
 
In December 2007, an EU-Africa Summit was eventually held in Lisbon, during 
the Portuguese EU presidency. The Summit agreed a Joint EU-Africa Strategy, 
as well as an Action Plan for 2008-2010.  
 
The Africa-EU strategic partnership: a Joint Africa-EU Strategy (the 
Partnership) recognises a shared vision between Africa and the AU, based on 
a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic 
objectives. It declares that the partnership would be guided by the 
fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between 
Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility, and respect for human 
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rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to 
development.314  
 
The Partnership has four main, stated objectives, summarised as follows: 
 
1. To reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address 
issues of common concern.  
2. To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable 
economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and 
continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 
2015.  
3. To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with 
strong, representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the 
United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions.  
4. To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred 
partnership, Africa and the EU will empower non-state actors and create 
conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, 
democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 
processes.315 
 
                                            
314 African Union and European Union (2007), the Africa-EU strategic partnership: a joint 
Africa-EU strategy, p. 2. 
315 African Union and European Union (2007), the Africa-EU strategic partnership: a joint 
Africa-EU strategy, pp 2-3 
 195
The strategic framework outlines specific strategies that need to be enacted 
in the following areas: (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human 
rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues.316  
 
Of particular interest here are the objectives of peace and security, as well as 
of governance and human rights. The Partnership recognises the need to 
promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to 
governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root 
causes of conflicts. It acknowledges the importance of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA), and stresses that the EU and its Member States 
can provide increased support for AU efforts to operationalise the APSA. 
 
The Partnership reiterates the significance of African ownership, but points 
out the significance of key EU policy, such as the November 2006 Concept for 
Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and 
Resolution of Conflicts.317  
 
In relation to governance and human rights, the Partnership highlights the 
promotion of democratic governance and human rights as a central feature of 
the Africa-EU dialogue and partnership. In the context of situations of conflict, 
the Partnership further asserted that Africa and the EU will hold a dialogue on 
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the concept of ‘situations of fragility’, in order to develop a common 
understanding and agreement on steps that could be taken.  
 
Regarding human rights, the Partnership declares that Africa and the EU will 
work together to protect and promote the human rights of all people in Africa 
and Europe, as well as on a global level in international for a such as the UN 
Human Rights Council, to promote human rights and international 
humanitarian law and for the effective implementation of international and 
regional human rights instruments.  
 
EU support for good governance will build on the approach followed to 
integrate governance in the EDF programming, under the Governance 
Initiative. In order to support the APRM process and the implementation of 
the Charter, and the pan-African governance architecture more broadly, the 
EU pledged to establish an instrument that takes into account the positive 
experience with the African Peace Facility. 
 
The Lisbon Summit also agreed an Action Plan (2008-2010) for the 
implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership.318 This sets out key 
partnerships and priority actions, including, among other things, the 
following: 
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security 
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• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 
• Full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture; 
• Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. 
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights 
 
• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora; 
• Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African 
Charter on democracy, Elections and Governance; 
• Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods. 
 
In order to promote effective implementation of the Action Plan, it pledged to 
establish appropriate institutional architecture and implementation modalities. 
These include, among other things, commitments to: establish more frequent 
contacts between African and EU political leaders; back-up bi-annual Troika 
meetings of Foreign Ministers with sectoral Ministerial meetings; organise the 
annual meetings between the College of Commissioners of the European and 
AU Commissions; invite representatives from European and African civil 
societies to express themselves ahead of Ministerial Troika meetings; set up 
planning and priority setting mechanism for future Action Plans; and convene 
a third EU Africa Summit at the end of 2010, in Africa.  
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The EU agreed to open an EU Delegation exclusively dedicated to the AU; and 
to review options to better align policies, instruments and procedures to the 
need to treat Africa as one. The AU agreed to enhance the role of the African 
Union and its Commission in policy formulation and implementation; and to 
simplify the framework for regional integration in articulation with Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and rationalise EPAs, RECs and Sub-Regional 
Organisations within the Banjul framework; 
 
The action plan further incorporated various ‘fiches’ which detail the rationale, 
the objectives, the expected outcomes, the anticipated activities and the 
possible actors and financial resources of each of the Africa-EU priority 
actions.319 
 
On peace and security, these ‘fiches’ list three areas for priority action: 1) 
enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 2) operationalising 
APSA; and 3) predictable funding for Africa-led peacekeeping operations 
 
On democratic governance and human rights; priorities include: 1) enhancing 
dialogue at global level and in international for a; 2) promoting the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and supporting the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance; and 3) strengthening cooperation in 
the area of cultural goods. 
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Conclusion 
 
The EU is a major peace and security partner of the AU. The EU supports key 
principles of human rights and a broad understanding of peace and security, 
both within its own principles and guidelines, and as part of its various 
commitments to Africa. EU operational engagement in Africa has supported 
military intervention to uphold human rights and human security, for example 
in its deployments to DRC. Although the case studies of EU involvement in 
DRC, presented both in this chapter and in Chapter 3, expose the difficulties 
and challenges that this engagement encountered. 
 
It is fair to acknowledge the contribution that the EU has made to African 
peace and security. Some commentators suggest that the only reason why 
the AU was able to mount a relatively credible mission in Darfur was because 
of the support of the EU, and in particular the Africa Peace Facility.320 And the 
design of the APF is widely understood as having provided a very good way of 
maintaining African ownership of external support. 
 
But, there have been major difficulties in realising a functioning relationship 
that responds to African interests and needs. Despite the success of the APF, 
at a general level, an inherent tension remains between African ownership 
and EU support for capacity-building, not least due to the paradoxical 
situation that genuine African ownership implies sufficient African capability to 
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manage external support. Moreover, the reality of local, community 
involvement is not impressive. There was little civil society engagement in the 
design of the Strategy itself, and the Strategy has little to say about how to 
incorporate the needs and wishes of local communities into peace and 
security initiatives in Africa.  
 
A number of practical and political problems undermine development of a 
functioning relationship between the EU and Africa. Agreeing unified policy 
between the two remains difficult, both within Europe and between Europe 
and Africa. This can be the case at the most fundamental levels, such as 
disagreement over the definition of what good governance actually means, let 
alone what actions should be the prioritised in trying to promote it. 
 
Financing is a major hurdle. The Africa-EU Joint Partnership highlighted the 
importance of “predictable funding for Africa-led peacekeeping operations”. 
But there are a myriad of European funding sources relevant to African peace 
and security, often with unclear allocations of which stream pays for what 
activity, and who, ultimately, is responsible for providing the money. 
 
Finally, the relationship is far from fully functional politically. It took seven 
years to convene the second EU-Africa summit, four years longer than 
intended, due to political disagreements in Europe over the attendance of 
Zimbabwe. And even then, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown refused to 
attend, thereby diluting the political strength of the agreements reached in 
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Lisbon. Furthermore, political commitment to back up promises with actions is 
far from guaranteed. The EU Battlegroups concept appears tailor-made to 
support UN or AU peacekeeping operations in Africa. But to date, none has 
been deployed, and it remains unclear how operational they are in reality, 
despite being well past the deadline to achieve full operationality. 
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6 G8-Africa Joint Plan: G8 and African perspectives 
 
The next two chapters look at G8 support for African peacekeeping. 
Specifically, they assess the effectiveness and relevance of the Joint Africa/G8 
Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations 
(the Joint Plan),321 agreed at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian. Chapter 6 focuses 
on G8 and African perspectives on the Joint Plan. Chapter 7 then examines 
key priorities and challenges to its implementation, and it outlines potential 
areas for agreement and action, with a particular focus on the UK Presidency 
of the G8 in 2005/6. 
 
The analysis in these chapters is based on a series of interviews with key 
practitioners and experts from the G8 and Africa, undertaken by the author 
between April 2004 and April 2005. These took place as part of a project 
intended to provide a strategic input to the implementation process that has 
been following up commitments made in the Joint Plan. Methodology for this 
field work is described in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Joint Plan, chapter 6 first outlines 
the G8 process: how the G8 came to be involved in supporting African peace 
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and security; what steps led up to agreement on the Joint Plan; and what are 
the Joint Plan’s key elements. 
 
Second, chapter 6 presents G8 perspectives on the implementation of the 
Joint Plan. Analysis is based on feedback gathered by the author during 
interviews with officials from the Canadian government, the French 
government, the German government, the Japanese government, the UK 
government and the US Government: including: G8 activities at continental 
and regional levels; operational support; promoting coordination with African 
partners and among G8 Member States; institutional capacity-building; 
training; G8 deployments; and logistical and equipment support. 
 
Third, Chapter 6 presents African perspectives on the implementation of the 
Joint Plan. These include input gathered by the author from face to face 
interviews during field research in west, south and east Africa and Addis 
Ababa, including the African Union; the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).322 Again, 
opinions from academics and practitioners are also incorporated. Key areas of 
discussion focus on AU leadership of development of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA); AU/donor coordination meetings; peacekeeping 
doctrine; the practicability of donor demands; assessing African peacekeeping 
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research was carried out.  
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capacity, and the major gaps; coordination among key African stakeholders; 
and African regional integration. 
 
G8 involvement in the capacity-building process: the Joint Plan 
 
The G8’s enthusiasm for enhancing African peace and security capacity has 
derived from a number of factors, in particular the following: 
 
• Africans’ increasing determination to develop indigenous peace and 
security capacity; 
• increasing demand for peacekeeping in Africa; 
• belief that African responses to African crises may be more acceptable and 
appropriate than external responses; 
• bad operational experiences for non-African states in African peacekeeping 
operations in the 1990s.323 
 
International support for developing African peace and security and 
peacekeeping capacity coincided with the UN Security Council’s 
disengagement from pursuing a peacekeeping role globally in the mid-1990s: 
there was a drop in numbers of troops, military observers and police serving 
with UN operations from 69,900 to 29,100 from 1995/1996. Factors 
contributing to this decline included: operational setbacks between 1993 and 
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1995 in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and financial and political 
considerations for states contributing personnel and other resources to 
expensive and high-risk missions, often deployed to areas of moot strategic 
interest.324  
 
Initiatives to build African peace and security capacity have continued to 
evolve. The involvement of the G8 in the process in reflects the expanding 
number of non- African stakeholders that are interested in developing African 
capacity. But the growing presence of UN missions in Africa suggests that 
over ten years of International support for capacity-building programmes in 
Africa have had a comparatively moderate effect, while the capability of 
African regional organisations capacity to deploy and sustain peacekeeping 
operations remains limited.  
 
Official G8 involvement in capacity-building for African peace and security 
began in 2001 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 G8 support for African peace and security capacity-building 
Year  Presidency  Summit  Agreement 
2001  Italy   Genoa  Genoa Plan for Africa 
2002  Canada  Kananaskis  Action Plan for Africa 
2003  France  Evian  Joint Plana 
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2004  US   Sea Island  Global Peace Operations Initiative 
2005  UK   Gleneagles  Commitments for Africa 
2006 Russia  St Petersburg Update on Africa 
2007 Germany Heiligendamm Growth and Responsibility in Africa 
2008 Japan  Hokkaido Development and Africa 
2009 Italy  L’Aquila G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding 
2010 Canada Muskoka Report on the G8 Conference of Senior  
     Officials on Capacity Building 
 
a The Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace 
Support Operations is annexed to the Implementation Report by Africa 
Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan. 
 
G8 and African leaders attending the Evian summit in 2003 released the 
Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the 
G8 Africa Action Plan;325 the G8 Africa Action Plan had been concluded at the 
G8 Summit in Kananaskis the previous year.326 The Joint Plan is the annex to 
the Evian Implementation  Report, and it provides a detailed programme of 
objectives for Africa and its partners across the entire range of the African 
peace and security architecture.  
 
The designers of the Joint Plan intended it to provide a focus for the 
cooperative efforts of external partners in supporting African capacity-building 
initiatives. It confirmed the formal recognition by the G8 of the potential 
advantages of partnership with NEPAD and the AU in developing African 
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www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/afraction-e.pdf 
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peace and security capacity, including for the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations. An essential objective of the Joint Plan is “to mobilise technical 
and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African partners are able to engage 
more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and 
undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter”.327 
 
The Joint Plan identifies the following elements as essential to shaping a 
strategic plan to realise the longer-term vision for African peacekeeping 
capabilities:328 
 
• determining capabilities to meet African goals; 
• assessing capabilities within African states, and deciding which of those 
• capabilities would be available for African peacekeeping operations; and 
• determining the remaining gaps or weaknesses requiring focused 
attention. 
 
The Joint Plan further identifies building blocks to creating an enhanced 
African peacekeeping capacity.329 These provide helpful reference points to 
assess their continuing relevance to African peace and security challenges, to 
current developments in appropriate conflict resolution and management 
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responses, and to practical options to develop African peacekeeping capacity. 
These building blocks are: 
 
• establishing multidimensional standby brigade capabilities, including 
civilian components, at the AU and regional level by 2010; 
• developing capacity to provide humanitarian, security and reconstruction 
support in the context of complex peacekeeping operations; 
• establishing a continental early warning network; 
• developing continental and regional institutional capacity for conflict 
prevention; 
• establishing priority regional logistics depots; 
• standardising doctrines and other civilian and military training materials; 
• enhancing capacity of regional peace training centres; 
• undertaking regional joint exercises; 
• existing peacekeeping initiatives in Africa; and 
• consensus-building in the OECD Development Assistance Committee to 
free up aid for peacekeeping-related activities. 
 
Existing international initiatives provided considerable activity in this area on 
which to build, and the Joint Plan demonstrated a political commitment to 
make progress in enhancing African peacekeeping capacity. However, a 
number of problems have hampered the practical follow-up to this process, to 
explore concrete ways of implementing the aspirations of the Joint Plan, not 
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least confusion both among and between G8 and African partners regarding 
where and how to proceed mutually and effectively. 
 
Attempts have previously been made to enhance G8/Africa coordination, 
notably the Africa Partnership Forum (APF). The APF was established in 
response to the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) in 2001, when leaders of the G8 agreed to set up a committee of 
high-level personal representatives to work with the NEPAD steering 
committee. The personal representatives were tasked with developing a Plan 
of Action in support of NEPAD, which resulted in the G8 Action Plan which 
was presented at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 200X. The committee 
developed into the APF. 
 
APF membership comprises the G8 countries as well as 11 other states that 
make significant development assistance contributions to Africa, including the 
Nordic countries and the Netherlands. Together, these countries account for 
some 98% of ODA to Africa. The President of the European Commission is 
also a member, while the APF further includes personal representatives of the 
heads of five key international institutions: the IMF, the OECD, the World 
Bank, the WTO and the UN. Finally, it also incorporates the African members 
of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee 
(HSGIC), as well as the heads of the AU recognised Regional Economic 
Communities, the Head of the African Development Bank and the heads of 
state or government of Africa’s principal industrialised development partners.  
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The APF provides a forum for dialogue and monitoring policy issues, strategy 
and priorities to support African development.330 A key stated objective of the 
APF aims is to set up a Joint Action Plan that brings together the 
commitments made by African states and their development partners to 
tackle the continent’s development needs. The terms of reference of the APF 
decree that it should not establish any new bureaucracy or institutions; nor 
should it duplicate the work of other fora.331  
 
Research suggests that the APF has an unwieldy agenda, and, combined with 
the fact that it has no follow up mechanism between meetings, its focus risks 
being blurred and, hence, its effectiveness impaired. It also lacks sectoral 
coordination (i.e. for governance, peace and security, etc.). Its remit is strictly 
restricted to strategic thinking and the information sharing, and it is not 
mandated to deliver on the various commitments made by its partners, only 
monitor and review them. All of these factors hamper its effectiveness as a 
coordinating mechanism.332 
 
G8 perspectives on implementing the Joint Plan 
 
The following section outlines G8 perspectives on implementing the Joint 
Plan. Analysis is based on feedback from officials from the Canadian 
                                            
330 Revised Terms of Reference for Africa Partnership Forum, 5 October 2005. para 3.  
331 Revised Terms of Reference for Africa Partnership Forum, 5 October 2005, paras 6 and 6. 
332 Ramsbotham, A,  Bah, A, and Calder, C (2005), The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 
Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, 
Chatham House, pp. 59-60. 
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government, the French government, the German government, the Japanese 
government, the UK government and the US Government.333 Field research 
methodology involved face-to-face interviews with key officials, as well as on 
telephone and e-mail interviews, and it included meetings in Paris, London 
and Washington. Key areas of activity covered include the following: G8 
activities at continental and regional levels; operational support; promoting 
coordination with African partners and among G8 Member States; institutional 
capacity-building; training; G8 deployments; and logistical and equipment 
support. Interviews with donors were based on the following set of eight 
questions, which were forwarded to interviewees prior to interviews, although 
there was often considerable scope for wider discussion:334 
 
9. What activities are your government currently undertaking towards the 
implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African 
Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations? 
 
10. Are you planning any new activities in this area?  If so, can you share 
information about these plans with us?   
 
                                            
333 The joint Chatham House/UNA-UK/ISS project (see note XX above) also interviewed 
officials from the United Nations, and from the European Union and the European 
Council, during visits to New York and to Brussels. However, data from these 
interviews has been incorporated into the UN and EU chapters of this thesis, 
respectively. 
334 Interviews were primarily undertaken under the ‘Chatham House’ rule, whereby quotes 
and information are non-attributable. A list of interviewees in included in Annex XX, 
although some wished to remain anonymous. Information in this section is accurate 
as of April 2005. Nevertheless, this provides a useful ‘snapshot’ of the types of 
assistance that works- or does not - as the project was intended to deliver. Updates 
of processes and activities are included when and where relevant. 
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11. Have you carried out or commissioned any surveys of PSO335 capacity 
or capacity building programmes in Africa?  If so, can you share these 
with us? 
 
12. What areas of PSO capacity building or individual PSO capacity building 
projects do you think have been most successful?  Why do you think 
that they have succeeded?  
 
13. What areas of the Joint Plan are your government’s highest priority as 
an individual donor nation? 
 
14. Which areas of the Joint plan do you think would be most promising 
for increased joint effort between African and G8 countries in general? 
 
15. What are the key challenges that you think will need to be addressed 
in order for the Joint Plan to be successfully implemented. 
 
16. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as 
presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? 
 
                                            
335 Please note that the Joint Plan refers to ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSOs). These are 
synonymous with complex peacekeeping, as defined in chapter 2. Where 
interviewees refer to PSOs, therefore, this should be understood as complex 
peacekeeping operations. 
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The Canadian government and the implementation of the Joint 
Plan336 
 
Peacekeeping is an important aspect of Canada's national heritage, a 
significant component of its foreign policy and of its contribution to the 
multilateral security system. Canadian peacekeeping policy is informed by fifty 
years of experience in UN peacekeeping operations. Canadian involvement in 
international peace support operations has expanded beyond the primarily 
military traditional peacekeeping deployments of the Cold War, in response to 
the involvement in complex emergencies.337 
 
Canada’s Africa policy supports a new vision for Africa led by NEPAD. Canada 
has taken a leading role in supporting that vision with the $500-million 
Canada Fund for Africa (CFA).338 This fund is part of the Canadian 
contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP) approved in June 2002 at the 
G8 Summit in Kananaskis. Both the APP and CFA are built on the priorities 
identified in NEPAD and recognise the right of Africans to take control and 
ownership of their own path to development. The CFA complements ongoing 
programmes of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and 
                                            
336 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on e-mail interviews with representatives of 
the Canadian government, September 2004; see Ramsbotham, A,  Bah, A, and 
Calder, C (2005), The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African 
Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, Chatham House, pp. 12-13. 
337 Canada and Peace Support Operations , www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menuen. 
asp 
338 Canada Fund for Africa http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/canadafundforafrica G8 Online, 
www.g8online.org 
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is a key element in the Agency's bilateral cooperation programme in Africa, 
which will total more than C$6 billion over the five years up to 2010. 
 
Ottawa states that both of the part Canadian funded Regional Centres of 
Excellence (RCEs) at Koulikoro and Accra in West Africa made rapid progress 
in meeting the needs of peacekeeping training. Canada was looking into 
expanding training opportunities for the humanitarian and civilian police 
clients in peacekeeping, beyond the emphasis on military training at the time 
of interview. Progress at the RCEs reflects a strong donor technical and 
managerial presence. Although, this comes with a cost in the relativeLY slow 
transfer of real ownership to African leadership at either Koulikoro or Accra. 
 
Activities that the Canadian government has undertaken to support delivery of 
the Joint Plan 
 
Canada was providing C$4million support for capacity-building at the AU, and 
was also supporting the AU to enhance its conflict management capacities in 
a C$4 million project enabling a rapid response team of military observers to 
Burundi and the creation of a Special AU Representative for the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict. Canada was also providing C$1.0 million through 
CIDA to assist the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) to investigate human rights abuses in Darfur. 
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Canada provided C$15 million for West Africa Peace and Security Initiative 
(PSI), which includes: 
 
• C$4.5million to strengthen the ECOWAS peacekeeping and conflict 
management capabilities by supporting eight professional staff for a 
mission planning cell; four African staff 13 for a small arms unit; an 
ECOWAS scholarship fund enabling ECOWAS Member States to send 
participants to peacekeeping training courses; and a contribution to the 
ECOWAS peace fund on the completion of an appropriate management 
system. 
• C$3.0 million to the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in 
partnership with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to deliver courses and 
train African trainers. 
• Two PSI projects aimed at helping combat the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) in West Africa, including a regional SALW 
program and an arms for development program managed by UNDP Sierra 
Leone and supported by other donors, such as the UK, the Netherlands 
and Norway. 
• PSI is planning an expanded civilian police (CIVPOL) training program in 
association with KAIPTC and the Mali-based Ecole de formation au 
maintien de la paix de Koulikoro. 
 
Operational support 
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Canada has supported peace consolidation in DRC, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Angola in areas such as CIVPOL, the Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth 
Commission, DDRR and land-mine clearance. Approximate 2004/05 assessed 
commitments to UN peacekeeping in Africa included to UNMIL ($9.0 million); 
to UNOCI ($8.4 million); and to ONUB ($4.3 million). (Total Canadian 
contribution to UN peacekeeping in 03/04 was $78 million; the estimate for 
04/05 was $196 million, reflecting the surge in demand). 
 
Other contributions 
 
In response to the G8 Action Plan on expanding global peacekeeping 
capabilities, Canada was proposing to focus on the African security framework 
by: 
 
• Supporting the development of an ECOWAS peacekeeping standing force. 
• Deepening support for African peacekeeping training through RCEs and 
staff colleges. 
• Contributing to G8 peacekeeping logistics arrangements, and 
• Extending further support to the AU in the development of its security 
framework through training and technical assistance as appropriate. 
 
Support was proposed at C$50 million over five years. Canada is an active 
participant in coordination meetings among African and donor partners to 
implement relevant plans on peacekeeping, including Washington 7-8 October 
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2004 meeting on the clearinghouse concept and annual ECOWAS/donor 
meeting 22-23 November 2004 in Abuja.339 
 
The French government and the implementation of the Joint Plan340 
 
France’s African peace and security policy is based around two fundamental 
principles:341 
 
• An understanding that the on-going proliferation of armed conflicts in 
Africa produces a disproportionate need for conflict management 
mechanisms on the continent. 
• A response to Africa’s increasing willingness to develop its own conflict 
management capabilities. French policy is not to disengage from Africa, 
but rather to develop Franco-African joint crisis-management approaches. 
French policy for Africa pursues the combined aims of supporting both 
African regional peace and security initiatives, and cooperative responses 
to African peace and security issues, among Europeans/donors and 
between Europeans/donors and Africans. 
 
                                            
339 For more on the ‘clearing house’, see: US Congressional Research Service, (2005), The 
Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, Report for 
Congress, 16 February, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/rl32773.pdf  
340 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on face-to-face interviews with 
representatives of the French government, Ministère de la Défense (MINDEF), Paris, 
October 2004. 
341 French Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (2004), Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping 
Capacities, Last update: 15/06/04, 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=42813 
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The main channel for implementing this policy is France’s Renforcement des 
Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) programme. RECAMP 
has been developed since 1997 as a mechanism to establish an open 
partnership to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity, in terms of training, 
equipment and exercises. At present RECAMP activities include annual 
manoeuvres, field exercises and seminars. 
 
Paris described the Joint Plan as a high priority for France. Paris was 
instrumental in the development of the Joint Plan, from the G8 Summit in 
Kananaskis in 2002 through to Evian in 2003. Although G8 declarations are 
not binding, France interprets the Joint Plan as a formal commitment. 
However, more generally it is in French interests that the G8 process remains 
somewhat informal, as all French policy relating to African peacekeeping has 
the EU as its first reference point.  
 
French policy does not support ‘going in alone’. France believes that European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Africa should be developed within the 
context of the relevant regional body and regional deployment. Whereas the 
ESDP Operation Artemis, which operated alongside the UN mission (MONUC) 
in eastern DRCongo, included no African troops, French Licornes forces 
operating alongside the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire included Africans and 
emphasised cooperation and collaboration within the region. Licorne forces 
operate under a mandate from the UN Security Council. 
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Activities that the French government has undertaken to support delivery of 
the Joint Plan 
 
RECAMP lies at the heart of French peace and security engagement in Africa 
and includes elements of doctrine and programmatic activities. Paris asserts 
that RECAMP is highly integrated and involves education, field training and 
equipment support, including for use operationally. It is directed by the 
Ministère de la Défense (MINDEF), alongside the Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangères (MAE), and it aims to bring together civilian and military leaders 
and policy makers from all the various regions of Africa. RECAMP has been 
developed to reflect African-specific needs and has evolved to complement AU 
peace and security policy and support the development of the ASF. It was 
originally designed to support African peace and security at the regional level, 
which remains its main purpose. 
 
Coordination 
 
French approaches to promoting coordination work at three levels, as 
follows:342 
 
• Political level RECAMP aims to support the development of regional 
mechanisms for strategic surveillance, warning and analysis in order to 
                                            
342 Ministère de la Défense (France) (2004), The RECAMP 
Programme,www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/actualites/recampgb.htm 
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enhance African regional bodies and Member States consultation and 
political decisionmaking capacity. 
• Politico-military level RECAMP seeks to support the development of conflict 
prevention and conflict management capacity in African regional 
structures. There is a joint emphasis on capacity to prepare and capacity 
to command conflict prevention and management activity. 
• Military level RECAMP training courses enhance the capacity for African 
forces to work cooperatively by teaching standard peacekeeping skills. 
This activity has taken place in relation to various RECs. 
 
French internal coordination 
 
The French were in the process of considering how to improve their internal 
coordination. Paris set up a ‘think tank’, established by the Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères (MAE), which was exploring ways to enhance coordination 
between relevant departments, including: the MAE; the Ministères de la 
Défence (MINDEF) and de la Justice; and the Agence Française de 
Dévelopement. This was taking place within the context of a French 
government paper examining the links between conflict prevention, conflict 
management and conflict resolution. Pierre-André Wiltzer was appointed as 
minister dealing with conflict issues and French input into enhancing 
peacekeeping capacity globally, operating cross-departmentally. He was 
mandated by the Prime Minister and is attached to the MAE. 
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Institutional capacity-building 
 
France was providing ongoing support to the development of the AU’s 
institutional capacity to deliver its peace and security mandate. This support 
included the provision of an Attaché de Défense (AD) in Addis Ababa; 
assistance with the development of the ASF - given by MINDEF through its 
Plan des Operations Conjointes (POC) for the AU; and the provision of training 
for AU staff at the Institute des Haute Etude de la Défense Nationale 
(IHEDN). In addition, France hosted a donor meeting on the African 
clearinghouse in May 2004. 
 
France was also committed to supporting the development of institutional 
peacekeeping capacity in the African regional bodies. In addition to the 
regional RECAMP work in training and operational activities France provides 
the following regional support: 
 
• In Western Africa France posted an AD Accredité and an Assistant Militaire 
Technique (AMT) to ECOWAS. 
• In Eastern Africa France posted an AD Accredité to Djibouti who is 
supporting the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade 
(EASBRIG). 
• In Central Africa France posted an AD Accredité to GABON to provides 
support to the Economic Community of Central African States 
(CEMAC/ECCAS). 
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• In Southern Africa, France was developing plans to deploy a regional 
conflict adviser to work alongside the UK Regional Conflict Adviser (see 
below). 
 
Training 
 
RECAMP training activities involve both initial and advanced training.343 
RECAMP  training is intended for personnel that have already received a basic 
training. The training is conducted in connection with the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). 
 
RECAMP training is given at both individual and collective level. Individual 
training is carried out in France at institutes including IHEDN and the Paris 
College Interarmées de Défense (CID); and in Africa at training institutes that 
the French have supported which include the Command and Staff colleges in 
Koulikoro (Mali) or Libreville (Gabon) and the peacekeeping school in 
Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire).344 For example, the latter runs three courses for 
three different levels of officers: multinational brigade HQ staff officers, 
battalion HQ staff officers and observer officers. It offere 15 to 20 places per 
year per course. All instructors and trainees are African, with instructors 
required to complete a specific DPKO course. Collective training is given by 
French Détachements D’instruction Opérationnelle (DIOs) or by technical 
                                            
343 Rear-Admiral Alain Coldefy (2004), Deputy Head of the French Armed Forces, Speech 
made at RECAMP IV POL/MIL Seminar, 24 May 2004, 
www.recamp4.org/uk/coldefy.php 
344 Formerly located in Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire), intended to be relocated in Bamako in 2006. 
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training detachments (DITs). Advanced Training Programmes are organised in 
two-year cycles comprising three components: 
 
1. A major cycle for one sub-Saharan region (e.g. ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, 
SADC). 
2. Intermediate cycles in the other three regions. 
3. Ad-hoc exercises outside the cycle. 
 
Advanced training is organised jointly by France and an African country, and 
is carried out at regional level. It is intended to provide pre-trained units with 
additional training to facilitate their operation in a multinational environment. 
All training is exclusively related to peacekeeping. 
 
Major cycles are focused at the strategic level on inter-operational activities 
and are aimed at training an entire chain of command for a peacekeeping 
operation. Planning for exercises begins with an induction conference at the 
regional HQ, stressing their regional dimension. For example, RECAMP IV 
(ECOWAS) began in June 2003 with a politico-military seminar in Abuja to 
prepare an Initial Planning Directive (IDP); the operational concept was then 
planned at a strategic conference in June 2004; exercise BENIN 2004 was 
then planned for December 2004. 
 
Intermediate cycles can take place every two years in regions where no major 
exercise is happening. They are supported by pre-positioned French troops. 
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For example, exercise NICUSY 2004 (Mozambique, June 2004) was organised 
by the armed forces of the southern zone of the Indian Ocean and the 
Mozambican military authorities and involved around 11 southern African 
countries, plus Portugal and France. 
 
Out of cycle exercises These enable France to respond to initiatives from 
African and non-African countries, such as Gabon’s Exercise BIYONGHO. 
 
Operational support 
 
RECAMP supports individual UN or African peace operations in the following 
ways: Force generation – RECAMP expertise assists in the generation of the 
force and equipment from RECAMP depots in Cape Verde, Gabon and even 
directly from France. RECAMP can support operational projection movements, 
as well as their operational readiness through French DIOs. 
 
Mission support  
 
Mission support can involve: diplomatic support; military support for 
information exchange or planning, assisting operational command structures, 
stationing officers/liaison detachments with contingents; and deploying a non-
African force. Co-deployment – French Licorne forces operating in Cote 
d’Ivoire are more acceptable in theatre because they are operating alongside 
ECOWAS, where France provides robust, Chapter VII response capacity within 
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this partnership. ECOWAS forces learn important lessons from deployment 
with French partners relating to essential operational skills including assembly, 
command and supply. Licorne forces are also formally embedded within 
ECOWAS structures. 
 
Deployments 
 
As at April 2005, French support for African peacekeeping operations included 
the following deployments: 
 
• Côte d’Ivoire – France has provided 4,000 troops as part of Operation 
Licorne which has supported the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(ECOMICI) and followed by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); 
DIO and support equipment for Togolese troops serving with MICECI 
(note, MICECI has been integrated into MINUCI, under Senegalese 
command). 
• Liberia – France has provided one military liaison officer with the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). 
• DRC – France has provided prepositioning forces, DIO, civil policing and 
equipment support for Senegalese forces serving with ECOMICI and the 
UN Organisation Mission in DRCongo (MONUC). 
• Burundi – Two French DIOs supporting Ethiopian forces serving with the 
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). 
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• CAR – A three person DIO team, preposition forces and equipment 
support has been provided to the Force de la CEMAC (deployed in the 
Central African Republic). 
 
Logistics and equipment 
 
France has equipment pre-positioned to support African peacekeeping 
battalions at three locations: Dakar, Djiobouti and Libreville. RECAMP 
battalions are organised according to UN battalion criteria, comprising 608 
personnel and 109 vehicles, as follows: 
 
• 1 HQ and HQ company (154 personnel) 
• 3 peacekeeping companies (3 x 123 personnel) 
• 1 humanitarian transport company (85 personnel) 
 
French forces provide command assets (signals), individual equipment 
(combat-dress and individual weapons) and vehicles. Dakar also has 1 field 
hospital with a capacity of 100 beds. 
 
The German Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan345 
 
Germany’s contribution to peacekeeping initiatives in Africa seeks to coincide 
with the priorities of NEPAD, and the implementation of the G8 Africa Action 
                                            
345 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on e-mail interviews with representatives of 
the German government, September 2004. 
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Plan (AAP). German offers of peace and security partnership focus on 
strengthening African capability to prevent and manage armed conflict, 
particularly by enhancing the security institutions of regional organisations 
and the African Union (AU). 
 
The German government attaches high importance to enhancing African crisis 
prevention and resolution capabilities, in view of the persistence of armed 
conflict on the continent, which is obstructing development in the countries 
and regions concerned.346 German policy stresses strengthening the long-term 
capability of African political actors to prevent and resolve armed conflict 
without diminishing the global responsibility of the international community of 
states under the leadership of the UN Security Council for peacekeeping and 
peacemaking. The German government realises these aims through its 
Equipment Aid Programme. It supports the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra. 
 
Activities that the German government has undertaken to support delivery of 
the Joint Plan 
 
DEU was providing assistance in setting up the KAIPTC. A German staff officer 
was serving at the KAIPTC as a CIMIC instructor. DEU was supporting the UK 
                                            
346 Peter Linder (2004), Relations between Germany and Africa, Speech by the German 
Ambassador at the Command & Staff College in Accra, 27 July 2004, 
www.accra.diplo.de/en/botschaft/archiv/speech_270704a.html 
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Peace Support Training Centre (PSCT), and was participating at the RECAMP 
IV Exercises. 
 
Logistics and equipment 
 
Germany was considering combining military equipment aid projects with 
CIMIC courses for African officers. Berlin also considered Germany’s military 
equipment aid and military educational aid as ‘flanking’ measures. 
 
The Japanese Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan347 
 
Japan’s Africa peace and security policy stems from an understanding that 
global stability and prosperity in the 21st century is impossible without 
resolving problems in Africa.348 This rationale lies behind the Japanese 
Government’s initiative, the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD), launched in 1993. Through the TICAD process, Japan 
supports Africa, through the AU and NEPAD initiatives. Japan's TICAD process 
emphasises the consolidation of peace as a prerequisite for development. 
Japan asserted that the fact that the AU is now actively engaging in more 
peace-related activities than ever before opens a distinct opportunity to 
realise peace in Africa. Japan would continue to support African efforts. For 
example, Japan was paying approximately 20% of the total cost of UN 
                                            
347 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on e-mail interviews with representatives of 
the Japanese government, September 2004. 
348 Junichiro Koizumi (2004), Message from the Prime Minister of Japan, on the Occasion of 
the Third Summit of the African Union, 6 July, 
www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/au/message0407.html 
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peacekeeping activities in Africa, and it would continue to assist Africa’s 
efforts for consolidating peace, such as through disarmament, demobilisation, 
reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) and landmine clearance activities in 
various regions of Africa. 
 
Activities that the Japanese Government has undertaken towards the delivery 
of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan 
 
Japanese efforts to support the Joint Plan included the following: 
 
• In line with ‘related activities’ stipulated in the Joint Plan, Japan has 
supported peace consolidation in DRCongo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Angola in areas such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
and land-mine clearance. Japan also provided more than $40 million to 
UNHCR for its assistance for refugees and displaced persons in Africa 
(2004). 
• In 2003 Japan contributed $315 million to the UN peace operations in 
Africa. 
• Japan has been cooperating with the AU and ECOWAS in their 
peacemaking activities and peace conference processes. 
• In line with commitments made at Sea Island to support global capacity-
building for peacekeeping, the Japanese government was planning to 
support KAIPTC by cooperating in holding seminars as well as capacity-
building measures. 
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The UK Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan349 
 
The UK’s peace and security policy for Africa stresses African ‘ownership’ of 
local solutions to violent conflict, highlighting the need for Africa to address 
shortcomings in its regional security structures and conflict prevention 
mechanisms.350 It states that the international system, under the leadership 
of the UN and driven by the political and financial muscle of the G8, can help 
facilitate African processes. The UK also believes that the evolving EU 
relationship with the AU and sub-regional organisations has an important role 
to play in supporting African peacekeeping.351 
 
The UK welcomes the progress made by the AU in developing an African 
peace and security architecture as a means to enable Africans to take on 
responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management. UK policy 
asserts that traditional forms of peacekeeping and diplomacy have proved 
ineffective in Africa. Therefore, the focus at the time of writing was on 
building African capacity for a broad range of peacekeeping activities, ranging 
from preventive measures to peace enforcement. Conflict management and 
peacebuilding form the core of UK Africa policy. This is reflected in the 
                                            
349 Unless otherwise stated, information is based on a series of interviews with officials from 
the UK Foreign Office (Pan Africa Policy Unit), MOD and DFID, in London and in 
Africa, between April 2004-April 2005. 
350 DFID (2004), The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool – An Information Document. A Joint UK 
Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing ConfLict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
September 2004 
351 The UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa, FCO Website, 
www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=P 
age&cid=1017756005037 
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establishment of the cross-departmental Africa Conflict Prevention Pool 
(ACPP), comprising the Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD). The ACPP is designed to maximise the impact of conflict prevention 
work undertaken by these three departments. 
 
The UK’s conflict prevention strategy for Africa has developed from 
experiences in mediation, peacekeeping and peacekeeping training, and 
Security Sector Review (SSR). The UK emphasises coordinating its conflict 
prevention activities in Africa with donor partners in the EU, the G8 and the 
World Bank, and with African partners. The UK currently has prioritised Africa 
during its G8 and EU Presidencies in 2005. The report of the Commission for 
Africa, which was launched by the UK Prime Minster in 2004 to allow “a fresh 
look” at African needs, was seen as a key input to this process. 
 
Activities that the UK has undertaken to support delivery of the Joint 
Africa/G8 Plan352 
 
The UK was providing ongoing support to the development of the AU’s 
institutional capacity to deliver its peace and security mandate. The UK 
continues to promote G8+ peacekeeping donor contact groups in key 
peacekeeping capitals such as Abuja, Addis, Nairobi and Pretoria. The UK has 
                                            
352 Unless otherwise stated, all material is based on face-to-face interviews with 
representatives of the UK government, August 2004 and February 2005. 
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also been encouraging the convening of a donor coordination conference by 
the AU. 
 
The UK’s institutional support to ECOWAS, IGAD and limited support for SADC 
aims to enable these regional bodies to coordinate better with the AU and 
donors. The UK believes coordination with the US and France (the P3) works 
particularly well, notrably in the context of ECOWAS. 
 
The UK has participated in donor clearinghouse meetings on African peace 
and security capacity-building in France in May and Washington in October 
2004. 
 
The ACPP is the main vehicle to ensure effective cross-government 
coordination and it successfully helps facilitating a more strategic and 
comprehensive approach to addressing conflict in SSA. 
 
Institutional capacity-building 
 
The UK was supporting the development of a Strategic Management Capacity 
at the AU and a functional PSC. Through the EU, the UK was continuing to 
assist the AU develop the institutional capacity needed to support the PSC. 
The UK Defence Attaché based in Addis Ababa (DA Addis) advises the AU on 
military affairs while the UK’s RCA for the Horn of Africa (also based in Addis) 
was the key point of contact for wider UK assistance to the AU. 
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[CHECK/UPDATE] He provides advice to the AU where required. A DFID/FCO-
funded post from June 2005 was to focus on AU and ECA institution-building. 
 
West Africa both the UK RCA (based in Abuja) and UK Liaison Officer to 
ECOWAS support the development of the ECOWAS Secretariat, including its 
military planning capacity. The UK was providing £2m for course development 
and recruitment of key regional staff for the ECOWAS Regional Standby 
Brigade (ECOBRIG) and a P3-backed UK team from Permanent Joint HQ 
(PJHQ) had been assisting in its development. There were also plans to fund 
a research project on the broader requirements of ECOBRIG, in particular at 
the pol-mil strategic level which KAIPTC will be asked to carry out. 
 
East Africa RCA (Addis) supports capacity-building in East Africa. The UK was 
also supporting the development of the East Africa Regional Standby Brigade 
(EASBRIG). The UK was funding the establishment of the EASBRIG planning 
element (PLANELM) and the International Mine Action Training Centre 
(IMATC) in Nairobi. 
 
Southern Africa The RCA for Southern Africa (Pretoria) supports capacity-
building for SADC. This support is linked to implementing the Strategic 
Indicative Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO). A more comprehensive SADC 
peace and security assistance package was under consideration. 
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Central Africa The RCA for Central Africa (Nairobi) provides advice and 
support for peacekeeping in the Great Lakes Region. 
 
UK Defence Attaches (DAs) provide military advice and support in-country in 
the following capitals: 
 
• West Africa – Abuja, Accra and Freetown. 
• Eastern Africa – Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi. 
• Central Africa – Kinshasa and Luanda. 
• Southern Africa – Harare and Pretoria. 
 
Training 
 
West Africa the British Military Advisory Training Team (West Africa) (BMATT-
WA), based in Accra, was supporting the development of Ghanaian Armed 
Forces (GAF). It was also supporting the Ghanaian Command and Staff 
College (GAFCSC) and KAIPTC over regional peacekeeping capacity-building. 
The UK was sponsoring a Training Needs Analysis for ECOBRIG. The UK has 
also contributed to the French RECAMP IV command post training exercise in 
West Africa and made a financial contribution to the Bamako Tactical Training 
School (Mali). IMATT Sierra Leone is a special case where the UK provides 
training for the entire Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces as well as advice 
on security sector reform. 
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Eastern Africa the British Peace Support Team (East Africa) (BPST-EA), based 
in Nairobi, was coordinating UK military assistance to armed forces in Eastern 
Africa to contribute to SSR and to increase peacekeeping capacity. In this 
context, it was also supporting the Peace Support Training Centre based in 
Nairobi (minor infrastructure projects and courses sponsoring). 
 
Southern Africa BPST (SA) carries out peacekeeping training with South 
African National Defence Forces (SANDF) to further build peacekeeping 
capacity in SANDF, so that they are better prepared and trained for 
peacekeepings in DRCongo, Burundi and so on. It also provides some 
infrastructure projects for peacekeeping training schools. In addition, a 
number of UK short term training teams (STTT) are deployed each year to 
SSA and a variety of UK-based strategic training courses are regularly 
sponsored (Sandhurst, RCDS etc). 
 
Doctrine 
 
The UK and France have offered the AU assistance in the development of an 
agreed, common African peacekeeping doctrine, to support interoperability 
between national contingents as part of the operationalisation of the ASF. 
 
Operational Support  
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The UK was providing the following to ongoing African peacekeeping 
operations: 
 
• Côte d’Ivoire – Financial support to the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(ECOMICI), including an up to £2m support package for the GAF 
deployment; 
• Liberia – Three staff officers to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) HQ who 
are involved in planning, operations and intelligence and £2m to support 
the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL); 
• Sierra Leone – 22 staff and observers to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) HQ; 
• Sudan – Two Colonels supporting the south Sudan peace process; and two 
advance posts deployed to support planning for potential UN Monitoring 
Mission in Sudan; 
• DRCongo – Five staff to the UN Mission in the DRCongo (MONUC) HQ and 
£1m support for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
deployment to MONUC; 
• Burundi – Equipment and £3.6m assistance for the deployment of a 
Mozambican contingent to the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). 
 
Police Cooperation, Training and Instruction 
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The UK was supporting a range of activities aimed at developing civil policing 
capacity across Africa.353 These include: 
 
• ‘Train-the-trainer’ courses aimed at bringing about more consistent 
standards of training for civilian police officers for deployment to UN 
missions. Police personnel from the following African countries were 
trained (in Africa) in 2003: Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia, 
Cameroon, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia. Two courses are planned in Africa in 2005 (Kenya – January, 
Ghana – February/March), but it is yet to be confirmed which African 
countries will send participants. 
• Continuation courses in the UK trained personnel from the following 
countries in 2003: Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Botswana, Zambia, 
Gambia, Cameroon and South Africa. 
• Additional support is provided in Kenya, through training courses for 
Kenyan police officers and development of Kenyan trainers. 
• Ten UK police officers are serving in Sierra Leone, training and mentoring 
the local police force to bring them up to international standards. 
 
The US Government and the implementation of the Joint Plan354 
 
                                            
353 FCO,The UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa, FCO Website, 
www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page
&cid=1017756005037 
354 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with 
officials from the US State Department and the Pentagon, in Washington and in Addis 
Ababa, between June and September 2004. 
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American officials stressed that the ‘war-on-terror’ had increased US emphasis 
on building stability as a means of undermining havens/breeding grounds for 
terrorists. This included areas otherwise perceived as non-strategic, such as 
Africa. Major causes of instability in Africa identified by the US included 
diamonds, drugs and terrorism, as well as issues such as poverty and poor 
governance. Africa is the region most in need of support for overall 
development and peacekeeping capacity. US focus was on supporting 
indigenous African peacekeeping capacity, rather than direct US operational 
involvement. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
Program (ACOTA) is the primary US mechanism to help build African peace 
and security capacity. It was launched in spring 2002 to support peace 
operations and humanitarian assistance capabilities among selected African 
armies, providing peacekeeping training, technical assistance, mentoring and 
field equipment. Its aims are to train African militaries to provide the 
backbone of African peacekeeping operations. ACOTA evolved from the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which was launched in early 1997. 
The ACRI had replaced the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), which had 
been launched in 1996.355  
 
The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) had emerged in the context of the 
Burundi crisis in 1996. The ACRF aimed to set up an African force within six 
months, for which Washington suggested it might have provided airlift and 
                                            
355 Center for International Policy, US Security Assistance to Africa, 
www.ciponline.org/Africa/aid/imet.htm 
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some logistics.356 The ACRF never got beyond the conceptual stage, due, 
amongst other things, to opposition to the ACRF rationale from both Africa 
and Europe. It was, therefore, soon repackaged as the ACRI, reflecting a shift 
in focus away from developing a force to developing a capacity. Under ACRI, 
which cost around $15 million a year, national contingents would get training 
and equipment for traditional peacekeeping (i.e. without an enforcement 
capacity). Stress was placed on promoting sustainable African capacity. An 
emphasis on African countries keeping operational control of their national 
units helped persuade eight countries to sign up for ACRI programmes at 
battalion and brigade levels. But dissatisfaction remained among recipients 
and in the US: recipients perceived ACRI reflected US interests more than 
their own; and the Pentagon was unhappy that the State Department’s 
selection criteria did not always match recipients’ willingness to contribute 
troops for peacekeeping operations.357 
 
In response to the capture of peacekeepers deployed to Sierra Leone in May 
2000, Washington developed a subsequent capacity-building initiative: 
Operation Focus Relief (OFR).358 OFR was substantially different from ACRI, in 
that it would supply lethal equipment. It also aimed to tackle some of the 
problems associated with ACRI, not least a shared understanding with 
                                            
356 The plan was undermined by difficulties, including African states’ perceptions of a lack of 
consultation with them, combined with a failure to acknowledge the potential of 
regional bodies such as the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
357 Ramsbotham A, Bah A, and Calder, F, (2005), Enhancing African peace and security 
capacity: a useful role for the UK and the G8?, International Affairs, 81.2, p. 68 
358 Eric Berman, Recent dvelopments in US peacekeeping policy and assistance to Africa, 
Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 13: 2, 2004, 
www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/ CBerman.pdf. 
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recipient countries (Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria) that their troops would be 
deployed to the Sierra Leone operation using materiel provided by OFR.359 
 
In spring 2002, the Bush administration replaced the ACRI with ACOTA. This 
was intended to provide training for selected African countries in 
peacekeeping operations, as well as regular military tactics and some logistic 
support. ACOTA commands commensurate funding levels to ACRI, and it 
retains many of its components. But Washington has asserted that the 
programme has been adapted in some fundamental areas: 
 
• supplying support packages tailored for recipient needs; 
• using the ‘train-the-trainer’ concept to establish sustainability; and 
• incorporating support for building peace enforcement capacity (although 
this has largely been restricted to training). 
 
Under ACOTA, the US revised the ACRI concept in some fundamental areas 
including: 
 
• Supplying support packages, tailored for recipients’ requirements; 
• Using the ‘train-the-trainer’ concept to set up long-term sustainability; and 
• Helping build peace enforcement capacity. 
 
                                            
359 See Eric G. Berman, Recent dvelopments in US peacekeeping policy and assistance to 
Africa, Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 13: 2, 2004, 
www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/ CBerman.pdf. 
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The ACOTA program was incorporated within the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), a US programme to develop peacekeeping capacity globally, 
which was adopted by the G8 at Sea Island in 2004. GPOI support for Africa 
includes training and equipping units as part of the ACOTA program, 
maintaining equipment for deploying peacekeeping units, and enhancing the 
ability of the headquarters staffs from the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-
regional organisations to plan for and carry out peacekeeping missions, , as 
appropriate. 
 
Activities the US is undertaking towards the delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 
Plan 
 
In 2004, the ACOTA budget was around $15 million, and this was intended to 
be increased under GPOI in 2005 and for the remainder of the five-year 
initiative. In addition, the US pledged to dedicate resources towards 
enhancing the HQ element of the AU and ECOWAS and other sub-regional 
organisations, as appropriate. Furthermore, GPOI funds would also be used to 
enable the US to procure and cache equipment that would be available for 
deploying peacekeeping units. Specific activities that the US is currently 
undertaking towards the delivery of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan include the 
following: 
 
Institutional capacity-building 
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A US adviser was embedded at ECOWAS HQ in Abuja, helping to enhance its 
strategic management capacity through staff assistance work and training. 
The US was also assisting ECOWAS communications, which, at the time of 
writing, continued to rely on telephone and fax. Washington has been in the 
process of establishing 24 hour electronic communications between Abuja, 
connecting ECOWAS PAD staff and national MODs, including all Member 
States except Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso. Washington was 
also intending to extend its to video-conferencing, as well as a deployment 
package, for use in operations. Operationalising the ECOWAS system has 
experienced problems, but efforts were being made to overcome these. 
Washington had also expressed its willingness to assist with AU/regional 24 
hour connectivity. 
 
Coordination 
 
The US stated it had hosted a donors’ clearinghouse meeting, to exchange 
information on efforts to enhance African peace and security. This took place 
from 7 – 8 October 2004 in Washington, and involved representatives of all 
G8 Member States, the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the UN and NATO. The US 
government recalled that the clearinghouse concept was a G8 commitment. 
As a result of the meeting, the US volunteered to set up a website where all 
G8 members could list their activities to enhance African peacekeeping 
capabilities. 
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Training 
 
ACOTA remains the main US mechanism to train African peacekeepers. 
ACOTA works primarily bilaterally. However, ACOTA does conduct 
multinational exercises that involve several countries and the US is working to 
incorporate ECOWAS and the AU into these activities. 
 
The US government stressed that involvement in ACOTA implies a 
considerable resource commitment from host militaries, organisationally and 
in terms of resources. Washington stated that African militaries engaging with 
ACOTA need to dedicate battalion staff for two-and-a-half months and a 
whole battalion for one month. Hosts have to pay subsistence and other costs 
for participants. 
 
Three-phase training cycle  
 
In order to accommodate different standards of training within participating 
militaries, ACOTA training for battalion staff takes place in three phases: 
 
1) Basic training for the officer cadre among the whole battalion. 
2) The cadre assists US trainers to train a second battalion. 
3) The cadre trains a third battalion under US supervision. The 3-phased 
ACOTA training cycle caters for three battalions and one training cadre. 
The US government states that this method has proved highly effective, 
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ensuring that the officer cadre is familiar with all aspects of necessary 
training skills and that three battalions are also trained in the process. 
 
Following up the battalion-staff level training, entire battalions are involved in 
ACOTA field training exercises. ACOTA’s emphasis on ‘train-the-trainer’ is 
intended to support sustainable capacity-building within the context of African 
ownership of The process. ACOTA assistance focuses on skills for 
peacekeeping, which also reflects African desires. A major focus is on how to 
work together operating in multinational forces, such as in a UN mission. 
 
The ACOTA sustainability ethos was intended to be extended to equipment 
support. The type of training offered by ACOTA carries certain equipment 
requirements. Equipment packages supplied through ACOTA to African 
trainers can only be used for training purposes, in order to prevent training 
equipment being diverted for operations and so on and thereby maintaining 
longevity of training capacity among ACOTA partners. 
 
ACOTA is designed it to be flexible to respond to hosts’ requirements 
regarding specific needs, focusing tailored programmes to whatever level is 
required according to need. 
 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
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IMET programmes concentrate on academic training and contain considerable 
peacekeeping relevance, notably courses on human rights and civil-military 
relations. The IMET program provides training to more than 1,500 military 
officers from over forty African countries both in the host country and at US 
military colleges. 
 
Operational support 
 
As at spring 2005, the US government was involved in a number of 
operational support initiatives in Africa. These are summarised below: 
 
Sudan – The US provided crisis assistance to the AU over Darfur. Four 
ACOTA-trained battalions were deployed with the AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS 
1 and II). The US provided considerable funding for AMIS operational costs. 
 
Burundi – The US provided assistance, such as supporting the deployment of 
the Ethiopia contingent, to the AU mission in Burundi. 
 
Ethiopia/Eritrea – The US supplied six military observers deployed with the UN 
Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea. 
 
Liberia/Cote d’Ivoire – The US provided 81 military observer and troop 
personnel serving with the UN Mission in Liberia; the US also supplied start-up 
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and other assistance to the ECOWAS Missions in Liberia (ECOMICI) and Côte 
d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). 
 
Logistics and equipment 
 
The US was supporting AU logistics depots, which have been used 
operationally in Burundi and Darfur. 
 
In West Africa, the US was supporting the development of depots in Freetown 
and in Mali, for use by ECOWAS in the regional context. These initiatives were 
started in response to a 1999 ECOWAS initiative seeking the establishment of 
two logistics depots. 
 
G8-Africa Joint Plan: African perspectives  
 
So far this chapter has described what the G8 says it is doing to implement 
the Joint Plan. The key questions is, how does this work from an African 
perspective. In the last section of this chapter I present the results of my field 
investigation with key African partners. 
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Interviews with African partners were based on the following set of eight 
questions, although face-to-face interviews allowed considerable scope for 
further discussion:360 
 
9. Have you carried out, commissioned or taken part in any surveys of 
peace and security capacity or capacity-building programmes in your 
country, region, or Africa as a whole?  If so, could you share the 
outcomes of this work with us? 
 
10. What activities are you involved in or planning towards the 
implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan? If you are working with 
donor partners on these activities, who are they and what are they 
contributing to your efforts? 
 
11. To what extent do the terms of the Joint Plan fit with your priorities for 
developing effective African peace and security architecture, including 
the ASF/standby brigades? 
 
12. To what extent are the AU/RECs/donors coordinating their 
activities/plans for the establishment of African peace and security 
architecture and which areas would benefit most from further 
coordination? How can coordination be improved? 
                                            
360 Interviews were primarily undertaken under the ‘Chatham House’ rule, whereby quotes 
and information are non-attributable. A list of interviewees in included in Annex XX, 
although some wished to remain anonymous. Information in this section is accurate 
as of April 2005. 
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13. What are the key challenges/priorities that need to be addressed in the 
establishment and operationalisation of African peace and security 
architecture, including the ASF/standby brigades? How might 
cooperation between African and donor partners best be enhanced to 
address these? 
 
14. What areas of PSO capacity-building or individual PSO capacity-building 
projects do you think have been most successful? Why do you think 
that they have succeeded? 
 
15. What types of capacity-building support would you like to see donors 
prioritising and what other activities do you think the G8 should review 
or include in their programmes? 
 
16. What are your views on the AU/regional security architecture as 
presently foreseen as an effective conflict management system? What 
are the key institutions/mechanisms needed to operationalise African 
peace and security architecture and what are the key steps and actions 
to implement this? 
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The African Union and the implementation of the Joint Plan361 
 
The AU was beginning to carry out its own recruitment using a new approach 
which delivers significant improvements over the OAU system. However, 
Addis Ababa identified a need for a database of African peacekeeping 
expertise to facilitate recruitment. The expertise is out there, but it is not 
always easy to find it. 
 
Doctrine 
 
Some work cooperative work was being undertaken with donors to develop 
doctrine. For example Lt-Col Jenkins (UK) was working with the AU 
Secretariat on this issue. 
 
Unrealistic donor demands 
 
The AU stated that donors need to have patience towards the evolving African 
Peace and Security Architecture. Africans will make mistakes and lessons are 
not learned overnight; the EU and UN continue to make mistakes too. The AU 
believes that it often does a better job than people acknowledge and than 
other bodies could manage. It thinks that donors should have more 
                                            
361 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with 
officials from the AU, undertaken in Addis Ababa and in London, between September 
and December 2004. 
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confidence in Africans, and should remember that donors’ record of 
involvement in African crises has not been that good. 
 
G8 process 
 
The AU asserted that the G8 has the potential to be an important partner in 
the development of the AU peace and security architecture, but that it should 
not be the sole centre of gravity for donor engagement, as this risks 
alienating other key stakeholders in the process. The AU considered the Joint 
Plan to be a useful agreement. The AU felt there were discontinuities within 
the G8 process and commitments. It cited the Sea Island Summit outcomes, 
which pledge to train 75,000 troops without mentioning any of the logistical 
support that will be needed to sustain current operations. When the AU 
pointed this out at the October 2004 clearinghouse meeting in Washington, 
donors simply moved the discussion on to training and did not respond 
substantively. Addis Ababa also felt that some donors see things from the 
perspective of their own priorities, which leads them to see peace and 
security in Africa as a policing issue to prevent migration of Africans to the 
north. The AU acknowledged that both Africans and the G8 have to fulfil their 
parts of the deal and there are problems on both sides. 
 
AU leadership 
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The AU stated that there was a growing understanding of the need to change 
unequal African/donor partnerships. Respect and trust for AU leadership was 
recognised by many donor representatives resident in Africa, but this was 
slower to filter through to respective capitals. The AU felt that it had no 
choice but to seek donor partnerships (although there are serious African 
contributions, such as South African support for the Burundi peace process). 
The AU was pressing for a more rationalised donor/AU programme. The 
capacity-building process has meant that donors and Africans necessarily 
have to address coordination problems. But the AU acknowledged that it 
could not, in the meantime, turn down specific bilateral donor initiatives while 
that process moves forward. The AU could get overwhelmed by 
uncoordinated donor efforts, and so it was seeking to develop a framework 
within which to promote coordination. There was little meaningful dialogue 
prior to the Darfur crisis, when donors tended to impose their wishes on the 
AU. For instance, it took donors more than a year to accept the Africans’ 
preference of five regional brigades to make up the African Standby Force, 
rather than a single, continental brigade, which donorsfavoured. Operational 
engagement in Darfur has brought donors in Addis together through the 
establishment of initiatives such as the Partners’ Technical Support Group 
(PTSG), in which donor planners work with the AU to coordinate their 
activities. 
 
The role of the UN 
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The AU did not see itself as a ‘sub-contractor’ to the UN. It recalled UN 
failures in the past, which have been drivers in promoting indigenous 
capacity-building. But, the AU explicitly operates within the terms of 
international law and the UN Charter. 
 
The Economic Community of West African States and the 
implementation of the Joint Plan362 
 
ECOWAS carried out surveys of available regional peace and security 
capabilities as part of assessments of its capacity to respond to crises in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2002 and Liberia in 2003. Subsequently, the Kofi Annan 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra has also carried out lessons 
learned exercises from experiences of those deployments. However, lessons 
learned are often not properly digested and the results not implemented. The 
lessons learned process is hampered by a lack of clear conceptual 
understanding of issues of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and general 
peacekeeping activities. Consequently, a need was identified for a study to 
clarify priorities and specific areas of focus. Such a study would help the AU 
and RECs articulate their needs clearly. 
 
ECOWAS Mission Planning and Management Cell (MPMC) 
 
                                            
362 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with 
officials from ECOWAS, undertaken in Abuja, in September 2004. 
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As part of its continued efforts to develop and strengthen its planning 
capacity at the Secretariat, ECOWAS established the MPMC to plan future 
ECOWAS peacekeeping. The Cell comprised ten military officers seconded 
from ECOWAS Member States. Nine officers were responsible for planning, 
whilst one officer was responsible for on-going operations. Plans were 
underway to restructure the Cell to ensure that an adequate number of 
officers were placed in charge of peacekeeping issues. In fulfilment of its 
objective, the MPMC would visit all countries that had pledged troops to the 
ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) to assess their level of readiness and 
logistical status. It will also be responsible for marrying up troop pledges to 
create sustainable and cohesive units. 
 
The MPMC was further responsible for the development of an ECOWAS 
doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The MPMC was being 
funded by the government of Canada, who responded to a request for 
support from ECOWAS, which had been voiced at a recent ECOWAS/donor 
meeting. Canada committed three years funding for the establishment and 
operations of the MPMC. In addition to Canada, the P3 had officials seconded 
to the ECOWAS secretariat working closely with the MPMC. 
 
Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) 
 
The MPMC was working closely with ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring 
Centre (OMC) – the current ECOWAS early warning system. For ease of 
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communication, ECOWAS was organised into four regions with zonal bureaus 
located in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Cotonou, Benin; Monrovia, Liberia; 
and Banjul, The Gambia. The zonal bureaus were reporting directly to the 
OMC at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. 
 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) 
 
The KAIPTC was engaged with donors/development partners such as the UK, 
Germany, Canada, France and the US to consolidate peace and security 
related programmes and activities in West Africa. For example, the physical 
infrastructure of the KAIPTC was funded by the German government, while 
the course package was drawn up with substantial input from the UK 
government and the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Canada. A 
decision had recently been taken by the government of the Netherlands to 
provide 1.2 million to help the KAIPTC complete its building activities in 
respect of accommodation block and a mess facility. 
 
G8 role 
 
ECOWAS felt that G8 ambitions in Africa broadly matched ECOWAS’ original 
priorities of promoting regional economic development. It stated that the 
general thrust of the G8 Africa Action Plan was in line with ECOWAS ideals, 
citing the following examples: 
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• training African peacekeeping forces; ECOWAS referred to ACOTA and 
RECAMP as good examples, while the KAIPTC is specifically mentioned in 
the Joint Plan; 
• regulating the activities of arms brokers and traffickers; 
• developing and adopting guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms to 
Africa; 
• supporting efforts to eliminate and remove anti-personnel mines; 
• working with government and civil society to address the linkage between 
armed conflict and the exploitation of natural resources; and 
• encouraging more effective coordination and co-operation among donors 
and international institutions in support of peace-building and conflict 
prevention efforts (including DDR programmes). 
 
However, ECOWAS pointed out that its efforts to develop an effective peace 
and security architecture predate both the Joint Plan and AU’s call for the 
establishment of the ASF/standby Brigades, including both the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Conflict Resolution and the supplementary Protocol on Good 
Governance and Democracy. ECOWAS believed that it is important for new 
initiatives to build on existing structures, rather than seeking to impose new 
approaches, and that these should be geared towards strengthening 
ECOWAS’ capacity as an implementing partner of the AU. 
 
African Coordination 
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ECOWAS was incorporating the AU’s plans for the establishment of the ASF 
into its own processes for setting up ECOBRIG. It acknowledged that the AU 
PSC and the UN Security Council retained primary responsibility for 
authorising interventions. However, formal links between AU and ECOWAS 
planning were weak, although ECOWAS was in the process of concluding a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the AU to help clarify and 
formalise interactions. At the regional level there was a history of poor 
communication between respective national governments and the RECs. 
However, regular meetings of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission 
(DSC) were improving coordination for peace and security. In West Africa, 
operational experience in ECOWAS deployments in Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Côte d’Ivoire had facilitated regional cooperation among ECOWAS Member 
States, who have had to work together out of necessity. Support for these 
missions had also expedited donor coordination, including helping break down 
anglophone/francophone political divisions which in the past had impeded 
progress in West Africa. 
 
Key Challenges 
 
ECOWAS identified a need to develop its organisational structure in a way 
that is acceptable to all its Member States, and to operationalise its security 
architecture. It felt that finance was weak, including pay or allowances for the 
peacekeeping troops and difficulties with honouring of pledges. There was a 
need for more effective involvement of the civil sector and the civil police in 
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peacebuilding aspects of peace initiatives. Key challenges identified by the 
ECOWAS Secretariat included the following: 
 
• defining the operational requirement of ECOBRIG; 
• assessing the military capabilities of Member States in terms of equipment 
and logistics; 
• determining the requirements for logistics infrastructure in respect of the 
depots in Mali and Sierra Leone; 
• developing SOPs and training requirements for ECOBRIG; 
• determining requirements for the standardization of equipment for 
maintenance purposes; and 
• developing doctrine to support the ECOBRIG 
 
Comprehensive donor support 
 
ECOWAS believed that donor support activities were not always thought 
through sufficiently thoroughly. For example, the US supplied Ghana with the 
sophisticated Janus computerised training simulation system. However, there 
were no trained operators in Accra and the system had not been used very 
much. This was problematic beyond a waste of resources, as donors resented 
that assistance was not being used, which discouraged further donor 
engagement. 
 
 258
The Southern African Development Community and the 
implementation of the Joint Plan363 
 
SADC stated that it was important that its strategic vision matched actual 
resources available. This required strategic planning, and it would help 
ensuing ‘value for money’ from the capacity-building process. The SADC 
administration in Gabarone felt some tension between itself and some key 
SADC Member States. It stressed that building SADC institutional capacity 
complemented the organic growth of what was actually happening, and that it 
was not there to replace Member States’ capacity. South Africa was Chair of 
the SADC Organ in 2004/5, and was focusing primarily on the pan-African 
level, rather than the regional level. It was concentrating its efforts on the AU 
Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the implementation/operationalisation 
of the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA). 
 
Peace and security context 
 
There were no extant conflicts in the SADC region, so SADC felt that the focus 
should be less directed to developing military response capacity. However, 
much work was needed in post-conflict reconstruction, for instance to support 
the reintegration aspects of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
processes. 
 
                                            
363 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with 
officials from SADC, undertaken Pretoria in September 2004. 
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African Standby Force (ASF) 
 
SADC’s priority in establishing its arm of the ASF was to set up a Planning 
Element (PLANELM) and to assess regional capability. This would enable the 
allotment of responsibilities to various stakeholders in line with expertise and 
comparative advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Broad approach to security 
 
SADC policy acknowledged the inherent links between security and political 
integration in the southern region. SADC and its Member States recognised 
this well, and SADC asserted that it was no coincidence that the SADC 
Protocol relates to politics, defence and security. 
 
Practicalities of SADC regional politics 
 
The way that the Organ has developed reflects how SADC responds to, and 
evolves within, practicable possibilities in the region. SADC stated that if 
Member States saw things functioning at the regional level, this would 
encourage regional integration. Each phase of the capacity-building process 
needs to work to build confidence among stakeholders. 
 
G8 role 
 
 260
SADC was urging the G8 to consider moving away from focusing on easy, 
short-term projects to more long-term and sustainable development 
programmes, including paying more attention to post-conflict reconstruction 
and development. It also suggested that the G8 broaden engagement with 
African states. Increasing the number of African participants at G8 Summits 
would counter accusations by AU Member States who perceived themselves 
as marginalised from the process of G8 bias. At the time of writing, SADC was 
not seriously engaged with the G8 on the implementation of the Joint Plan.  
 
SADC stated that G8 priorities were not harmonised with those of their African 
partners. For instance, there was a growing perception of a clash of 
approaches in dealing with conflicts on the continent. SADC stated that, while 
the AU generally favoured political/diplomatic responses, donor partners often 
pushed the military/interventionist approach. In the regional context, a 
notable example was South Africa’s preference for ‘quiet diplomacy’ in dealing 
with Zimbabwe, in contrast with the more confrontational approaches of some 
external partners. 
 
Conceptual understanding of capacity-building 
 
SADC identified a need for a clear conceptual understanding of ‘capabilities’ 
and ‘capacitybuilding’. At the time, this was confused, particularly regarding 
emergency response versus long-term institutional capacity. SADC urged G8 
members and Africans to articulate and discuss their understanding of these 
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concepts. This process would be assisted by examination of the nature of 
African conflicts, focusing on experiences such as from disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programmes, which 
have tendency to relapse after several years. A clear understanding of why 
some post-conflict societies fall back into violent conflict would inform future 
responses to conflicts. It would also be useful to get a clearer picture of the 
policies and forces driving particular peace processes. 
 
Regional integration 
 
SADC was in the process of taking its internal capacity-building process 
forwards, was waiting to inform donor partners at the appropriate time of 
what sort of assistance was required, and how this assistance should be 
delivered. SADC suggested that donor partners could at that point (i.e. when 
it was most useful for SADC) offer and negotiate how to accommodate these 
requirements: SADC was willing to negotiate with partners regarding the 
various aspects of the peace and security architecture, but only when it was 
ready. For instance, SADC was at the time working to build strategic 
headquarters for peacekeeping. SADC Member States had supplied seed 
funding for this, but partner cooperation was needed. Other regions were 
moving ahead with peace and security capacity-building much more visibly 
than SADC, which discouraged partner interest in supporting SADC. SADC 
believed it should publicise its particular approach and circumstances better, 
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as well as the work that it was doing to maintain momentum and support as it 
made progress in its own way and at its own pace. 
 
Strategic Implementation Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO) 
 
In line with the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, SADC was 
setting up the institutional framework for implementing that Protocol through 
the Strategic Implementation Plan for the SADC Organ (SIPO). SIPO spells 
out the Organ’s activities and the vision of institutional structures at the 
regional level. A Politics, Defence and Security Department was set up but has 
yet to be manned. A priority here has been harmonising activities with the 
AU. 
 
SADCBRIG 
 
SADC was seeking to implement plans for its regional standby brigade, 
SADCBRIG. Plans for SADCBRIG were at the time being visualised in 
Gabarone, including a timetable for implementation. It was anticipated that 
the structure of SADCBRIG would be approved at the SADC Summit in 
Botswana. UPDATE 
 
Regional confidence-building 
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SADC identified he most pressing regional challenge for Southern Africa as to 
maintain the process of confidence-building, in order to facilitate regional 
integration. Cooperation in SADC over political, defence and security issues 
was comparatively new, and SADC had little experience of ‘pooling 
sovereignty’ for regional integration, or of investing funding and other 
resources into practical activities in this area and translating that into actual 
output. SADC identified a need for concrete, demonstrable progress to 
highlight SADC Member States’ commitment to take things forward regionally.  
 
However, SADC cited a number of problems which created tension between 
partners and was impeding progress. These included: differences in political 
outlooks and values; a failure to match resources with needs; ‘tied’ donor 
assistance; and a tendency for SADC to agree to things it does not really need 
in order merely to receive support.  
 
SADC stated that cooperation was much better at the level of Heads of State 
and Government than further down the chain. Improvements in this area 
would expedite progress more broadly. SADC suggested bringing mid-level 
commanders together for interoperability exercises, as these would be the 
people deployed in actual operations. This would help build confidence among 
Member States. Tangible improvements in performance as would then 
encourage a strategic shift to regional interoperability. 
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Training 
 
SADC urged greater efforts to increase intra- and inter-regional training 
programs. This could be done through the exchange of command staff 
officers to allow for ‘cross-pollination’. SADC stated that the EU Common 
Position on Zimbabwe remained a political and legal constraint on 
engagement by EU Member States in Southern Africa training initiatives, such 
as the Regional Peace Training Centre. 
 
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the 
implementation of the Joint Plan364 
 
IGAD generally lacks the military muscle for robust military intervention. In 
2004, IGAD’s involvement in peace and security was largely limited to 
diplomacy – although in March 2003 IGAD agreed to establish a Verification 
and Monitoring Team (VFM) to monitor the continuing cessation of hostilities 
between the SPLA/M and the government of Sudan.  
 
IGAD was involved in Somali Peace Process since 1991, and it assisted in the 
establishment of the interim government of Somalia, currently based in 
Nairobi, Kenya. IGAD also played a mediation role in the peace agreement 
between the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel group, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Following the AU’s call 
                                            
364 Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is based on a series of interviews with 
officials from IGAD, undertaken in Nairobi in September 2004. 
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for the establishment of the ASF, Eastern African states have entrusted IGAD 
with the interim responsibility of coordinating efforts towards the 
establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). 
 
The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) Strategic Vision 
 
IGAD was designated ‘interim coordinator for the Eastern Africa Standby 
Brigade (EASBRIG). IGAD’s office of Political and Humanitarian Affairs with its 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution unit has coordinated all 
efforts for the establishment of the EASBRIG. IGAD’s role has been 
challenged, largely due largely to the fact not all Member States of EASBRIG 
are members of IGAD. However, with no other REC to take on the 
responsibility of a coordinator, IGAD was broadly accepted as the best 
compromise. In spite of differences and existing political tensions between 
Member States of the EASBRIG, they see the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts as a matter of urgency that can only be handled at the 
subregional level, hence the concerted efforts to establish the regional 
brigade. The draft MoU states the objective of EASBRIG as “…to carry out in a 
timely manner the functions of maintenance of peace and security as 
mandated the Peace Security Council of the African Union in accordance with 
the constitutive Act of the African Union.”365 
 
                                            
365 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the “Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade 
(EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004. 
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Politics, Peace and Security 
 
The Eastern African region has been beset by numerous conflicts, ranging 
from wars of secession to other complex intra-state conflicts. Most conflicts in 
the area have a regional dimension, leading to the tensions and suspicion that 
exists between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, 
Sudan and Rwanda, among others. Consequently, the Eastern Africa region 
saw the establishment and operationalisation of EASBRIG as an important 
step in not only preventing, resolving and managing conflicts, but also as a 
confidence-building measure. EASBRIG stated that joint training programs 
envisaged under EASBRIG would go a long way in building confidence 
between Member States, which would then contribute to strengthening efforts 
at preventive diplomacy. 
 
EASBRIG 
 
IGAD Member States had taken significant steps towards the establishment of 
EASBRIG. After a series of ministerial, military and technical meetings, the 
region adopted adopted a Draft Policy Framework, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and a budget for EASBRIG. Moreover, it reached 
agreement on the establishment and location of the following organs: the 
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Brigade Headquarters, the Planning Element (PLANELM) and the Logistics 
Base (LOGBASE).366 
 
The Brigade HQ 
 
The Eastern Africa region agreed to establish a Brigade HQ to be located in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, separate from the regional PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya. 
A number of observers stated that this separation was a political compromise, 
so that Kenya would not be seen as too dominant, and tha this was not 
helpful in terms of developing a functioning, regional military capacity. The 
head of the Brigade HQ would be a military officer of the rank of a Brigadier 
or its equivalent, and for the first year was to be provided by the host nation. 
Thereafter the appointment would be made on a rotational basis. Military and 
civilian personnel, on secondment from Member States, would staff the 
Brigade HQ. Among other things, the Brigade HQ would serve as a command 
headquarters for force preparation and operational command of the EASBRIG. 
It would also operate as a secretariat to the Committee of Eastern Africa 
Chiefs of Defence Staff. 
 
The Planning Element (PLANELM) 
 
                                            
366 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the “Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade 
(EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004. 
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Member States agreed to locate the PLANELM at Karen, Nairobi. It was to be 
headed by a military officer of the rank of a Colonel. As with the Brigade HQ, 
the head of the PLANELM would be provided by the host nation during the 
first year, reverting subsequently to a defined rotational formula. The main 
function of the PLANELM was to serve as a full-time multinational planning 
headquarters. All planning would be carried out within the framework of the 
ASF and the UN Standby Arrangement System. To strengthen its planning 
capacity, the PLANELM would enter into agreements with national and other 
centres of excellence in the sub-region and elsewhere. 
 
The Logistic Base 
 
In the interest of an effective command and control of the regional logistic 
resources, the Logistic Base (LogBase) would initially be co-located with the 
Brigade HQ in Addis Ababa, with outposts in Member States depending on the 
situation. Like the PLANELM, the LogBase was to be headed by a Colonel, 
with a similar rotating leadership. The main function of the LogBase was to 
act as the central depot for maintaining, storage and management of the 
logistical assets of EASBRIG. In addition, it will “coordinate all activities 
involving logistics of the EASBRIG, including but not limited to performing 
functions mandated by the African Union and/or the United Nations managing  
external assistance”.367 
                                            
367 For more information on the organs of the EASBRIG see the “Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade 
(EASBRIG),” Kigali, Rwanda, 9-10th September, 2004. 
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Early Warning 
 
IGAD’s existing early warning system was originally designed in relation to 
drought  and other ecological disasters. However, efforts were under way to 
develop a robust early warning mechanism, which would provide advance 
warning about impeding conflicts. The Eastern African region was the 
establishment of regional early warning mechanisms as a major part of the 
overall plan for the establishment and operationalisation of the ASF. 
 
Donor Coordination 
 
IGAD stated that donor coordination was irregular. The UK, though its Peace 
Support Training Program (BPST) based in Karen, Kenya, was supporting, 
among other things, training and financing for the construction of the 
PLANELM. However, these efforts were not coordinated with those of other 
donor countries. For instance, Germany through its Technical Development 
Programme GTZ has provided IGAD with financial support for the convening 
and hiring of consultants for all EASBRIG meetings. Assistance from the US 
and France was provided primarily on a bilateral basis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 270
The analysis above suggests that both the G8 and its African partners believe 
that the Joint Plan has potential to deliver a functioning African peacekeeping 
capacity, and both are working to implement it effectively. The Joint Plan 
supports relevant components of the African peace and security architecture, 
including the ASF, and its peace enforcement and peacebuilding functions.  
 
But there are also some major gaps. In practical terms, a number of key 
areas for action to enhance implementation are apparent, including strategic 
management capacity; donor coordination; operationalising the African stand-
by force; and training and logistics. There are also clearly difficulties with 
African ownership, as well as a distinct lack of emphasis on local communities 
and civil society. 
 
Chapter 7 will respond to these action areas in more detail, highlighting key 
challenges and priorities areas for action, and then outlining potential areas 
for agreement to take the implementation process forward. 
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7 G8-Africa Joint Plan: implementation 
 
This chapter presents further results and research regarding implementation 
of the G8-Africa Joint Plan, including from the author’s interviews with key 
African and G8 representatives, as well as from a two-day international 
workshop organised by the author at Chatham House in London in 2005, 
which brought together key governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well as the UN and the EU. 
 
Chapter 7 first outlines key challenges and priorities for the implementation of 
the Joint Plan. These can be grouped into the following categories: African 
strategic vision and leadership; the African Standby Force; African peace and 
security architecture (APSA); institutional human resources/strategic 
management capacity; coordinating donor support; African ownership of the 
capacity-building process; financing peacekeeping capacity-building; logistics; 
and training. 
 
The chapter then outlines priority areas for increased Africa-G8 cooperation, 
including the following: institutional human resources and strategic 
management capacity; improving donor coordination; operationalising the 
ASF; training; and logistics.  
 
The third section of the chapter presents the outcome of the Chatham House 
Conference organised by the author on potential areas for agreement and 
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action for implementation of the Joint Plan.368 The workshop covered key 
areas in the African PSO capacity-building process. 
 
Challenges 
 
African strategic vision and leadership  
 
The AU stressed the importance of enhancing capacity for the breadth of the 
continental peacekeeping capacity. This stretched from the AU PSC, through 
to the ASF – including police and civilian capacity. It incorporated the CEWS, 
and extends down to basic infrastructure such as effective budgeting and 
accounting systems. 
 
A number of African stakeholders stressed that donor support should be 
approached as a long-term and sustainable project and should be 
multidimensional. It should take into account regional and national resources 
as the building-blocks of the system within the overall framework of the AU. 
More broadly still, efforts to enhance African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) should be seen within the broader context of promoting African 
development, emphasising links between peacekeeping capacity-
enhancement and the NEPAD process. The AU should not become solely a 
peace and security institution, although many stakeholders agreed that 
                                            
368 Research for this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 
April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well 
as the UN and the EU. A list of participants is contained in Annex XX. 
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peacekeeping capacity-enhancement was a key starting point for other 
aspects of development, and was a measure of African commitment to 
transformation. 
 
The AU identified the ASF as the key implementing mechanism for the whole 
African peace and security architecture, impacting upon conflict prevention 
(through preventive deterrence) and management. At the same time, a 
number of stakeholders warned against over-emphasising military capacity as 
the most visible component of peacekeeping, as this risked distorting the 
continental architecture to rely too heavily on emergency response, at the 
expense of non-military preventive measures. These could be less costly in 
financial and human terms, and played to existing African strengths in 
mediation. The US in particular highlighted the importance of constabulary 
forces to respond to civil disorder as part of African peacekeeping, and it was 
supporting the Italian initiative to establish an international Centre of 
Excellence to provide carabinieri/gendarmerie training and skills for 
peacekeeping, as highlighted at the Sea Island Summit. 
 
Donors generally agreed that their support for capacity-building should come 
in response to the AU’s own strategic vision, based on coordinated discussion 
with the AU Commission (AUC). They also declared that the AU Commission 
for Peace and Security maintained a good, broad vision of the ultimate shape 
of the African peace and security architecture, and had good awareness of 
the primary challenges involved in developing this. However, a number of 
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stakeholders warned that the AU lacked the capability to translate its vision 
into well-defined, specific, and phased steps which were implementable, and 
around which donors could coordinate their assistance. The multiplicity of 
donor agendas within Africa further complicated this lack of clarity, which was 
undermining African ownership of the capacity-building process, and also 
presented a major problem for donors who were seeking to increase their 
assistance, and to channel it to areas of greatest need. 
 
The African Standby Force 
 
The AU highlighted the need to maintain flexibility for the ASF, in order to 
enable it to respond to emerging developments in regional capacity. Many 
African stakeholders stressed that attempts to impose a rigid continental 
structure from Addis Ababa were not practicable, and also failed to 
acknowledge existing realities. To be able to respond to African crises in the 
short- and long- term, the AU asserted that the ASF needed to develop 
capacity that was both rapidly deployable, and was sustainable. The US 
stressed the importance of clarifying the necessary operational components to 
deploy African peace operations, relating to forces that could be deployed, 
sustained and rotated. At the time, financial structures to support this 
capability did not exist in any African region. 
 
Flexibility of partnership in theatre 
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Many stakeholders suggested that universal standards needed to be 
developed for the ASF, taking into account the fact that the ASF is likely to 
operate as a bridging force for UN deployments. This implied that both the 
AU’s and the RECs’ peace and security architecture should be developed in 
line with UN standards, and should be designed to cooperate with the UN, 
especially in relation to doctrine and rules of engagement, in order to promote 
interoperability and complementarity among the various components of the 
architecture. Another layer could be added if EU Battlegroups develop a major 
African role. 
 
Planning element (PLANELM) 
 
A key priority identified for the development of the ASF was the establishment 
of PLANELMs for the AU and the RECs. The PLANELM at the AUC is aimed at 
ensuring interoperability between the various elements of the ASF through 
the development of coherent doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
and terms of reference and a pool of expertise, as well as to manage 
peacekeepings deployed by the AU. The AU PLANELM would form the core of 
the system, incorporating liaison officers from the RECs to coordinate 
regionally. REC PLANELMs will need similar links, perhaps through the 
appointment of a focal point for the ASF with whom the AU can liaise.  
 
The AU consultant on the ASF had developed Terms of Reference for the ASF, 
but these could not be shared with the RECs without the establishment of the 
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AU PLANELM. The AU is timetabling for recruitment but may face delays. The 
AU believed that delays in setting up the AU PLANELM have compounded 
problems regarding interoperability of the regional brigades. At that moment 
West and Eastern African regions are far advanced in the process of 
establishing the structures and mechanisms needed for the operationalization 
of the brigades, including developing doctrine and SOPs for the ASF. 
However, lack of human and other resources limited AU leadership in these 
areas. The process of concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between the AU and the RECs would serve as a defining framework for 
AU/REC relationships. Thinking about next steps after the signing of the MoU 
needs to be developed. 
 
Regional Standby Brigades 
 
Coordination between the AU and Regional Standby Brigades (RSBs) 
remained a problem. Many donors expressed concern that existing regional 
African bodies do not tally well with the RECs, as defined by the AU, owing to 
the overlap of regional organisations in some parts of the continent. One 
notable exception was the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Some African and donor stakeholders asserted that each region 
was developing its own brigade according to its perceived needs and 
priorities, and were concerned about the long-term implications of this. Levels 
of development of the various RSBs differed enormously, with the West and 
Eastern African regions significantly ahead of the others, and even of the AU 
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itself, while North Africa was disengaged from the ASF process, primarily for 
internal regional political reasons; and little regional capacity existed at all in 
central Africa. This lack of cohesion could undermine interoperability among 
the various RSBs and their respective roles within the overarching continental 
ASF structure, unless timely measures were taken to gain comparable speeds 
in all the regions. The UK stressed that such tensions were further 
complicated by donor support favouring regional over continental 
development for some regions, warning that retroactive attempts to impose 
continental standards and command and control onto existing RECs sometime 
in the future would be difficult. 
 
The AU stressed that judgements about which was the most appropriate body 
to act operationally must be made on a case-by-case basis in response to 
specific political circumstances. RECs did not always present the best option in 
their region politically. For example, the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) was not effective or suitable to the Ethiopian/Eritrean 
crisis and to Darfur, where the AU acted instead. However, ECOWAS was 
proving effective in West Africa, after initial regional disputes in the 1990s. 
 
ECOWAS Regional Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) 
 
West Africa had the most developed operational peacekeeping capacity, 
which makes the cost/benefit equation for ECOWAS of operating with the AU 
more difficult to analyse. However, ECOWAS could provide an operational 
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example of how a viable regional organisation can be integrated into the 
system. 
 
Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) 
 
Problems of regional coherence were visible in Eastern Africa, where IGAD’s 
coordinating role for EASBRIG has been difficult because not all Member 
States of EASBRIG are members of IGAD. A firm commitment to the AU by 
EASBRIG was comparatively easy, as IGAD was not developing capacity to 
run its own operations. It was following the model used by the Multinational 
Standby Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), looking to the AU or the 
UN to provide strategic HQ.369 
 
Southern African Standby Brigade (SASBRIG) 
 
SADC had been criticised for lagging with issues of implementation of its 
peace and security agendas, including in relation to the establishment of its 
RSB. SADC asserted that it is developing machinery, including for SASBRIG, 
but that regional political sensitivities restrict its capacity to publicise its 
activities. 
 
African peace and security architecture (APSA) 
 
                                            
369 For further information on SHIRBRIG, go to: www.shirbrig.dk/index.htm 
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The Panel of the Wise (POW) was the key AU institution for preventive 
diplomacy. It was intended to be agile. The choice of its composition was 
deemed to be very important, as its members’ independence and integrity 
would be its key strength. 
 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Response 
 
The AU stressed that CEWS needed expertise, equipment and linkages with 
relevant regional and international bodies in order to become fully functional. 
SADC expressed concerns over the nature and methods of collecting 
information for early warning. This was linked to a lack of consensus on 
whether early warning should be dealt with in the public domain or as a 
military/intelligence, which was cited as a highly sensitive issue. This lack of 
clarity risked breeding suspicion and apprehension by African Member States, 
which stifles efforts to operationalize early warning systems. A number of 
stakeholders believed greater clarity would encourage donor understanding 
and support for early warning. SADC had adopted the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Model for collecting and 
analysing information, which is deemed to be more compatible and politically-
acceptable as it is used by the UN and other international organisations. 
 
Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) 
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The CADSP provides a framework to review all components of the African 
peace and security architecture and presents a consolidated basis for the AU 
to engage with donor partners. 
 
Institutional human resources/strategic management capacity 
 
Overcoming chronic limitations in institutional human resource and strategic 
management capacity was seen as a major priority for building effective 
African peacekeeping capacity, as well as for operationalising the relevant 
architecture. This was true at both AU and regional levels. For instance, the 
AU PSC has a huge mandate but limited capacity within the Conflict 
Management Directorate, which includes the old Secretariat for the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Central Organ. These limitations could 
have a far-reaching impact across many areas of African peacekeeping 
capability, undermining African leadership of the capacity-building process 
and African capacity to absorb donor assistance. 
 
Operational capacity 
 
Human resource problems extended to operational capacity for peacekeeping. 
The US identified a number of problems in HQ-level planning at the AU in 
relation to peacekeeping capacity, including mission and mandate; working 
with contributors of troops and other resources; force structure; force 
generation; dealing with donors; and working with opposing forces (or 
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warring factions). More specifically, Washington emphasised serious staffing 
gaps in African military capacity for peacekeeping above the tactical level, 
pointing out that, in 2005, only four people were running AU operations at the 
Commission for Peace and Security. The AU highlighted that until recently 
there was only one regular staff member in the Field Operations Unit (FOU) at 
the AUC who was occupied with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The 
US stated that ECOWAS deployments in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have 
revealed the organisation to be overwhelmed and out of its depth regarding 
strategic management capacity, and lacking the relevant expertise for major 
multinational deployment. The US also suggested that donor assistance in 
response to the Darfur crisis was overwhelming the AU. 
 
Balancing crisis response with strategic capacity-building for peacekeeping 
 
All stakeholders stressed that the mismatch between existing African 
peacekeeping capabilities and contingency demands represented a major 
challenge for the peacekeeping capacity-building process, diverting nearly all 
the energy of African institutions to emergency response. The vast majority of 
the AU’s limited institutional human resources were being absorbed by the 
Darfur deployment; during an ECOWAS operation, capacity at HQ in Abuja to 
develop the organisation’s political infrastructure was similarly stretched. The 
EU was concerned that new AU personnel sponsored by Brussels would only 
be used for emergency response and would not contribute to capacity-
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building in the long-term. Additional funding was needed to support a more 
independent crisis response capacity. 
 
Donor technical assistance 
 
Several stakeholders argued that providing donor expertise to fill capacity 
gaps was not helpful in the longer-term as it did not help build African 
capacity, implied African incompetence, and failed to take into account 
existing African expertise. African stakeholders stressed that donor technical 
assistance should be more strongly focused on sourcing African expertise and, 
over the longer term, training Africans to fill these roles according to areas of 
greatest need. 
 
Financing for human resources 
 
Funding was clearly key for recruitment, although a number of stakeholders 
expressed concern that African Member States tended not to place sufficient 
prestige on appointments to their regional and continental institutions. The 
AU highlighted delays in their recruitment process due to key management 
gaps at the AUC. Some of these delays were also linked with accounting and 
other demands placed on the AU by donors. The EU pointed out a gap 
between overall costs and assessed contributions in relation to AUC financing 
for additional personnel. The planned expansion of AUC staff from 300 to 600 
carried an accompanying budget growth from $43m to $165m per annum for 
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2005. Only $63m of the $165m was earmarked to come from assessed 
contributions, leading to questions about how to bridge the remaining budget 
gap. 
 
Institutional management structures 
 
The US highlighted the significance for donors of developing African 
recipients’ capacity for transparent management funds and other resources. 
Washington argued that budget management should be a key feature of 
training and other support to facilitate donor accounting of assistance and as 
a means of enhancing recipient management capacity more generally. This 
was true at continental, regional and national levels. At the regional level, 
France stated that ECOWAS has had some success in communicating clearly 
how human resources would be used and would add value, but a lack of clear 
management structure in other RECs has been a barrier to providing support. 
 
Coordinating donor support 
 
Improving donor coordination with African partners was seen by many as a 
major priority. Initiatives to coordinate donor assistance should be African-led, 
in order to ensure donor assistance was responding to African priorities. Poor 
donor coordination risked duplication and competition between strategies and 
activities and exacerbates accounting demands for African bodies. On the 
other hand, effective coordination promoted cohesion, understanding, 
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genuine dialogue and cooperation. The multiplication of donor partners had 
increased transaction costs for the AU and RECs. The AU believed that 
systematic donor coordination did not imply the imposition of a single rigid 
system, but did require a clear framework that donors could commit to. The 
emphasis should be on flexibility to account for existing donor support 
initiatives, as well as cohesion to maximise effectiveness. Many donors 
stressed coordination in favour of joint donor initiatives, which risked being 
cumbersome, expensive and inefficient. Washington stressed that national 
constraints such as budget timelines and conditionalities placed on assistance 
undermine coordination among donors. 
 
G8 coordination 
 
Many African stakeholders complained of a lack of coherence among G8 
Member States in the follow-up process for implementation of the Joint Plan. 
A major problem for G8 engagement was the lack either of G8 machinery 
through which to implement its policies, or of a formal relationship between 
the AU and the G8 as a group. In practice, support came mostly from 
individual G8 states, sometimes in partnership with other, major non-G8 
donors with a longer history of engagement in Africa, including the 
Scandinavians and the Canadians, the Netherlands and Germany. The EU 
pointed out that there was no G8 focal point for coordination in Addis Ababa. 
Many non-G8 stakeholders believed that the G8’s dependency on its 
presidency to define its agenda undermined developing a cohesive, long-term 
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G8 approach. For instance, the US expanded the African peacekeeping 
capacity-building process to the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) at 
Sea Island in 2004, and this did not mention the ASF. 
 
Some key players in Africa remained largely unaware of the Joint Plan; SADC 
stated that it was not directly engaged with the G8 in its implementation. 
Others saw the Joint Plan as a ‘pledge’ or wish-list, rather than an actionable 
plan, stressing that it needed to be synchronised with other African initiatives 
such as the ASF and its constituent brigades. The KAIPTC stated that it had 
no direct engagement with the G8 process, despite being mentioned in the 
communiqué of the 2004 G8 meeting in Sea Island. SADC warned that limited 
African participation at G8 meetings risks accusations by other AU member 
states of G8 bias, undermining pan-African cohesion. 
 
Operational coordination 
 
The US stressed that ad hoc operational relationships between donor partners 
and African bodies were undermining effective deployment and that the donor 
network responding to a crisis needed to be established as early as possible. 
For instance, when seeking to deploy a mission, a body like ECOWAS may 
deal simultaneously with ten different donors, all with different agendas and 
requirements. 
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Coordinated donor training initiatives 
 
The US stated that significant coordination between donor training initiatives, 
such as ACOTA, RECAMP or UK programmes, had not been achieved to date, 
primarily due to practical obstacles such as the US being constitutionally 
barred from supporting certain functions, such as construction. ACOTA had 
been trying to involve other players but somewhat peripherally. 
 
African ownership of the capacity-building process 
 
The AU complained of a tendency for some donors to support capacity-
building from the perspective of their own priorities. It stated that much 
donor assistance still tended to be directive, reflecting donor agendas rather 
than African priorities, and African aspirations can be overwhelmed by donor 
objectives. The AU cited the following examples of discrepancies matching 
donor support with AU needs and priorities: 
 
• donors were originally resistant to accepting African preferences for the 
ASF to comprise five regional brigades, rather than a single continental 
brigade; 
• AU requests for assistance in establishing a satellite telephone system 
were met instead with vehicle-mounted communication system, which has 
proved inappropriate; and 
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• in Darfur, the US hired Pacific Architects Engineering (PAE) to provide 
logistical support to AMIS without consulting the AU.  
 
Some African and donor stakeholders stated that, at present, the various 
donor meetings – such as the ‘P3+ mechanism’ (France, the UK and the US 
and other significant donors) or clearinghouse meetings, such as in 
Washington in October 2004 – failed to interact adequately with 
representatives of African institutions and governments. Rather, they merely 
aggregated donor opinions and activities. The AU complained that its 
attempts to highlight the need for logistical support at the 2004 Washington 
clearinghouse meeting were ignored by donors. 
 
On the other hand, some donors complained that African institutions were not 
proactive in facilitating African/donor interaction, and that African institutions 
were often slow in responding to proposals for interaction initiatives. 
Furthermore, the US believed that African institutions can be politically over-
sensitive, placing too much emphasis on being seen to do things their own 
way and not accepting advice and assistance that may be appropriate and of 
practical importance.  
 
Financing peacekeeping capacity-building 
 
African states’ inability to finance their own institutions was undermining both 
African leadership of the capacity-building process, and donor confidence in 
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African institutions and relevant initiatives. Donor budgets to support African 
capacity-building were often accompanied by conditionalities, and were small 
in comparison to the scale of the task. African stakeholders stressed that this 
placed an even greater emphasis on the need for African identification of 
priorities, vis-à-vis the need for external partners to scale up and channel 
assistance to areas of greatest need. 
 
The UK believed that African partners tended to focus too much on funding, 
which can divert attention from other key capacity-building issues such as 
building political will, developing relationships with one another and with 
donors, institutional capacity-building, transparency, and training. 
 
Operational financing 
 
Neither the AU nor RECs had the capacity to provide funding for Member 
State contributions to African peacekeeping. AU commitments to establish a 
funding mechanism had not yet been realised. A number of donors 
complained that the heavy reliance of African peacekeeping on donor financial 
support exacerbated perceptions that African bodies lack sufficient will to 
develop more stable internal funding, such as through the establishment of 
standard payment structures. Debate was on-going as to whether African 
peacekeeping missions should be funded through assessed contributions and 
which countries should pay contributions. Incentives to contribute troops and 
other resources were undermined if contributors are expected to meet their 
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own costs. UN missions pay more for troop contributions, discouraging 
participation in African missions, but UN policy proscribes providing resources, 
including paying salaries, in support of non-UN peacekeeping. The US also 
stated that its support for operational financing is complicated by limitations 
in the availability and flexibility of funding. 
 
Logistics 
 
The lack of basic logistic equipment available for African peacekeeping was 
identified as a major gap in African peacekeeping capacity, including 
shortages in strategic deployment/airlift, tactical manoeuvring and 
maintenance, with a particular shortfall regarding transportation/deployability 
and communications. 
 
Strategic airlift 
 
ECOWAS highlighted strategic airlift as vital for effective deployment. Africans 
stated that they required at minimum guaranteed access to, and shared 
control over, logistical resources, if not actual ownership of assets. Progress in 
enhancing logistic capacity was complicated by a lack of consensus as to 
whether to develop indigenous African capacity or to outsource it. 
 
Logistics depots 
 
 290
The UN highlighted major problems with the conditions that donors attach to 
logistical support. For instance, France retained primary control of RECAMP 
depots. Other G8 countries will only deal in certain types of equipment, such 
as German and EU restrictions over equipment that can be used aggressively. 
Washington highlighted poor maintenance of equipment by African recipients, 
due to lack of appropriate skills, training and infrastructure. 
 
Training 
 
Many African stakeholders complained that donors continued to focus on 
training as a priority for enhancing African peacekeeping capacity, ignoring 
broader requirements for logistics support and so on. Training assistance was 
seen as useful, but must be well-directed and linked operationally to effective 
peacekeeping deployment. 
 
ECOWAS stressed that training programmes should focus at both tactical and 
operational levels to produce quality personnel for peacekeeping. It argued 
that Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) should be supported in their 
training at these levels. Given the numbers of troops from certain key 
countries involved in peacekeeping in the region, attention should also be 
given to tactical and operational training at the national level to complement 
RCEs’ efforts. This would help to tailor training programmes to the specific 
needs of the country in question. It would also help to narrow gaps between 
agreements being made at the political and strategic level and their tactical 
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implementation on the ground, countering the current top-down approach to 
policy in the region. Cooperation between RCEs and national training 
programmes would promote effective training programmes through 
delegation and coordination of various training activities. 
 
Training feedback/lessons learned 
 
ECOWAS identified lack of feedback as a major challenge for training. No 
systematic efforts have been made to assess the efficacy of donor training 
programmes, in particular their impact on beneficiaries. Major contributors of 
troops were often left out of training programmes, which tended to be driven 
by the narrow national interest of the donor partner. Lessons learned were 
often not properly digested and the results not implemented. This was largely 
as a result of the lack of mainstreaming peacekeeping into the framework of 
the AU system, coupled with a lack of institutional capacity and expertise to 
follow-up on a conceptual understanding of issues of peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping activities. 
 
Training exercises 
 
SADC recommended bringing mid-level commanders together for 
interoperability exercises, as they would be the people deployed in actual 
operations. This would help to build confidence among Member States – a 
particular priority in Southern Africa but important across the board. Tangible 
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improvements in performance as a result would encourage a strategic shift to 
interoperability at the regional level. SADC also stressed efforts to increase 
intra- and inter-regional training programs. This could be done through the 
exchange of command staff officers to allow for cross-pollination. 
 
Long-term donor commitment 
 
A number of stakeholders stressed that the process of building effective 
peacekeeping capacity would take time for the AU. Institutions such as the 
UN and EU have spent years developing their capacities, and improvements 
are ongoing. The French government urged donors to recognise that African 
peacekeeping capacity would need extensive donor support for at least ten 
years, notably for enforcement activities, including for long-term capacity-
building and for short-term operational assistance. Contrary to some peoples’ 
assumptions, stakeholders were eager to point out that African peacekeeping 
capacity does not offer a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa for 
the donor community. 
 
Doctrine 
 
Expeditious development of an AU peacekeeping doctrine was cited as a 
priority by many stakeholders, in conjunction with coordinated progress at 
regional levels. Several interviewees also stressed the importance of doctrinal 
coherence and cooperation with the UN. The UK government emphasised that 
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the AU needed access to existing national and multinational doctrine as a 
starting point for the development of genuine African peacekeeping doctrine 
that meets African specificities. London also warned that some donors were 
promoting contradictory approaches to peacekeeping doctrine in training and 
other support, while the AU and RECs might also be developing separate and 
conflicting doctrines. The UK further warned that inconsistent doctrines risked 
undermining both interoperability for African peacekeeping, and the 
development of a clear and unified understanding of operational objectives, 
strategy and tactics. 
 
Tangible results in capacity-building 
 
A number of donors stressed the importance of achieving tangible results in 
capacity-building, in terms of long-term institutional capacity and 
operationally such as in Darfur. This would help to build and maintain 
momentum, and to promote donor confidence in the AU’s capacity to deliver. 
Many donors saw the AU’s performance in Darfur as a yardstick for the 
potential of operational crisis response capability. However, both African and 
donor partners warned of risks involving in over-emphasising tangible results, 
such as unrealistic operational demands and timetable for the AU response in 
Darfur. Failure to deliver could undermine donor support for longer-term 
capacity-building.  
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Priority areas for increased cooperation 
 
Five main areas for increased cooperation between the G8 and Africa were 
identified during project issues. These are outlined briefly below. Priority 
areas for future cooperation are then discussed in more detail in the final 
section of this chapter. 
 
• institutional human resources and strategic management capacity; 
• improving donor coordination; 
• operationalising the ASF; 
• training; and  
• logistics. 
 
The rest of this section details stakeholder recommendations for further 
action in each of these areas. 
 
Institutional human resources/strategic management capacity 
 
Given the chronic understaffing of African peace and security institutions, 
combined with severe operational pressures, many African and donor 
stakeholders accepted the need for some external technical expertise to 
support African capacity, in the short-term at least. However, there it was 
acknowledged that there is a need to build on existing examples to develop a 
new approach to the provision of external expertise – one which reinforces 
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African leadership and strengthens African capacity. Possible options here 
included loaning experts directly to major African contributors of troops, who 
would then be directly answerable to host country governments. The US 
suggested that American assistance could be expanded more systematically 
through ACOTA by placing contractors and advisers on the ground to build 
capacity at the staff level. However, even though a loan system was 
considered a good compromise by many stakeholders, a number of African 
partner remained steadfastly opposed to any international expatriate presence 
within their institutions. 
 
Donor support for African technical expertise 
 
The US stated that ECOWAS, in consultation with the Canadians and the P3, 
had taken steps to develop its professional staff, empowered with the 
technical capacity and mandate to work on a range of issues on a regional 
basis. To facilitate this, the Canadians were sponsoring West African 
personnel to operate in Abuja, to work both on current operations, as well as 
on longer-term capacity-building. Such developments provided good lessons 
for collective progress in institutional capacity-building in other regions and at 
the AU. 
 
Donor coordination 
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A Technical Assistance Group was established to support operational 
engagement in Darfur and to improve coordination among donors in Addis 
Ababa. Structures for partners to support the AU were established early on, 
based on two complementary tracks:  
 
Track 1) political: this had smoothed relations between donors and the AU, as 
well as across the different political dimensions for different players involved. 
Donor partners realised they needed to cooperate to avoid overloading the AU 
with questions. 
 
Track 2) technical (planning/logistics): progress on the political side had had a 
knock-on effect, helping to facilitate progress on technical cooperation 
regarding planning for the deployment. The AU found it hard to articulate its 
practical needs. Donor planners would advise the AU, who would then fine 
tune that advice. Donors responded to various requests, such as for helmets, 
airlift and so on. The EU states that this has improved understanding of the 
need for more AU staff to act as donor counterparts. 
 
Many stakeholders suggested that similar mechanisms could be systematised 
to function more strategically, covering a wider spectrum of short- and 
longer-term capacity-building issues. It might also be possible to combine this 
approach with a more strategic AU/donor coordination group. 
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ECOWAS/donor coordination meetings 
 
ECOWAS provided a useful model for coherent African-led donor coordination 
that could be replicated in other regions and at the continental level. Regular 
ECOWAS/donor coordination meetings, such as in Abuja in November 2004, 
were seen as effective in providing an opportunity for ECOWAS to present its 
requirements to donors, and for donors to select areas which they could 
support. This provided a forum for coordinated donor activity, in-line with 
ECOWAS priorities. Support for further development of ECOWAS’ capacity to 
provide an audit of expenditures and other financial management, as well as 
an ‘Executive Secretary’s Report’ on activities and priorities, could further 
improve this process. 
 
An AU/donor contact group 
 
Some African stakeholders suggested that an AU-donor contact group be 
established, in order to discuss the African peace and security architecture. 
This could facilitate coherent and effective implementation of capacity-
building. African/donor discussion fora which focused on specific issues of 
peace and security, and which restricted the number of donor points of 
contact for African institutions, had proved effective in facilitating 
coordination. Any new contact group should be African-led and would need to 
take into account the various donor groupings already involved in supporting 
African peacekeeping capacity-building, including the G8 and the EU.  
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Some donors recommended expanding this idea further, to develop a pan-
African clearinghouse, led by the RECs and the AU, which would help African 
institutions to present to donors clearer political statements of their 
requirements. The UK highlighted the establishment of G8+ Contact Groups in 
key peacekeeping capitals, as well as the Washington clearinghouse meeting 
(October 2004) as good starting points to enhance donor coordination. 
London planned to expand the scope of contact groups and to convene a 
further clearinghouse meeting in the course of 2005. 
 
Database of donor activities 
 
African and donor stakeholders recommended the establishment of a user-
friendly database of donor activities to improve coordination and enable a 
more African-led approach to African peacekeeping capacity-building. The US 
suggested developing matrices of various activities to support African 
capacity-building among G8 Member States, in partnership with the UN and 
other donors, including looking into developing benchmarking standards and 
effectiveness. 
 
The US military’s European Command (EUCOM) had initiated an Africa 
clearinghouse to provide a multilateral donor forum in which information on 
security assistance and cooperation programmes for Africa can be exchanged. 
The US, Canada and European states were regularly represented at these 
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meetings and, more recently, there had been African institutional 
representation from the AU and ECOWAS.  
 
African Standby Force 
 
Early developments in establishing the ECOBRIG and EASBRIG Planning 
Elements (PLANELMs) were widely seen as promising. Canada provided 
support to ECOWAS, while the UK supported construction of the PLANELM at 
Karen in Nairobi, which is near to British training support facilities for 
Kenya/East Africa. These efforts were helping to promote regional integration 
and cohesion across a range of activities, and link training with real 
operational needs. In relation to the EASBRIG PLANELM, the longstanding 
military relationship between the UK and Kenya was viewed as useful, in 
helping to enhance mutual trust and cooperation, and in promoting long-term 
donor support. Canada has offered to help establish a PLANELM and Brigade 
HQ for the AU. 
 
The SHIRBRIG Africa Capacity Building Project was exploring possibilities for 
sending a SHIRBRIG PLANELM team to the newly established AU or REC 
PLANELMs to assist in writing standard operating procedures (SOPs), staff 
working procedures, collective training, team building and so on. It was also 
considering providing assistance in writing peacekeeping doctrine, guidelines 
for employment and deployment. There is further consideration of an activity 
called ‘contact training’, which would bring the whole PLANEM of the AU or a 
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REC to SHIRBRIG HQ in Hoevelte, Denmark, for two months period of 
cooperative work, including a Command Post Exercise to demonstrate how 
SHIRBRIG collective training is planned and executed. 
 
Improving AU/REC cooperation 
 
Many stakeholders saw the establishment of a formal Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RECs as an important milestone to 
improving coordination, not least over the ASF. The AU stressed the 
advantages of flexibility in the continental ASF structure, which was based 
around subsidiarity/division of labour according to which institution is most 
capable/appropriate for different situations. The best illustrations of the 
potential role of the AU in peacekeeping could be drawn from what was 
happening on the ground in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS I and II), and 
possibly soon in Somalia. Here, the AU have led the interventions as the most 
appropriate institution, but with strong regional support. The AU and some of 
the regions felt that donor concerns over the ASF, in relation to regional 
inconsistencies or regions developing standby capacities at different speeds or 
in different formats, were exaggerated. These issues could represent 
challenges, but these could be overcome through a flexible approach 
responding to evolving realities on the ground. 
 
Donor/African co-deployment 
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France highlighted the benefits of co-deployment of donor and African 
peacekeeping personnel: the ESDP Operation Artemis operated alongside the 
UN mission (MONUC) in eastern DRCongo. But it did not include African 
troops. Conversely, French Licornes forces operating alongside the UN 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire incorporated African peacekeepers, and they 
emphasised cooperation and collaboration within the region. 
 
Logistics 
 
The US pointed to the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and the UN 
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as introducing a new operational 
concept of minimum essential lists of logistic resources required for a mission, 
for instance relating to weapons, as a means to avoid large numbers of ill-
equipped troops arriving in theatre. The US further suggested that regional 
logistics depots could help in assessing what materiel is already available 
regionally and moving resources to where they are needed. UK offers to 
finance a study on the logistics requirements of the AU/ASF had so far been 
turned down by the AU.  
 
Training 
 
Many stakeholders emphasised the significance of ‘train-the-trainer’ packages 
to develop sustainable training packages. 
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Regional Centres of Excellence  
 
There was strong support for developing Regional Centres of Excellence 
(RCEs) for peacekeeping training, which were seen to have been very 
effective mechanisms for emphasising regional aspects of training and 
regional interoperability; channelling donor support and coordinating various 
training initiatives regionally; and linking training with operational demands. 
 
National-level training 
 
At the national level, Nigeria believed that current engagement with the UK at 
its Jaji training centre had been very effective, and could inform similar 
programmes elsewhere. To respond to Nigeria’s concerns that demands for 
peacekeepers were outweighing the capability of RCEs to provide training, the 
UK was supporting development of the Nigerian Infantry School in Jaji. British 
policy supported Nigerian priorities, which the UK was helping to ‘fine tune’, 
thereby maintaining Nigerian ownership, and also responding to genuine 
training requirements relating to relevant operational shortcomings. 
 
AU task teams  
 
To counter problems balancing emergency response with strategic capacity-
building for peacekeeping, the AU suggested that a task team be set up at 
the AU to deal with emerging crises, which would allow the AU PLANELM to 
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focus on long-term planning and the operationalising the ASF. This model 
could also apply to regions such as West Africa, which experienced similar 
operational pressures to Addis Ababa. In the long term, planning capacity at 
the strategic level would need to be sufficient to deal simultaneously with 
emerging conflicts. 
 
Mediation 
 
The AU has a strong mediation focus. In the past, peace agreements have 
been achieved in Africa using external mediation. More recently, this process 
has been internalised. Implementation of peace agreements has proved more 
difficult through lack of peacekeeping capability to support them. African 
Heads of State and diplomats had been leading African mediation efforts. 
They are not professional mediators, but figures like Nelson Mandela have 
unique skills and powers to ‘impose peace’ during negotiations. However, 
more formalised institutional machinery to support such efforts – including 
personnel trained in mediation skills – could greatly facilitate mediation 
capacity. 
 
Support for the PSC 
 
The AU stressed that ratification of the PSC Protocol by all AU Member States 
would formalise their commitment to abide by its terms and so strengthen its 
legitimacy as the starting point for the AU peace and security architecture. 
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African funding 
 
Some donors suggested that the AU establish a voluntary sliding scale of 
financial contributions, with richer AU Member States paying more. The AU 
was trying to move towards this, with countries like South Africa and Nigeria 
pledging substantial amounts. 
 
Potential areas for agreed action to implement the Joint Plan as 
determined at a Chatham House Conference organised by the author 
 
The final section of this chapter presents a summary potential areas for 
agreement and action for implementation of the Joint Plan.370 Research for 
this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 
April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, 
as well as the UN and the EU. The workshop covered key areas in the African 
PSO capacity-building process: 
 
• overview and context  
• donor coordination  
• training and logistics  
                                            
370 Research for this section is taken from a two-day international workshop held on 13-14 
April 2005 at Chatham House in London. The workshop brought together key 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from Africa, G8 countries, as well 
as the UN and the EU. A list of participants is contained in Annex XX. 
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• strategic management capacity  
• operationalising the African Standby Force; and 
• supporting the breadth of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
 
The findings of the workshop are summarised below. 
 
Overview and context 
 
Participants felt that peacekeeping should be seen as a key implementing tool 
for African development more broadly. African leadership of the capacity-
building process was seen as essential to developing sustainable and effective 
PSO architecture, as Africans have the greatest interest and expertise in the 
area, and external efforts through the UN cannot tackle all African peace and 
security issues. 
 
Limited but tangible successes were already discernible in African capabilities 
for conflict prevention and crisis response – but a key gap remains in relation 
to post-conflict situations/peacebuilding. 
 
Key challenges for G8/donors 
 
• providing long-term funding, which is difficult for donors in view of their 
domestic constituencies. Donor coordination around African-identified 
priorities. 
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Key challenges for Africans 
 
• encouraging African member states’ support to develop the AU into truly 
supranational body, with continental and international legitimacy; and 
• providing clarity for priorities in PSO capacity-building – and resisting 
donor pressure for activities that contradict African priorities or existing 
capacity. 
 
Chances of success 
 
There was broad consensus behind AU policy and leadership as a good basis 
for building effective African PSO capacity. The G8 was seen to be delivering 
successfully on some of its pledges, and its engagement in the capacity-
building process was largely seen as useful and welcome. But impetus needed 
to be given to new initiatives to cover key gaps, including operationalising the 
ASF, tackling root causes of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding activities 
in multidimensional operations. 
 
Donor coordination 
 
Participants felt that enhancing donor coordination should stem from some 
fundamental questions: 
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• What is donor coordination for? Donor coordination should provide ‘space’ 
for the AU and RECs to present their plans to donors, ensuring that donor 
partners can hear what the AU and RECs need. Donors also need to 
understand political drivers at regional and continental levels. 
• What is it that needs to be coordinated? G8/donor action in support of the 
development of the ASF and other AU/REC priorities. 
• How deep should coordination be? Coordination extends from information-
sharing to allocating tasks very specifically. There needs to be clarity of 
what is meant/intended. Implementing political decisions of the G8 is 
hampered by its lack of relevant machinery. Delivery occurs by G8 
members working bilaterally or through other groupings. This complicates 
African communication with the G8 on PSO issues. Donor coordination 
needs to move beyond the G8 to include the breadth of key actors 
involved in the capacity-building process. There is a disconnect between 
different donor/African dialogues, demanding a more systematic approach. 
 
Priorities for enhancing donor coordination 
 
At the strategic level, participants suggested that establishing a core group of 
pro-active G8 states that would exist beyond G8 presidencies (and 
incorporating other major donors such as the EU and the UN), building on the 
example of G8/Africa Task Team established after the Kananaskis G8 summit 
in 2003. 
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A willing G8 Member State could volunteer to retain the G8 Africa peace and 
security portfolio under successive presidencies (say for a maximum of three 
years, or for the life of commitments made under the AU/G8 PSO annual 
meetings hosted by the AU). 
 
The ASF roadmap and proposed workshops provide ad very valuable basis for 
coordination around specific, AU-identified issues.371 Models of AU/donor 
coordination should draw on the successful examples used for Darfur. 
 
Training 
 
Political will was seen as a major driver for African peacekeeping capacity, 
and so there needed to be focus on achieving African support at the national 
level. But little effort was being put into training needs assessments and the 
AU/RECs do not have the capacity to provide clarity in this area. Much training 
is wasted as it does not properly address needs. 
 
The ‘train-the-trainer’ concept needed to be thought through to be effective, 
as it presupposes that national infrastructure is in place to enable participants 
to train in their host countries, which is seldom the case. 
 
                                            
371 AU (2005), Roadmap for the operationalisation of the  African Standby Force, experts’ 
meeting on the relationship between the au and the regional mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, 22 – 23 march, exp/au-recs/asf/4(i), 
www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/doc/asf%20roadmap.doc 
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Priorities for progress 
 
• Priority should be given to needs analysis of training requirements for 
RECs and the continent as a whole, using this as a basis for donor 
support. 
• Centres of excellence were seen as a very useful part of the training 
architecture, but they cannot match training demand alone and need to 
work in parallel with national capacities. 
• Support for infrastructure development for pre-deployment training. 
• Weaknesses of train-the-trainer programmes needed domestic support 
systems to be developed. 
• It was seen as necessary to ensure that troop-contributing countries could 
meet UN minimum standards before AU or REC deployment (this was a 
training and logistics issue, including equipment). 
 
Logistics 
 
Developing effective African logistics support for the ASF needed to decide on 
the most useful starting point, from the continental level or dealing with RECs 
separately. A sub-regional approach risked being expensive, not least by 
encouraging duplication. Commonality of stocks and equipment with access 
for RECs would foster interoperability and flexibility. 
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There was also confusion over the level of reliance on outsourcing logistics to 
the commercial sector. Donor consensus on this is not easy, as it needs to 
accommodate African control of logistics resources and a capacity to respond 
to African requests. 
 
Priorities for progress 
 
Key priorities for progress in logistics for African peacekeeping were identified, 
as follows: 
 
• The need for a decision about whether to address logistics centrally or 
regionally was identified as a priority for progress. Availability of resources 
was likely to drive towards delivering on a centralised, AU basis. 
• Commercial solutions should be promoted at the moment for logistics, 
with efforts shifting towards developing African capacity to contribute to 
this over long-term. 
• Strategic lift – a hybrid solution based around commercial provision is the 
most useful way forward. 
• Standardised logistics capacity should be developed as part of the 
establishment of the ASF. 
 
Strategic management capacity 
 
 311
There had been some significant staffing gains at certain African institutions, 
such as the Canadian-funded mission support capability at ECOWAS. 
However, these were seen as limited and unstructured. African institutions’ 
continuing failure to secure African financial support and reliance on donor 
funding remains a major problem for sustained funding/development and 
African ownership. Donors were having to shift focus from training African 
troops for participation in UN PSO, to developing indigenous African capacity 
across a much broader range of issues, including human resource/strategic 
management capacity. 
 
Priorities for progress 
 
A number of key priorities for progress in African strategic management 
capacity were identified, and are outlined below: 
 
• Recognise the importance of strategic management capacity for African 
leadership and the breadth of capacity-building issues. 
• Work in partnership with the AU/RECs towards a clearer understanding of 
the kind of strategic management needed, including: 
– Planning; 
– Command and control infrastructure; 
– Budgeting/accounting; 
– Contract management; 
– Expertise re: interfacing with multidimensional missions; 
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– Conflict prevention. 
• Support an increased focus on identifying and using African expertise, for 
example through a pool/database and through developing clear training 
career structure focused on providing staff to AU/RECs. 
• Consider the impact of pay rates on recruiting expertise – i.e. UN vs. AU. 
• Support the development of a culture of management and devolved 
responsibility. AU capacity to budget, manage and account for funds 
transparently will be important for donor confidence going forward. 
• Delivering the ASF will require significant increases in funding from 
donors. The AU needs a stable, long-term and flexible funding mechanism. 
The G8 should consider how to develop this, drawing on lessons from the 
EU Peace Facility funding model, particularly relating to Africans’ ability to 
draw on funds without bilateral conditionalities 
• Create self-sustaining initiatives supporting human resources, such as 
through expanding the Canadian/ECOWAS mission planning and 
management cell model to incorporate matching financing from African 
sources. 
• Provide better strategic analysis as a means of developing agreed 
language on the aspects of strategic management capacity between 
Africans/donors. This will support development of a consensual approach 
to ways forward. 
• Address human resource deficiencies further down the chain; i.e. 
developing competent militaries/police/management capacities as the 
building-blocks of ‘what to manage strategically’. 
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Operationalisation of the ASF 
 
The ASF was seen as the key implementing mechanism for the AU 
peacekeeping architecture. The a need to define the operational parameters 
of the ASF was seen as important – e.g. through the five ASF workshops 
agreed as part of the Roadmap for Operationalistion of the African Standby 
Force.372 Donors should support and welcome these. 
 
The roadmap was seen as a useful step in the operationalisation process – 
but there was still a lot of work to be done, not least in relation to 
sequencing; for instance, militarily speaking, doctrine needed to be developed 
before major thinking can be done about what type of training was required. 
 
The first priority was seen as the establishment and operationalistion of the 
Planning Element (PLANELM) at AU HQ. This was seen as important, as the 
PLANELM was intended to act as the nucleus of the ASF, for instance by 
standardising doctrine. The PLANELM also facilitates coordination and 
interoperability with RECs, requiring support for PLANELM development in 
RECs. 
 
                                            
372 AU Doc (2005), Experts’ meeting on the relationship between the au and the regional 
mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, EXP/AU-
RECs/ASF/4(I) – March 23-25. 
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Problems relate to donor funding for the AU and regional brigades: favouring 
one over another according to donor perspectives distorts development of the 
ASF continentally, according to African-identified priorities. 
 
Priorities for progress 
 
Support for urgent development of the PLANELMs at the AU and RECs should 
be a key priority for the G8 and other donors. This needed a long-term 
commitment and clear thinking of precisely how donors can support it. 
 
Staff from UN DPKO could be seconded to the AU PLANELM to assist in its 
establishment. 
 
Establishing a military advisor to the AU Chair would help raise the political 
profile of the issues involved in operationalisng the ASF. 
 
It was seen as important that strategic resources such as centres of 
excellence were distributed evenly through regions, although it was also 
important to recognise that some regions have less ‘absorptive’ capacity. 
 
Scenario VI (forced entry) deployments, within the AU’s terminology of types 
of operation, were seen as beyond the capability of the RECs and the AU. In 
relation to the development of the ASF, it was seen as important recognise 
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the importance of lead nations for robust deployments and to develop their 
capacities in addition to RECs and AU. 
 
Donors could establish a more centralised donor funding facility enabling the 
AU/RECs more control over division of resources, taking into consideration 
regional demands and so on. 
 
Supporting the breadth of the African peace and security architecture 
 
Beyond the military sphere, the African peace and security architecture – 
comprising the Continental Early Warning System, conflict 
prevention/mediation and the Panel of the Wise, the non-military aspects of 
the ASF, the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the Peace and 
Security Council – needed to be considered and supported in order to build a 
balanced and effective continental system. Support should be given in line 
with existing strengths and realities of African capabilities, within the breadth 
of other actors in the international system. 
 
There was confusion and scepticism about the focus and value of early 
warning systems, regarding what is precisely meant by early warning. A lot of 
information was already available in various fora. Mediation/conflict 
prevention is a traditional area of expertise for the AU/Africa. However, little 
attention had been paid to the Panel of the Wise in terms of capacity-building. 
Progress in this area should be closely coordinated with the UN, exploiting 
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synergies in peace processes and linking African processes with broader 
geopolitical developments. 
 
There needed to be more concentration on civilian aspects of the ASF, 
relating to integrated multidimensional operations. The AU cannot offer 
multidimensional capacity, but needs capacity/expertise to link effectively with 
the UN system. For peacebuilding, the AU can offer a strong political role in 
developing peace processes. 
 
Priorities for progress 
 
It was seen as important to contextualise support for the AU within the wider 
African development agenda. PSO capacity-building is a useful starting point, 
but should not exclude AU member states not involved in PSO from the 
broader process. A major part of the AU’s strength as an agency for conflict 
prevention and resolution in Africa lies in its political legitimacy, across the 
continent and internationally. Other priorities identified included the following: 
 
• Devise more systematic mechanisms for developing existing capacities for 
conflict prevention and management. 
• Involve the breadth of key stakeholders in conflict prevention processes 
from an early stage. 
• Re-balance focus towards civilian elements of the African PSO architecture 
– recognising the importance of inter-alia preventative diplomacy. 
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• Develop minimum substantive civilian mission components, including: 
 
– Public information; 
– Intelligence; 
– ‘Softer’ components of post-conflict reconstruction e.g. customs 
officers; and 
– Mission support e.g. logistics, admin. 
 
Development of CEWS should focus on the AU’s analytical capacity to convert 
information into policy recommendations, using existing networks of 
information in RECs and civil society. A clearer understanding of what role 
ASF civilian police would play needed to be developed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis above suggests four key areas for action to enhance 
implementation of the Joint Plan: strategic management capacity; donor 
coordination; operationalising the African stand-by force; and training and 
logistics. These action areas are summarised below:  
 
1) Strategic management capacity 
 
The chronic human resource shortfalls in African institutions seriously weaken 
African strategic management capacity at the AU and in the RECs. These 
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limitations have had a far-reaching impact across many areas of African 
peacekeeping capability, undermining African ownership of the capacity-
building process and Africans’ ability to absorb donor assistance. Operational 
commitments such as in Darfur have stretched the already thin AU capabilities 
still further, and have diverted resources away from long-term institutional 
development. Support for institutional human and other resources is, 
therefore, a major priority. Providing donor expertise to fill capacity gaps does 
not provide a long-term solution, and is politically hazardous, as it risks giving 
the appearance of ignoring existing African expertise and failing to build 
African capacity. 
 
Long-term donor commitments to support institutional capacity-building with 
minimal conditionalities are better suited to deliver more sustainable progress. 
African Member States also need to provide greater and more systematic 
support towards assuming full ownership of the process over time. However, 
in view of the scale of the human resources problem, coupled with the 
urgency of demands, some external technical expertise is essential in the 
short-term. There is a need to develop a new approach to the provision of 
external expertise – one which reinforces African leadership and strengthens 
African capacity. 
 
2) Donor coordination 
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Poor donor coordination undermines the development of strategic approaches 
and multiplies transaction costs for the AU and other recipients. Effective 
coordination promotes cohesion, understanding, genuine dialogue, and 
cooperation. A lack of G8 coherence is a serious impediment in following-up 
the Joint Plan. Also, the fact that there is no G8 institutional machinery 
through which to implement its policies, or that no there is no formal 
relationship between the G8 and the AU, is also an obstacle to coherent 
implementation. G8 focus is governed by its presidency, which undermines its 
capacity for long-term strategic engagement. The Russian Presidency in 2006, 
for instance, did not place a high priority on Africa. 
 
However, operational engagement in Darfur has brought donors together 
effectively at the AU in Addis Ababa. Structures for donor dialogue with the 
AU have been built to meet political and technical needs and have been 
working effectively. These mechanisms could be used as models for a more 
systematic approach, to function strategically over a broad spectrum of short- 
and longer-term capacity-building issues. 
 
3) Operationalising the African Standby Force 
 
Building operational planning capacity is a key component to operationlising 
the ASF. Establishing planning elements (PLANELMs) at the AU and in the 
regions is seen as key to this process. The AU PLANELM can ensure 
interoperability between the various elements of the ASF, not least the 
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Regional Standby Brigades (RSBs), for example by developing coherent 
doctrine. The AU PLANELM forms the core of the system, liaising with regional 
counterparts. 
 
Some promising lessons can be learned from early developments in 
establishing the PLANELM for Eastern Africa in Nairobi. The UK supported 
construction of the PLANELM, which is near to British training support facilities 
for Kenya/East Africa. These efforts help to promote regional integration and 
cohesion across a range of activities, and link training with real operational 
needs. 
 
4) Training/logistics 
 
A common complaint among African stakeholders is donors’ over-emphasis on 
training at the expense of logistical support. Training is important, but is not 
effective without the necessary equipment. Key logistical shortages relate to 
strategic deployment/airlift, tactical manoeuvring and maintenance, and 
communications. Logistics is an essential operational skill and developing this 
capability was identified as a major priority. 
 
Regional Centres of Excellence (RCEs) such as the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra provide good models for improving PSO 
training, particularly in regard to emphasising regional aspects of training and 
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regional interoperability; channelling donor support; coordinating various 
training initiatives regionally; and linking training with operational demands. 
 
The G8/Africa research presented above focuses heavily on practical problems 
to delivering a functioning African peacekeeping capability, and how the 
capacity-building process should function.  
 
A clear understanding of what the APSA should be trying to achieve can guide 
what sort of capability should be being developed. Current plans for the APSA 
appear extremely ambitious in their goal of developing a comprehensive 
capability across the complex peacekeeping spectrum, from peace 
enforcement through peacebuilding. Clearer thinking is needed to pinpoint 
where African capability can add most value within a wider, interlocking 
international peacekeeping. For example, a pattern seems to be emerging 
whereby African regional interventions serve as advance operations ahead of 
a larger UN deployment. Building capability specifically for this might be a 
much more achievable goal. 
 
Both donors and African partners stress the importance of African ownership 
of its own peace and security architecture, this ambition has proved difficult 
to sustain in practice. Donors generally agree that their support for capacity-
building should come in response to the AU’s own strategic vision. But the AU 
has found it hard to translate its wishes into viable plans, around which 
donors can coordinate their assistance. Meanwhile, the myriad of donor 
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initiatives are often both conflicting and self-serving, further undermining the 
AU’s ability to direct proceedings. 
 
Furthermore, the research above shows a distinct lack of emphasis on local 
communities and civil society. The Joint Plan is designed to support Africa’s 
peace and security capability. And so it can only work within the parameters 
of the structures of the AU, and the African peace and security architecture 
more broadly: it cannot impose solutions onto Africa. As we saw in chapter 6, 
the APSA places considerable emphasis on individual human rights. But 
previous chapters have shown that, for this aspiration to become meaningful, 
mechanisms must be built which can systematically incorporate local voices 
into the design and implementation of peacekeeping missions. Both the G8 
and Africa need to find ways to work together to pursue this objective.
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8 Case studies 
 
Chapter 8 uses case studies of African peacekeeping deployments to draw 
together and apply the findings of previous chapters, and to examine how 
well African regional peacekeeping has functioned, including to deliver civilian 
protection, with support from the international community. A pattern was 
established in earlier chapters for contemporary African peacekeeping, 
whereby vanguard African deployments have preceded larger, UN operations. 
This paradigm has assumed a number of configurations, and key examples of 
these are discussed below, in relation to deployments in Burundi, Darfur, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. The case studies of African regional 
deployments in this chapter therefore include discussion of the follow-on UN 
missions, to develop a more comprehensive evaluation of the potential of this 
joint model. 
 
Key themes discussed in this chapter include: capability, including capacity, 
mandate, training and doctrine; interaction between African regional 
peacekeeping and the international community; and African interests.  
 
The case studies assess the respective missions’ effectiveness in protecting 
vulnerable civilians. Civilian protection has not been the primary operational 
objective these deployments, but has been a specifically mandated aim in 
most cases.  
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Structurally, the case studies are divided between ‘regional’ and ‘continental’ 
deployments. Regional deployments are relevant to the regional brigades that 
will make up the ‘building blocks’ of the African Standby Force (ASF). In this 
instance, we look at ECOWAS deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, since, 
of the five regional brigades that underpin the ASF structure, only ECOWAS in 
West Africa has significant operational experience in peacekeeping. 
Continental deployments focus on the AU’s first three peacekeeping missions, 
in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. 
 
Regional deployments 
 
Sierra Leone 
 
ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Its record in Sierra Leone in 
terms of civilian protection was mixed. But it was not entirely bad. And 
ECOWAS’ mission in Sierra Leone paved the way for, and also formed a core 
component of, the subsequent deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was at the forefront of the revival of UN peacekeeping 
in the late 1990s, and Wilkinson has suggested that UNAMSIL represented a 
‘test-case’ for peacekeeping, following the problems of the 1990s.373 Civilian 
protection was one of the many tasks included in the UNAMSIL mandate. The 
mission undoubtedly improved civilians’ security in Sierra Leone, at least in 
the medium-term. But the extent to which it provided direct protection to 
                                            
373 Wilkinson, P. (2000) ‘PSO Under Fire: Lessons from Sierra Leone’, ISIS Briefing on 
Humanitarian Intervention, No.2. 
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vulnerable civilians, or contributed to peacebuilding in the longer term is less 
clear. 
 
The conflict in Sierra Leone dated from March 1991, when fighters from the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an offensive from the east of the 
country, near to the Liberian border, in an attempt to overthrow the 
government in Freetown. In 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected in 
democratic elections. But instability and a coup d’état preceded this and, 
following the elections, the country continued to be beset by violence, 
including additional attempts to seize power by force. The civil war had left 
half the country’s 4.5 million people displaced, and had led to the loss of over 
50,000 lives. Tens of thousands more were victims of amputations and rape. 
 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
 
ECOWAS dispatched troops to reinforce the Sierra Leone government forces 
soon after war broke out in 1991. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
was largely restricted to the capital, Freetown, and Sierra Leone’s second 
largest town, Bo. Despite its geographical limitations, during the early and 
mid-1990s many Sierra Leoneans expressed greater confidence in the 
protection offered by ECOMOG than in that offered by government soldiers. 
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And ECOMOG was seen as decisive in removing the abusive 1997-98 military 
junta from power in February 1998.374  
 
However, ECOMOG’s reputation diminished after 1998. There were increasing 
allegations of ECOMOG troops being involved in illegal diamond-mining and 
other forms of banditry – hence the local nickname for the force, ‘Every Car 
and Moving Object Gone’. There were even claims that ECOMOG personnel 
were involved in brokering illicit deals with the RUF. ECOMOG’s standing was 
also dented by its failure to halt the advance on Freetown of rebel RUF 
fighters in late 1998, or to prevent the RUF’s devastating assault on the 
capital in January 1999. Finally, ECOMOG forces were also accused of 
committing abuses themselves, in particular against civilians who were 
deemed to have collaborated with the RUF. During fighting between the junta 
and ECOMOG troops, tactics employed by Nigerian soldiers serving with 
ECOMOG included bombarding the junta’s military HQ from the sea, and some 
shells hit civilian settlements. Also, the junta undertook air strikes on civilians, 
and subsequently blamed them on the Nigerians.375 
 
On June 1998, the UN Security Council agreed to establish the UN Observer 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The mission was mandated to monitor 
                                            
374 Keen, D (2002), Sierra Leone’s War in Regional Context: Lessons from Interventions, LSE 
Human Security Series, 
www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/WestAfricaPaper.pdf  
 
375 Keen, D (2002), Sierra Leone’s War in Regional Context: Lessons from Interventions, LSE 
Human Security Series, 
www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityReport/WestAfricaPaper.pdf  
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and advise efforts to disarm combatants and to restructure Sierra Leone’s 
security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams documented reports of on-going 
atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians, under the 
protection of ECOMOG. However, violence continued and Sierra Leonean 
rebels gained control of more than half the country. Following the capture of 
Freetown by rebels in January 1998, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and 
again installed the civilian government later that same month, although many 
thousands of rebels fighters remained at large in the surrounding 
countryside.376  
 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
 
In July 1999, negotiations between the government and rebels finally led to 
the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, which promised an end to fighting 
and the formation of a government of unity.377 In October 1999, Security 
Council resolution 1270 authorised the replacement of the small UNOMSIL 
observer mission with a larger peacekeeping operation, the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).378 It was to comprise 6,000 personnel, and it was 
mandated to oversee implementation of Lomé. Its mandate include a number 
                                            
376 UNDPKO, UNAMSIL, UNDPKO website, 
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/index.html 
377 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone (July 1999), Article v, para 2. 
378 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had already undertaken 
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1998. While the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) did help to end Liberia’s civil 
war, and contributed to the stabilisation of Sierra Leone, the impact of these 
interventions on protecting civilians was poor. Sustainable peace processes in each 
country required further interventions by the UN and other states; Mepham D, and 
Ramsbotham A, (2007), Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the Responsibility to 
Protect in Africa, London: ippr, p.3. 
 328
of specific tasks, such as helping to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate armed 
groups into civil society, monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, and, 
ultimately, to support elections in the country and help to establish peace and 
security. 
 
But continuing violence subsequently convinced the Security Council to 
expand the UNAMSIL mandate three times, up to an eventual strength of 
17,500 troops, making it the largest UN operation at the time.379 The mission 
was also authorised, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to “take the 
necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford 
protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.380 
 
The Lomé agreement contained some major flaws, which helped to fuel on-
going violence. These included amnesty for serious human rights abusers. 
Lomé also offered powerful government positions to senior RUF figures, 
including its leader Foday Sankoh, who were widely regarded as the main 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations committed during the war. 
Indeed the UN, in witnessing the agreement, had insisted on the inclusion of 
a proviso refusing to recognise the amnesty in relation to crimes of genocide, 
                                            
379 United Nations (2000), Security Council Resolution 1346, March 2001; Wilkinson, P. (2000) 
‘PSO Under Fire: Lessons from Sierra Leone’, ISIS Briefing on Humanitarian 
Intervention, No.2. 
380 United Nations (2000), Security Council Resolution 1289, February. 
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crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.381 
 
The RUF regularly breached the ceasefire, continued to violate human rights 
and resisted the demobilisation process. Meanwhile, UNAMSIL showed itself 
to be incapable of fulfilling its mandated objectives. In May 2000, when the 
force was around 11,000 strong, 500 peacekeepers were captured and taken 
prisoner. Wilkinson asks why 11,000 UN troops under a Chapter VII mandate 
were not able to maintain a secure environment in Sierra Leone. He contends 
that UNAMSIL ignored some basic military principles of combat, such as a 
common doctrine, standard operating procedures, joint and combined 
operational planning, and common training standards and experience. At the 
time of the abductions, UNAMSIL was a disparate group of more than 30 
national contingents, with no coherent operational infrastructure, and which 
were deploying to Sierra Leone in a highly unstructured fashion. Amongst the 
various contingents serving with UNAMSIL, no common doctrine or approach 
existed to deliver peace enforcement effectively, and many contingents were 
neither trained nor equipped for the demands of using force.382  
 
The British government decided to dispatch around 1,000 soldiers to support 
UNAMSIL, and their involvement arguably saved the mission. In a short space 
of time, they provided effective opposition to the RUF, halted its military 
                                            
381 BBC Newsonline (8 July 1999), UN Warning to Sierra Leone. 
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advances, secured the release of the hostages and got the peace process 
back on track. British military intervention helped to reinforce the 
government’s authority, and it destroyed any prospect of the RUF taking 
control of the country. The action was successful in maintaining the elected 
government of President Kabbah, stopping large-scale human rights abuses 
and preventing Sierra Leone from descending once again into full-scale civil 
war.383 
 
Ultimately, UNAMSIL was able to deploy throughout the country. It succeeded 
in disarming 75,000 ex-fighters, and a reasonably stable peace was 
established. UNAMSIL then played an important role in helping to extend 
government authority and the rule of law to all parts of the country.384 On 18 
January 2002 President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah officially announced the end of 
the war. A symbolic burning of weapons in Freetown on the same day marked 
the successful completion of the UN-supervised disarmament process, in 
which over 45,000 fighters gave up their weapons. Elections in May 2002 
were decreed by the international community to have been ‘free and fair.’ 
UNAMSIL helped to train Sierra Leoneans in human rights, and it was 
supported the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those 
most responsible for war crimes. 
 
                                            
383 Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, (2007), Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the 
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384 Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, (2007), Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the 
Responsibility to Protect in Africa, London: ippr, p.55. 
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But Sierra Leone remained fragile, more effort was needed to tackle the root 
causes of conflict and cultivate a culture of human rights in the country: the 
economy was highly dependent on external funding; a disproportionate share 
of income from diamond mining continued to bypass the government and 
ended up in private hands. And, despite reintegration programmes, thousands 
of former fighters and disaffected youths were unemployed. The UN Security 
Council established the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to 
help consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. It was mandated to help the 
government strengthen human rights, galvanise development, improve 
transparency and hold elections in 2007.385  
 
ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers had limited success in protecting 
vulnerable civilians in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG enjoyed some initial success. 
But, ultimately its reputation was severely tarnished by abusive behaviour by 
some of its own personnel. And UNAMSIL was only ever expected to provide 
“at most” a temporary “protective umbrella” for some civilians in isolated 
situations.386 Moreover, the extent to which UNAMSIL has been able to 
contribute to significant peacebuilding in a more comprehensive sense has 
also been questioned.387 But a DPKO-sponsored public opinion survey in 
Sierra Leone in 2005 surveyed 900 people from all age groups across Sierra 
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Leone’s 14 districts, showing that nearly 100 per cent agreed that the security 
situation had improved with the presence of UNAMSIL.388  
 
Liberia 
 
In the early 1990s ECOWAS intervened in the conflict in Liberia. Some West 
African troops in Liberia involved in this first ECOWAS intervention in Liberia 
committed widespread abuses of human rights. But a second ECOWAS 
mission in Liberia in 2003 proved more effective. In late 2003, ECOWAS 
agreed to deploy a 3,500-strong operation to oversee implementation of the 
recently agreed peace agreement in Liberia. Like the African Mission in 
Burundi (AMIB), described in more detail below, the ECOWAS Mission in 
Liberia (ECOMIL) was to act as a vanguard mission ahead of a larger, UN 
operation, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Unlike AMIB, however, 
transition from a regional, African mission to a UN operation was explicitly 
agreed from the start, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolution 1509 
(2003).389  
 
The armed conflict in Liberia had resulted in serious human rights abuses, 
including arbitrary killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence against 
women, girls and young boys, arbitrary arrests and detention, forced 
conscription of child soldiers, systematic displacement, and indiscriminate 
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targeting of civilians. An estimated 250,000 people lost their lives in war-
related circumstances in Liberia since 1989, and at least at least half of these 
were civilian non-combatants. There were eyewitness accounts of massacres 
of civilians and of mass graves. Liberian society was heavily militarised during 
the conflict, with a proliferation of militia groups emerging.390 
  
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
 
ECOMIL was mandated to establish zones of separation between warring 
parties, to secure an agreed ceasefire line and to create conditions for the 
arrival of UNMIL. ECOMIL comprised contingents from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. The deployment of the first 
elements of ECOMIL began on 4 August. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) provided support for the initial deployment of ECOMIL, and the US 
government also provided support for ECOMIL, and also positioned a task 
force of over 2,000 marines off the coast of Liberia.391 
 
ECOMIL contingents were subsequently ‘re-hatted’ and reassigned to UNMIL 
in October 2003. ECOMIL contingents with the appropriate level of capability 
constituted a brigade within UNMIL that operated in the Monrovia area. 
ECOMIL troops that did not meet the required level of capability were deemed 
to be potentially vulnerable to attack, and as such a threat the overall 
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effectiveness of the UN force. Where necessary, these troops were repatriated 
and replaced by better-equipped forces. 
 
Civilian protection was not a mandated task for ECOMIL peacekeepers. And 
observers have stressed that ECOMIL lacked capacity to provide a serious 
deterrent to human rights abusers, as civilians were still subject to murder, 
rape, forced recruitment, looting and forced displacement at the hands of 
rebel groups and government militias during its deployment.392  
 
But ECOMIL certainly helped to create a more secure environment for Liberian 
civilians in the longer term, not least by stabilising the situation in Liberia 
sufficiently to hand over operational responsibilities to the UN. Since then, 
UNMIL has overseen a number of initiatives designed to build more durable 
security in Liberia. UNMIL played a major role in conducting a credible, 
transparent, free and fair national election, and on 23 November 2005, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf was declared Liberia’s President, and the first ever elected 
female head of state in Africa. Between November 2004 and April 2006, 
321,747 internally displaced persons returned home, while over 300,000 
refugees have returned home since October 2004. UNMIL has also supported 
security sector reform, and as at 1 June 2006, 2,468 police trainees had been 
recruited, of which 1,712 have already graduated from the Police Service 
Training Academy.393  
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Continental deployments 
 
Burundi 
 
In April 2003, the AU deployed its first peace operation. The South African-led 
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) comprised around 2,500 peacekeepers. Acute 
instability plagued Burundi since it gained independence from Belgium in 
1962, and the conflict was marked by periodic presidential assassinations and 
brutal inter-communal pogroms. In one particularly violent incident, during 
fighting between Hutus and Tutsis in the north of the country in 1988, around 
20,000 Hutus were killed and another 60,000 fled into neighbouring 
Rwanda.394 Violence intensified dramatically in 1994, after the main Hutu 
party, the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), withdrew from the 
government in protest at political power being ceded to Tutsis. 
 
African Union Mission in Burundi 
 
The South African Defence Force (SADF) provided most of the troops for 
AMIB, although these were supplemented by contributions from Mozambique 
and Ethiopia. AMIB was mandated to observe a loose ceasefire agreed 
between the main parties to the conflict, to assist in the demobilisation of 
combatants, and to protect vulnerable civilians at risk of violence. Mamadou 
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Bah was appointed AU special representative in Burundi. Included among 
AMIB’s responsibilities were to protect politicians participating in the 
transitional government, to establish secure demobilisation centres in order to 
launch the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and 
to help establish conditions to facilitate the return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons.  
 
AMIB was deployed on the implicit assumption that it would be succeeded by 
a UN mission. Therefore, a significant part of its role was to establish 
conditions that would allow for a UN peace operation to enter the Burundi.395 
Resource and capacity constraints and ongoing insecurity meant that AMIB 
was only partly successful in implementing its mandate.396 That said, the 
mission did help to stabilise the situation in Burundi, and it played a useful 
‘bridging’ role, facilitating the deployment of the larger and better-resourced 
UN mission in 2004. 
 
United Nations involvement in Burundi 
 
On 21 May 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 
1545, which authorised the deployment of the UN Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB). ONUB was mandated with a maximum of 5,650 military personnel, 
including 200 observers and 125 staff officers, up to 120 UN police personnel, 
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as well as the appropriate civilian personnel. It was authorised under Chapter 
VII of the UN charter to: monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements 
and investigating violations; oversee disarmament and demobilisation of 
combatants; monitor the illegal flow of arms across the national borders; help 
to create humanitarian space; and assist with the electoral process.397 In July 
2005, elections were held in Burundi for the first time in 12 years, which were 
broadly seen as free and fair. In December that year, ONUB began a gradual 
withdrawal from Burundi, which went on for the following 12 months before 
the peacekeeping mission handed over to an integrated UN office in the 
country: the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB). 
 
 
Peacekeeping operations are only one part in a range of factors that influence 
events in a conflict. Jackson stresses that Burundi’s “tentative” return to 
peace and democracy is the culmination of a decade-long process, whose 
success is the result of a number of factors.398 First, key Burundian political 
parties were willing to strike unprecedented compromises. Second, in the 
latter part of the crisis, there was exceptionally determined sustained regional 
engagement in the peace process, namely pressure from the Organisation of 
African Unity/African Union (AU) and its membership, and particularly South 
Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. This was supplemented by pressure and 
support from the EU, from Canada and from the US. Third, local and 
                                            
397 United Nations, UNSC (2004), Security Council resolution 1545, S/2004/1545 
398 United Nations, DPKO, (2006), The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) – political 
and strategic lessons learned, UNDPKO independent external study, July, 
www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/ONUB%20Lessons%20Learne
d.pdf 
 338
international NGOs provided energetic diplomacy behind-the-scenes. But 
Jackson adds that AMIB and ONUB played there parts, as “Burundi’s success 
is … the outcome of a sustained process in which domestic, regional and 
international/multilateral actors were called upon to interact in complex and 
complementary ways”.399 
 
Overall, AMIB helped to create conditions under which peace could be built. 
By the end of its mission, AMIB had succeeded in establishing relative peace 
to most provinces in Burundi, with the exception of the region outside 
Bujumbura where armed resistance, in the form of the Forces Nationales de 
Libération (FNL), remained a problem. AMIB was therefore engaged in 
peacebuilding through helping to allay violent conflict, and through trying to 
lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction.  
 
Resource and capacity constraints and ongoing insecurity meant that AMIB 
was only partly successful in implementing its mandate to observe the 
ceasefire, initiate the demobilisation of combatants and protect civilians at 
risk.400 But throughout its period of operation, AMIB helped to de-escalate a 
potentially volatile situation, and in February 2004 a UN evaluation team 
concluded that conditions were appropriate for establishing a UN 
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peacekeeping operation in the country.401 It also did a reasonably effective 
job in stabilising the situation in Burundi, and it played a useful ‘bridging’ role, 
facilitating the deployment of the larger and better-resourced UN mission in 
2004. ONUB oversaw elections 
 
Darfur 
 
The conflict in Darfur has a long history. For decades there have been 
tensions over land and grazing rights between the primarily nomadic Arabs, 
and farmers from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa communities. But the roots 
of recent crisis can be traced to a meeting in July 2001 between a group of 
Zaghawa and Fur, at which they pledged to cooperate to defend their villages 
against government attacks.402  
 
Tensions escalated dramatically in April 2003 when two rebel groups in the 
region, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), mounted an attack on a military garrison at al-
Fashir, provoking a brutal and disproportionate response from the Sudanese 
government and its allies. The al-Fashir raid can be seen as a turning point 
both militarily and psychologically. It was from this point onwards that the 
conflict escalated dramatically, with a huge increase in Sudanese government 
attacks on rebel groups in Darfur. 
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Between 2003 and 2007, more than 200,000 people were killed in Darfur and 
more than two and a half million displaced.403 And nearly four million people 
were dependent on humanitarian aid for food, shelter and health care. All 
parties were implicated in committing serious human rights abuses, including 
some of the rebel groups, and few showed convincing interest in resolving the 
conflict diplomatically. Many commentators suggest that primary responsibility 
for the human tragedy in Darfur rests with the Sudanese government and the 
government-backed militia, known as the Janjaweed.404 
 
The Janjaweed have committed ethnic cleansing and forced displacement by 
bombing, burning and looting villages. Women and girls have been 
particularly vulnerable to violence and abuse, with large numbers of them 
becoming victims of sexual attacks when going out of their villages to get 
water or firewood or when taking goods to local markets. The livelihoods of 
millions more Darfurians have been destroyed. Fighting has also impacted on 
Sudan’s neighbours. For example, many hundreds of thousands of Darfurians 
have sought safety in Chad, although many of these remain vulnerable to 
attacks from Sudanese forces across the border. 
 
The response to the situation in Darfur has largely been led from within Africa 
over the first years of the crisis, particularly through the efforts of the AU. AU 
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initiatives took two main paths: Addis Ababa’s role in mediating ceasefire talks 
and peace negotiations; and 2) the deployment of the AU Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS). 
 
AU Mediation 
 
President Idriss Deby in neighbouring Chad led initial mediation efforts in 
Darfur. However, in early 2004 the AU assumed the lead in negotiations in 
N’djamena, the capital of Chad, supported by the Geneva-based Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue. These negotiations produced the N’djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in April that year, which was fortified in 
late May by an agreement to establish a Ceasefire Commission, and by the 
deployment of AU observers to Darfur. 
 
The AU was deeply involved in trying to facilitate peace talks between the 
various parties, through a series of negotiations between the Sudan 
Government and rebel groups. The seventh round of these AU-led talks 
culminated in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria, in early 
2006. This was signed on 5 May by the Government of Sudan, but only by 
one of the rebel groups, Minni Minnawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA/MM). The negotiation process was undermined by obstructive 
approaches by both the government and the rebels. In addition, international 
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support for the talks was sometimes counter-productive, particularly the 
setting of an arbitrary deadline to conclude the DPA.405 
 
It was hoped that the DPA would lead to the cessation of hostilities and the 
creation of a lasting peace. But the opposite happened, as security 
deteriorated sharply. Factions of the rebel groups that refused to sign the 
DPA formed a new National Redemption Front (NRF), and subsequently 
escalated attacks. The Sudanese government launched major military 
counter-offensives in an apparent attempt to secure a decisive military victory 
in Darfur. The SLA/MM has sometimes acted as a paramilitary wing of the 
Sudanese army, but more recently it has been involved in clashes with 
Sudanese government forces. And the worsening security has inevitably had a 
commensurately negative impact on the humanitarian situation.406 
 
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
 
The AU had only just negotiated the transfer of its African Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) to the UN in May 2004, when it agreed to deploy monitors to Darfur. 
The eruption of the Darfur conflict in 2003 was a major challenge for the AU, 
which was, at that time, absorbed in building its new basics of its new peace 
and security architecture.407 The AU lacked the military and financial capability 
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to deliver and sustain effective peacekeeping forces in tough environments 
like Darfur. In terms of intergovernmental organisations, only NATO has 
shown itself capable of delivering this kind of capacity.408  
 
The AU at first authorised the deployment of a small force of 60 military 
observers, protected by 310 troops. Peacekeepers serving with the AU 
mission in Sudan (AMIS) were originally deployed under a ‘Chapter VI’ type 
observation mandate, to oversee the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire 
Agreement. But it was soon obvious that the agreement was a sham, not 
least because Khartoum pursed its military objectives in Darfur through the 
Janjaweed, often with overt support from government forces.409  
 
Deteriorating security persuaded the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to 
strengthen the AMIS mandate and force. AMIS was expanded to include 
2,341 military personnel and 815 civilian police, and then 6,171 military 
personnel and 1,560 civilian police, during meetings on 20 October 2004 and 
subsequently on 28 April 2005. Under its enhanced mandate, AMIS was 
tasked with overseeing compliance with the ceasefire agreement and related 
accords, with helping to establish a secure environment for humanitarian 
assistance, and with a limited role in protecting civilians under imminent 
threat. 
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The AU secretariat had initially been very clear on what would be needed to 
contain the violence in Darfur and to protect vulnerable civilians. In July 2004, 
Alpha Oumar Konare, the Chair of the AU Commission, asked the AU to 
develop a plan for a full peacekeeping force, mandated to disarm the 
Janjaweed by force. But Baldo describes how two political realities restricted 
AU deployment to Darfur. First, any deployment would need to be agreed by 
the Sudanese government in Khartoum. This gave a de facto veto to the 
ruling National Congress Party over the terms of the mission. Second, the AU 
did not have sufficient capacity to carry out this task on its own, and it 
needed both financial and technical support. This was not a surprise. In 
January 2005 an AU official asserted that the organisation was like ‘a house 
under construction’, with ‘no roof yet’; he stated that “people are asking us 
for protection from the rain and we are not yet ready”.410 
 
Darfur Integrated Taskforce (DITF) 
 
The AU was reliant on substantial support from western donors, both in the 
form of financial assistance, and technical assistance, especially in the area of 
logistics. IN terms of finance, the EU African Peace Facility provided 50% of 
funding for AMIS.411  The AU was well aware of the shortcomings of its 
capability to manage AMIS, and it established a dedicated capacity at AU HQ 
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to direct and support the mission. The primary rationale of the DITF was to 
link political and military issues relating to the AU’s response to the Darfur 
crisis, and to ensure coordination between planning and implementation 
elements within the AU, specifically between HQ in Addis and AMIS.  
 
But the DITF was also a key hub through which to coordinate international 
engagement with AMIS. Within the DITF structure, two subsidiary bodies 
were established to facilitate assistance. 1) The Liaison Group (LG), chaired 
by the head of the DITF; this was supported by senior AU military, police, and 
political affairs officers, and was attended by representatives of the EU, the 
US, some EU Member States, and the UN. 2) The Partners Technical Support 
Group (PTSG), chaired by a senior member of the EU delegation in Addis 
Ababa; this was attended by representatives of the embassies of Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the US and 
NATO.  
 
International contributions to AMIS included the following:412  
 
• EU: vehicles, communication equipment, pay and allowances, experts 
(CIVPOL) and maps;   
• UN: UN Assistance Support Cell in Addis Ababa, staff training, and 
MAPEX;413   
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• NATO : strategic air lift, staff training at strategic/operational levels,  
MAPEX under UN auspices, tactical air lift, information analysis training, 
capacity building for Peace Suport Operations division (PSOD), after  AMIS 
transition to the UN mission,  basic operational equipment;  
• US: construction and maintenance of camp facilities, observers;   
• Canada: 105 armoured personnel carriers (APC’s), ammunition, ground 
fuel, 25 helicopters, experts, maps  
• Norway: communication equipment, CIVPOL accommodation at IDP 
camps;   
• Netherlands: communication equipment.   
 
AMIS’ effectiveness 
 
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in his September 2006 report 
to the Security Council on Darfur that AMIS’ efforts brought “some limited 
relief from the worst excesses of this vicious war”.414 There was a tangible 
reduction of violence and civilian safety in areas where AMIS was deployed, 
such as in Kebkabiyah (North Darfur) in late 2004, and in Labado and Graida 
(both in South Darfur) in early 2005. AMIS also helped to open up 
humanitarian up space for what would become one of the biggest relief 
operations in the world, which included 14,000 aid workers.415  
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But, with fewer than 7,000 troops at its peak, who were poorly equipped and 
lacking a credible mandate, AMIS could not provide significant civilian 
protection to the people of Darfur. There was also a political failure by the AU 
to acknowledge that the Sudanese government had clearly failed to uphold its 
responsibility to neutralise the Janjaweed militia and to protect its citizens, 
and that it was a primary perpetrator of atrocities against civilian in Darfur.416   
 
Insecurity continued to worsen in Darfur through 2005 and into 2006, and 
AMIS’ structural weaknesses became increasingly obvious, as the force was 
incapable of tackling ceasefire violations by all parties. The poorly configured 
DPA exacerbated instability still further. AMIS did little to counter this. During 
the first few weeks after the signing of the DPA, AMIS failed to implement the 
provisions of the DPA that came under its mandate, which did considerable 
damage to the credibility of the force later on.417    
 
The logistical challenges of operating in Darfur without the consent of the 
government meant that, even if the AU had demonstrated the political 
determination to confront Khartoum, which it did not, the AU could not have 
mounted a sufficiently proactive mission. But international donors were not 
prepared to finance an expanded AU mission. A stronger mandate would have 
made direct confrontation with Khartoum much more likely, creating a serious 
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risk of ‘mission creep’. And it would have required many more troops, with the 
attendant risk of demands for troop contributions from donor countries if 
AMIS became involved in serious combat with Sudanese forces. Instead, the 
efforts of the AU and key donors focused on achieving a final peace 
agreement. This required maintaining the cooperation of Khartoum, in order 
to maintain its presence at the negotiating table.418 
 
The wider international response   
 
The international community for a long time could not muster concerted 
support for a peacekeeping intervention in Darfur. The US and UK were 
heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, while most European states 
demonstrated a preference for diplomatic solutions and were also focused on 
NATO’s commitment in Afghanistan. Other governments, such as China, 
staunchly defended Sudanese sovereignty and their own rights to access 
Sudanese oil, while yet others, particularly the Arab League, denied the 
Sudanese government’s responsibility for war crimes in Darfur and described 
the situation there as a civil war.419 
 
However, as mounting evidence of atrocities in Darfur continued to emerge in 
2004, it became increasingly difficult for the international community to avoid 
acting. A report by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Mission to Darfur in 
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early May 2004 described candidly the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the 
culpability of the main players. The first UN Security Council resolution 
specifically on Darfur, resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, endorsed the presence 
of AMIS. Successive resolutions placed various demands and threatened 
penalties on the parties to the conflict. They called on all parties to allow 
humanitarian access, to cooperate with AU mediation initiatives, and to 
uphold commitments to the ceasefire and other political agreements.   
 
In April 2006, the Security Council also voted to place targeted sanctions on 
four Sudanese individuals – a former Sudanese military commander, a 
Janjaweed militia leader and two rebel commanders. These included travel 
bans and the freezing of foreign bank accounts and other assets. Since May 
2006, UN resolutions have also required non-signatories to sign up to the 
DPA. Threats by the Security Council in response to non-compliance have 
included financial, military and other sanctions, as well as referral of suspects 
of major war crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC).   
 
UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur 
 
Since the UN World Summit in September 2005, the international debate over 
Darfur has increasingly been framed within the context of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P) agenda. In a speech given in London in January 2006, Kofi 
Annan declared that the UN Summit’s commitment to R2P would only be 
meaningful if the Security Council was prepared to act “swiftly and decisively, 
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to halt the killing, rape and ethnic cleansing to which people in Darfur are still 
being subjected”.420   
 
The UN Security Council began to focus on the idea of a transition from the 
struggling AMIS to a much larger and more capable UN mission. The AU PSC 
endorsed this idea in May 2006. In August 2006, the UN also finally approved 
it. Security Council resolution 1706 agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of 
more than 17,000 troops and up to 3,300 civilian police officers to Darfur, to 
try to halt the spiralling violence.421 UN Resolution 1706 proposed to expand 
the mandate of UNMIS to cover Darfur as well. The UN force was mandated 
to take over the role of AMIS by no later than 31 December 2006. However, 
no one in New York or in key international capitals was prepared to deploy UN 
forces without Khartoum’s consent, which the government of Sudan showed 
no interest in providing.  
 
But the deployment of a UN operation to Darfur has always conditional on 
Khartoum’s consent to it. The Security Council has repeatedly made it clear 
that it would not deploy any peacekeeping force that is not acceptable to 
Khartoum. Meanwhile, a UN-led intervention in Darfur without the against the 
wishes of the Sudanese government is beyond the UN’s capabilities, and it is 
also an anathema to many in the UN system. But Terrie asserts that the 
extent to which the Sudanese government would fully comply or cooperate 
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with a UN presence deployed to Darfur with Khartoum’s acquiescence is also 
extremely doubtful.422 
 
The Sudanese government claimed that the deployment of a UN mission 
would be a violation of its sovereignty and would be tantamount to a 
declaration of war. But commentators suggested that this claim was 
disingenuous, as international troops serving with the UN Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) were already stationed in the south of the country, deployed with 
Khartoum’s acquiescence to underpin the 9 January 2005 North-South peace 
agreement. Commentators have also maintained that Khartoum’s opposition 
was based on fears that a UN force would be more effective in countering its 
military actions in Darfur, and that a UN presence on the ground, backed by 
the Security Council, might lead to key figures in the Sudanese government 
being indicted for war crimes before the International Criminal Court.423   
 
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)  
 
On 16 November 2006, Kofi Annan and the AU convened a high-level 
consultation on the situation in Darfur in Addis Ababa. This brought together 
the Chair of the AU Commission, the five Permanent Members of the Security 
Council and a number of African countries, including Sudan. Following the 
meeting, the UN announced a major a breakthrough in negotiations: that 
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Sudan had agreed to a strengthened AU force (as an interim measure), to a 
re-energised peace process and to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in 
Darfur, in the context of an AU/UN ‘hybrid mission’. This was a new concept 
for UN-regional peacekeeping, which would require unified AU-UN leadership. 
It would provide a number of operational advantages, including UN funding 
for the mission, capabilities and troops which might not be available among 
AU Member States, and day-to-‘day backstopping support and guidance from 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
There was considerable confusion about what was actually agreed at the 
meeting. Immediately after the UN’s announcement, the Sudanese 
government denied such an interpretation of the outcome of the meeting. In 
fact, in November 2006 Khartoum increased attacks in Darfur. As a result, the 
humanitarian situation worsened, causing number of relief organisations to 
announce their withdrawal from Darfur.424 
 
International pressure and on-going negotiations eventually led to more 
explicit agreement on the deployment of a joint AU/UN force, which was 
officially authorised in July 2007 under UN Security Council resolution 1769. 
The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was provided with a 
maximum strength of 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military 
observers and liaison officers, as well as a civilian component, including up to 
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3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 
personnel each. Resolution 1769 authorised UNAMID, under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, to take the necessary action support implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent the disruption of its implementation, and 
to protect civilians – although all of this was “without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the Government of Sudan”.425    
 
By February 2008, UNAMID comprised 9,212 uniformed personnel, including 
7,467 military personnel, 1,605 police officers, and one formed police unit, as 
well as 1,312 civilians. At this time, UNAMID’s military component had been 
strengthening its activities in the mission area, in order to increase its 
visibility. It was now conducting several hundred patrols throughout Darfur 
every month, and it had tripled the number of patrols and convoy escorts in 
Western Darfur, in response to a recent rise in violence in the area. Additional 
measures were being reviewed to reinforce the Western sector, although 
there were serious logistical constraints hampering further expansion of the 
activities of the military component. The Force Commander increased 
contacts with the parties, in order to facilitate UNAMID’s assessment of their 
movements, intent and capabilities, and also to build the parties’ confidence 
in UNAMID’s impartiality. UNAMID was further continuing to work with the 
government, JEM and SLM/A-Abdul Wahid to facilitate safe passage to secure 
locations for vulnerable civilians.426    
                                            
425 United Nations SC (2007), Resolution 1769, 31 July, S/1769/2006 
426 United Nations, UNSC (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 25 March, S/2008/196. 
 354
 
Challenges to the effectiveness of UNAMID    
 
A number of factors were hampering the generation of the UNAMID force. In 
February 2008, the UN reported that the effective deployment of UNAMID 
battalions was dependent on donor countries providing support to countries 
contributing troops to the mission, in terms of equipment, training and 
capability. The priority in building-up UNAMID at this stage was to enhance 
the capacity of former AMIS troops re-assigned to UNAMID, which were due 
to deploy in the following quarter. There was also a lack of offers to provide 
UNAMID with utility helicopters, light tactical helicopters, aerial 
reconnaissance aircraft, and logistics and transport units. Furthermore, a 
number of police-contributing countries were not prepared for expeditious 
deployment. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations therefore 
planned to send assessment missions to those countries in order to identify 
shortfalls in equipment and other areas that were hindering deployment.427 
 
UNAMID also faced numerous logistical challenges. The availability of transit 
accommodation to facilitate incoming units was highly erratic, and the failure 
of the Sudanese government to provide UNAMID with the land it required to 
set up its HQ in Western Darfur was also a hindrance. The transition from the 
AMIS to the UNAMID supply system was experiencing logistical difficulties, 
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including ageing equipment inherited from AMIS. Early 2008 had not 
completed the deployment of UN communications equipment and systems, 
and UNAMID was, in the meantime, sending some operational messages via 
commercial Internet. No countries had yet made additional pledges for 
aviation and transportation units, and UNAMID still lacked one heavy and one 
medium ground transport unit, three military utility aviation units (18 
helicopters in total), as well as additional attack helicopters.428    
 
On 18 October 2010 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, reported to the 
Security Council on progress made towards implementing the mandate of 
UNAMID, covering the period since 14 January.429 
 
Violence in internally displaced persons camps 
 
In late July 2010, violence broke out at Kalma camp in which four people 
were killed. Three people were also killed during unrest at Hamadiya camp 
near Zalingei. Security at Kalma camp continued to deteriorate resulting in at 
least 35 fatalities, as well as the displacement from the camp of some 25,000 
IDPs to Nyala and surrounding villages. Several thousand ‘displaced IDPs’ 
from Nyala camp sought refuge at the nearby UNAMID community policing 
centre. Humanitarian workers and UNAMID personnel were eventually allowed 
access to the camp in mid-August. The violence illustrated the growing 
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problem of weapons and armed elements inside IDP camps. UNAMID initiated 
talks with IDP leaders, while the authorities in Southern Darfur also 
announced their intention to relocate Kalma camp to nearby Beleil. The 
government conceded that relocation would have to be voluntary and 
disarmament efforts non-coercive.  
 
UNAMID reinforced its presence and conducted 24/7 patrols in the camp 
during the crisis, as well as daily engagements by UNAMID integrated civilian 
teams with camp leaders and other residents. Similar events occurred in 
Hamadiya camp near Zalengei. Tensions between pro- and anti-Doha IDPs 
reflect an ongoing power struggle within the camps.  
 
Security, governance, human rights and the humanitarian situation 
 
Security remained fragile and unpredictable during this period, including 
intermittent fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and rebels; 
inter-tribal violence; unrest in some IDP camps; attacks and abductions of 
humanitarian and UNAMID personnel; and criminality. However, incidents of 
carjacking and abductions of UN personnel decreased due to tighter 
mitigation measures put in place by UNAMID.  
 
The SAF forced JEM elements out of areas in Southern Darfur that had been 
the scene of fighting in April and May. JEM elements had relocated in the far 
north of Northern Darfur, around the Libya-Chad border. There were fewer 
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armed confrontations between parties to the conflict. JEM forces clashed with 
SAF in July as SAF tried to prevent it from taking up positions in the south. 
Clashes were also recorded between SLA-Abdul Wahid forces and SAF. 
 
In September an unidentified armed group reportedly in uniform attacked the 
village of Tabarat in Northern Darfur. Eyewitnesses identified the attackers as 
Arab tribesmen. They killed 37 and injured 35, targeting men. Around 3,000 
people were displaced to Tawilla, around 30 km away. Khartoum restored 
order and established a commission to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators. 
 
Tribal clashes, notably between the Misseriya and Rezeigat over land and 
access to migration routes in the Kass area, were the major cause of death in 
August, claiming the lives of 157 people. Inter-tribal clashes over water 
resources and cattle thefts continued to flare up, although local agreements 
appeared to be holding in some areas. 
 
There were 26 incidents of restrictions of UNAMID or UN agency movements, 
the majority by the government. Humanitarian access was denied in some 
villages. UNAMID forces were attacked several times and seven peacekeepers 
were injured. Criminals targeting UNAMID and humanitarian personnel 
remained a concern, although the overall crime rate involving the UN, 
associated personnel and IDPs in areas patrolled by UNAMID dropped by 20 
per cent. UNAMID military personnel conducted 3,411 routine patrols, 637 
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short-range patrols, 324 long-range patrols, 1,001 night patrols, 184 
humanitarian escorts and 691 logistics/administrative patrols, in IDP camps, 
towns and villages across Darfur. UNAMID police undertook 524 firewood and 
farming patrols, 2,818 patrols outside villages, towns and IDP camps, and 
1,140 medium and long-range patrols.  
 
UNAMID police had recruited 5,580 community policing volunteers, of whom 
2,414 had been trained and were active in IDP camps and communities 
throughout Darfur. A total of 99 zone safety coordinators were also recruited 
to implementing the policies of the community safety committees established 
in a number of IDP camps.  
 
UNAMID delivered numerous training sessions for Sudanese government 
police and military personnel, including on sexual and gender-based violence, 
human rights and criminal investigation methods. UNAMID documented 73 
incidents of human rights violations and abuses, affecting a total of 122 
victims of diverse forms of violations including sexual and gender-based 
violence and violation of the rights to life, personal security, physical integrity 
and freedom of movement, and the right to a fair trial. UNAMID continued to 
engage in dialogue with SAF and armed opposition movements aimed at 
establishing action plans to end recruitment and the use of child soldiers.  
 
Progress against UNAMID benchmarks 
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The Secretary-General assessed progress against a number of benchmarks 
set out in annex II of his report of 16 November 2009.430 He noted limited 
progress towards the first benchmark of a comprehensive political solution 
through implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement or subsequent 
agreements. The second benchmark referred to UNAMID’s contribution to 
restoring a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. Restrictions on 
movement had hampered UNAMID’s ability to respond to incidents of tension 
or conflict, particularly between the SAF and rebels. There were also 
restrictions on the movement of humanitarian convoys to Kalma camp in July 
and August. Nevertheless, UNAMID military and police patrols, and the 
community policing volunteer initiative, helped to promote stability 
 
Modest progress was made against some areas of benchmark three, relating 
to the rule of law, governance and human rights, and assisting state 
institutions. UNAMID child protection officers were working with rebels and 
the government to stop the recruitment of child soldiers. The Prison Advisory 
Unit gained greater access to and improved conditions in some prisons. 
UNAMID was also providing human rights training to corrections officials. 
However, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for 
Darfur had not been established.  
 
Stabilising the humanitarian situation and facilitating humanitarian access – 
benchmark four – had achieved only limited progress, undermined by 
                                            
430 United Nations, UNSC (2009), Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, 16 November, S/2009/592. 
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incidents of conflict, more stringent security management measures 
implemented by humanitarian organizations in response to attacks and 
abductions, and access restrictions. UNAMID continued to speak to the 
government about lifting restrictions on movement and access. UNAMID had 
recently set up joint verification and security mechanisms with the UN country 
team and the government. 
 
UNAMID deployment and operations 
 
As of 30 September 2010, UNAMID civilian personnel strength stood at 4,261 
– 77 per cent of the approved strength of 5,516 – comprising 1,105 
international staff, 2,688 national staff and 468 UN volunteers. The Secretary-
General noted continuing problems recruiting and retaining staff due to harsh 
living conditions and unpredictable security. Two hundred and seven potential 
candidates had declined offers of appointment since January 2008, while 315 
had left the mission.  
 
UNAMID military strength stood at 17,199 – 87 per cent of the authorized 
strength of 19,555. There were 2,280 UNAMID individual police officers – 74 
per cent of the mandated strength of 3,772. Following the arrival of a 
Senegalese formed police unit in August, 14 of the projected 19 formed police 
units were currently deployed, with three units projected to arrive in 
November-December 2010. Total formed police unit personnel strength stood 
at 1,949 – 73 per cent of the authorized strength of 2,660.  
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Between 1 July and 17 September, Khartoum issued 769 new entry visas to 
UNAMID personnel – an improvement on previous months, and as of 19 
September, 200 visa applications were pending approval.  
 
Representatives of the Sudanese government, the AU and UNAMID met in 
New York for the ninth Tripartite Coordination Mechanism meeting on 
UNAMID in September. The meeting included discussions on humanitarian 
access to IDPs, the granting of a radio frequency for UNAMID radio, and the 
allocation of land for construction of community policing centres and team 
sites. 
 
Some UNAMID contingents were still critically under- equipped and did not 
meet the UN desired serviceability and self-sustainment standards as required 
under the approved contingent-owned equipment manual.  
 
Somalia  
 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
 
On 27 February 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1744 authorised the AU 
to establish a Chapter VII mission to promote security in southern Somalia.431 
The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is mandated with a maximum strength 
                                            
431 United Nations, UNSC (2007), Security Council Resolution 1744, 20 February, 
S/RES/1744 
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of approximately 8,000 peacekeepers. It is tasked with: assisting the free 
movement, safe passage and protection of the parties involved with the 
dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia; supporting implementation of 
Somalia’s National Security and Stabilisation Plan; and helping foster the 
necessary security conditions for humanitarian assistance. 
 
But AMISOM’s mandate promises much more than its military component 
could hope to deliver effectively. Civilian protection is not one of its mandated 
tasks. More fundamentally, there are real questions about whether the AU will 
be able to generate the force in the first place. AMISOM anticipates handing 
over to a UN force after a year. And Resolution 1744 authorised a technical 
assessment mission to explore modalities for a follow-on UN operation. 
However, there was certainly no explicit commitment from the UN to effect 
such a transfer. And, as the next case study will demonstrate, the political 
and practical problems experienced in delivering the transfer of AMIS to a UN 
or a hybrid force do not set a hopeful precedent.432  
 
In March 2008, the UN suggested that political developments in Somalia 
provided a more benign environment for proactive engagement by the UN in 
the country.433 Somalia’s new Prime Minister, Yusuf Nur Hassan Hussein, 
appointed a streamlined government early in 2008, largely comprising 
professionals recommended by the National Reconciliation Congress. The 
                                            
432 Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, (2007), Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the 
Responsibility to Protect in Africa, London: ippr, p.51. 
433 United Nations, UNSC (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 
S/2008/178, 14 March. 
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international community, including the UN, broadly welcomed this 
development. In January2008, Prime Minister Hussein announced the 
appointment of a new Cabinet.  
 
But, the more favourable political situation did not bring a significant 
improvement in security, as violence, severe human rights violations, and the 
grim humanitarian condition of the Somali people continued throughout the 
country. The north was relatively stable, compared to southern and central 
areas. In the north, the border dispute between ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ 
remained a major security concern. In southern and central Somalia, anti-
government elements, including the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), continued 
to conduct frequent insurgency operations, in particular targeting Ethiopian 
Armed Forces and the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, police 
stations and government authorities. In Mogadishu, there were regular 
attacks by anti-government elements, as well as an increase in counter-
operations by the Ethiopian Army and the government. Field guns and 
mortars were regularly being used in heavily populated areas, leading to 
considerable loss of civilian life and displacement. 
 
Insecurity in Somalia was complicated by regional and international factors. 
The proliferation of Somali refugees in a number of countries led to ties 
between some regional states and diaspora groups with various elements 
within Somalia. The proliferation of arms, the use of Somalia as a base for 
proxy wars and the continuing threat of piracy were also destabilising factors. 
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International terrorist groups were also reportedly seeking haven in the 
Hiraan and Juba districts, which were believed to be the stronghold of UIC 
extremist elements. 
 
Violations of human rights were continuing unabated in Mogadishu, with 
civilians bearing the brunt of indiscriminate shelling and shootings. Civil 
society, especially journalists and human rights activists, were being 
specifically targeted, and public servants were also subjected to political 
assassination.434  
 
By early 2008, AMISOM was providing security at the airport and seaport as 
well as the presidential palace in Mogadishu. The arrival of 850 Burundian 
troops had bolstered the strength of AMISOM, up to 2,613-strong. The 
existing AMISOM mandate was based on a strength of 8,000 personnel, 
comprising nine infantry battalions, a 270-strong police component and 300 
integrated civilian and military staff for the Mission HQ. At his time, only three 
battalions had been deployed. The fourth was not expected to be fully 
deployed until the end of May. 
 
There were on-going discussions over the deployment of additional troops 
from Nigeria and Ghana. Financial, logistical and force generation constraints 
continued to hamper the efforts of the AU to realise AMISOM’s full strength. 
Financial support for AMISOM was being provided by the EU, China, the 
                                            
434 United Nations, UNSC (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 
S/2008/178, 14 March. 
 365
League of Arab States and the UK. The US was supporting the Ugandan 
contingent on a bilateral basis, and the US and NATO pledged to provide 
airlift facilities. Nigeria pledged a contribution of $ 2 million. A UN team of 
military and civilian experts was deployed to Addis Ababa to support AMISOM 
planning and implementation capacity.  
 
United Nations Support Package for AMISOM 
 
A meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2008 extended 
the AMISOM mandate for an additional six months.435 But on 20 February 
2008, the Chair of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konaré, wrote to the UN Secretary-
General requesting a UN financial, logistical and technical support package for 
AMISOM, totalling some  $817,500,000, in order to help it realise its full 
strength [see below].  
 
The AU acknowledged that existing AU support arrangements were not 
attractive to potential future troop-contributing countries. The UN had 
previously helped to mobilise bilateral assistance for the Burundian and 
Ugandan contingents already deployed to AMISOM. But troop contributions 
that had been pledged from Ghana and from Nigeria were not likely to be 
deployed without a more robust and guaranteed mission support package.  
 
                                            
435 African Union, AUPSC (2008), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the 
situation in Somalia, 18 January  
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The AU appealed for support in the following areas:436 
 
Logistics support 
 
1. Constructing AMISOM’s mission HQ; 
2. Establishing a main logistics base outside Somalia and a forward logistics 
base in Mogadishu; 
3. Fuel and ration contracts; 
4. Enhanced communication systems; 
5. Establishing a transit camp near Mogadishu airport; 
6. Communication equipment, armoured vehicles and accommodation 
infrastructure for the AU police component; 
7. Transportation of AMISOM troops/equipment to Mogadishu from 
respective troop-contributing countries; and 
8. One dedicated fixed wing aircraft for transportation of personnel.  
 
Budget estimates at March 2008 totalled $885,174,163. At that time, there 
was a deficit of $817,500,000, as follows:437 
 
Mission headquarters HQ salaries and associated costs $23,000,000 
Construction of mission HQ $30,300,000 
                                            
436 United Nations, UNSC (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 
S/2008/178, 14 March. 
437 United Nations, UNSC (2008), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 
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Mission headquarters vehicles $20,500,000 
Communications $8,000,000 
General supply items $5,200,000 
Mission fuel $68,500,000 
Field personnel $355,400,000 
Air  $22,700,000 
Maritime (4 Frigates, 1 Log Tender)  $147,000,000 
Medical  $13,200,000 
Police including armoured vehicles  $57,500,000 
Humanitarian including quick-impact projects  $20,500,000 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration  $22,300,000 
Civil affairs and media  $23,400,000 
Grand total  $817,500,000 
 
The AU acknowledged that its existing administration was not resourced to 
cope with the operational tempo needed to meet peacekeeping on such a 
large scale, and so it appealed to the UN to help with mission support. 
Specifically, the AU requested UN staff on loan in the areas of Chief of Mission 
support, procurement, budget, finance, internal audit oversight, contingent-
owned equipment, contract management, and a security adviser to the Head 
of Mission. The AU asserted that lessons learned from the AMIS experience 
should be translated into best practice that assured accountability and 
transparency. 
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Contingency planning for a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia438  
 
In January 2008, the UN sent an assessment mission to Somalia, led by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The mission developed four 
contingency plans for a possible UN peacekeeping operation, based on four 
separate scenarios, which could occur sequentially:  
 
Scenario 1 The government would continue to pursue political dialogue with 
the opposition, security would remain fragile, and there would be no 
significant increase in AMISOM strength. In this scenario, UN political and 
programmatic support to Somalia could be enhanced by relocating UN staff 
from Nairobi to Somalia.  
 
Scenario2 60 to 70 per cent of Somali actors would agree to support political 
dialogue; security arrangements would be made that enable a stronger UN 
presence in Mogadishu. In this scenario, the UN Political Office for Somalia 
(UNPOS) HQ would be relocated to Mogadishu in order to strengthen UN 
political support to the peace process. Appropriate security arrangements 
would be needed to support this initiative, to protect personnel and physical 
infrastructure and to support mediation efforts with Somali actors.  
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Scenario 3 The principal factions would initiate a code of conduct on the use 
of arms, and agreement would be reached on a gradual withdrawal of 
Ethiopian forces. A stabilisation force (estimated at 8,000 strong, together 
with police officers) would be deployed to facilitate the withdrawal of 
Ethiopian troops, to preclude a security vacuum and to stimulate to the 
political dialogue.  
 
Scenario 4 Political and security agreements would be consolidated, including 
clear support for a UN peacekeeping mission, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian 
forces.  Deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission for Somalia would be 
contingent on political agreements and security commitments, which would 
need to include provisions on power-sharing, laying-down arms, respect for 
human rights, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the development of 
governing institutions. The force would need to comprise 15 to 21 infantry 
battalions: up to 27,000 military personnel, with a possible police component 
of up to 1,500 officers. 
 
On 11 May 2010 the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 
developments in Somalia since 8 January 2010.439 
  
Security in Somalia remained volatile, including attacks by armed groups 
against the TFG and AMISOM in Mogadishu. AMISOM troops foiled an 
attempted suicide attack on their base in Mogadishu in April. A December 
                                            
439 United Nations, UNSC (2010), Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 
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2009 – January 2010 food security and nutrition assessment by the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded that a widespread humanitarian 
crisis still existed in Somalia, with 3.2 million (43 per cent) of Somalis 
requiring humanitarian assistance and livelihood support, including 1.4 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Security concerns and inaccessibility were 
hampering relief efforts.  
  
Increased violence in southern and central Somalia in the first three months 
of 2010 had devastating consequences for civilians. More than 110,000 
people were displaced during this period, bringing the total number of 
persons displaced by the conflict to 1.4 million. Civilians were increasingly 
caught in crossfire violence between insurgents and government forces in 
Mogadishu, with the Mayor of Mogadishu urging them to flee the city in 
March. In southern and central Somalia civilians also continued to be 
threatened and abused by armed group elements, including stoning, 
amputations, floggings and other corporal punishments. Recruitment of 
children by various parties had increased in the previous year.  
 
Donor funding provided for the reimbursement of all categories of contingent-
owned equipment for the period ending 23 March 2010. But those funds were 
by now exhausted and it remained unclear how the next contingent-owned 
equipment reimbursements, due in June, would be financed.  
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Using airlift provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Uganda deployed a fourth battalion in mid-March bringing AMISOM troop 
strength to 6,120. A 40-strong Burundian support team also deployed to 
AMISOM. Forty of the authorized 270 AMISOM civilian police officers were 
deployed, from Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. 
On 28 March seven police officers arrived in Mogadishu to launch training 
programmes for the Somali police.  
 
During this period, the TFG was developing a national security and 
stabilization plan, intended to ensure coherence in developing the security 
and justice sectors. As this process continued, on-going activities to reform 
the security sector included: building the Somali National Security Forces 
through a six-month training curriculum; a predeployment course to new 
recruits prior to their incorporation into the National Security Forces, 
supported by AMISOM and the UN; police training; and building the capacity 
of the Ministry of Intelligence.  
 
Predeployment training to Somali forces had enabled 2,800 Somali troops to 
form into seven mixed clan battalions of approximately 450 each. AMISOM, 
UNPOS and UNDP were helping the Somali Police Force with training, 
technical assistance, stipends, non-lethal equipment, and rehabilitation of 
basic infrastructure. By the end of March 2,950 police were registered with 
the Somali Police Force.  
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Conclusion 
 
African peacekeeping capability is severely constrained by chronic capacity 
and financial shortfalls. African peacekeeping deployments are, therefore, 
reliant on the assistance of the international community. Previous chapters 
have outlined how donor countries have supported the development of the 
AU peace and security architecture. And the case study of the Darfur 
deployment above shows how external partners have helped to sustain AU 
peacekeeping efforts in theatre. The EU African Peace Facility provided 
essential financial support, without which AMIS would not have been able to 
operate at all. And a functioning operational relationship was established 
between the AU and its international partners, through the Darfur Integrated 
Taskforce (DITF) and other fora. But, despite some limited initial success, the 
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) struggled to provide any meaningful protection 
for civilians in Darfur.  
 
Capacity problems are closely linked to political challenges for the AU. 
Previous discussions on AU capacity-building highlighted the struggles that 
the AU has had in trying to build political recognition and support from its 
Member States. In operational terms, this translates into a lack of 
commitment to provide personnel and other resources for specific missions. 
In Somalia, few African countries have been prepared to commit troops to 
bring AMISOM up to its full strength – although, the AU concedes that troop 
contributors are unlikely to be encouraged by the weakness of the support 
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package on offer. And in Darfur, many of AMIS’ problems have related to the 
weakness of its mandate to protect civilians, and this has stemmed in large 
part to the failure of the AU and its Member States to challenge Khartoum’s 
culpability in human rights atrocities in the region. Conversely, in Burundi, 
sustained regional engagement in the peace process, and in particular 
pressure from the OAU/AU was a key determinant in pushing forward the 
peace process. 
 
But UN peacekeeping has its own problems, although on a much different 
scale to the AU. In Darfur, for example, the UNAMID mandate still concedes 
Khartoum’s responsibility regarding civilian protection, which achieving final 
agreement and deployment of the UN component of the mission has taken 
several years. And it is questionable the extent to which even a full-strength 
UNAMID can contain the conflict. Most of the AMIS troops that are being re-
hatted for the hybrid mission come from African nations committed to 
peacekeeping, with commensurately trained and focused military forces. But 
the belligerents in Darfur are well organised, equipped and motivated, and 
critics have suggested countering them effectively will require a much more 
capable and committed force than UNAMID.440 Compared to AMIS, a fully-
functional hybrid force would be able to deploy more peacekeepers to more 
locations in Darfur. This would present greater protection from imminent 
threat to larger numbers of civilians. But it will not be able to confront and 
neutralise the numerous forces and proxies in Darfur, who will carry on 
                                            
440 Terrie, J (2007), ‘The African response to Darfur’, in Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, 
(2007), Darfur: the Responsibility to Protect, London: ippr, p.31. 
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fighting and attacking civilians in areas where there is no UN physical 
presence. 
 
The AU needs to retain ownership of its peace and security capability. This 
has proved difficult in relation to capacity-building. But it is also an issue 
operationally. For example, logistic support provided to AMIS in Darfur by the 
US to supply accommodation, transport, and communications was contracted 
to private American companies, specifically Dyncorp Corporation and Pacific 
Architects & Engineers (PAE).441 With such deals worth tens of millions of 
dollars being awarded to companies from the country supplying the finance, 
political hackles are raised in Addis Ababa questioning Washington’s true 
motivation for engaging with the AU.
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9 Conclusion 
 
How capable is the AU in practice to deliver effective peacekeeping to protect 
civilians? And how appropriate is international support to help realise this 
ambition? 
 
Given the AU’s relative peacekeeping infancy and its capacity and other 
operational constraints, a key focus of this thesis has been the quality, extent 
and suitability of international support for the AU, both to build African 
peacekeeping capability, and to provide operational support to African 
missions. The UN remains the primary peacekeeping agency in Africa. And at 
present African and UN peacekeeping are operationally ‘layered’, with African 
deployments looking to hand over to UN missions as their exit strategy – 
albeit with very mixed results. 
 
This thesis has focused on two particular international initiatives which have 
been designed specifically to support African peacekeeping, namely: 1) The 
European Union Strategy for Africa; and 2) The Joint G8/Africa Plan to 
Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations. This 
thesis identified African ‘ownership’ of its peace and security architecture as a 
key component of a viable African peacekeeping capability. 
 
In order to investigate this topic, this thesis has asked three inter-related 
research questions: 
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1. how has peacekeeping incorporated increasing emphasis on protecting 
civilians in international peace and security policy? 
 
2. is the African Union a competent agency to deliver peacekeeping 
operations? 
 
3. can international partnership provide appropriate and sufficient support to 
the African Union to fulfil its peacekeeping commitment? 
 
Chapter 2 established complex peacekeeping, peace enforcement, burden-
sharing and the increasing trend to include civilian protection as a primary 
operational objective as the basis upon which to assess the AU’s 
peacekeeping capability. Civilian protection requires specialist peacekeeping 
capability. Specific tools are also needed, such as relevant doctrine and 
training, and there are constitutional and political obligations on implementing 
agencies, to respond to serious threats to individual human rights, and to 
provide peacekeeping deployments with appropriate mandates and resources 
for civilian protection responsibilities. 
 
Chapter 3 showed that AU peace and security architecture (APSA) seeks to 
develop a robust capability that can protect the human rights of the 
individual, not least through the African Standby Force (ASF). But a number 
of challenges remain if the AU is to become fully functional. Key AU Member 
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States must be prepared to support the AU institutionally and politically, 
including authorising and resourcing missions in situations where the security 
of African civilians is under threat. Capacity is a major problem for the AU. A 
pattern has emerged for African regional deployments to play advance, 
vanguard roles ahead of the deployment of UN missions. But this model has 
yet to be built explicitly into the design and construction of ASF. The APSA 
should play to its strengths, developing specific and specalised elements that 
can fit into a global ‘interlocking system of peacekeeping capabilities’. 
Capacity-building programmes for the ASF should focus on the particular 
functions of the AU relative to operational partners active in Africa, to 
maximise the effectiveness both of African capability, and of international 
efforts to build AU capacity. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 focused on the last of this thesis’ research questions, 
which asked whether international assistance can provide appropriate and 
sufficient support to the AU. These chapters examined first EU and then G8 
engagement with Africa. 
 
The EU and Africa describe their partnership as mutually beneficial. But there 
are some basic structural challenges that complicate Africa-EU relations. The 
EU deals with Africa as two administratively distinct blocs north and south of 
the Sahara. This undermines the AU’s efforts to establish continental 
cohesion. And there is poor European coordination across a range of areas, as 
internal EU relationships – between the Commission, the Council and the 
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Member States, and within all three of these bodies – often overlap or 
compete. The establishment of the new European External Action Service 
(EAS) risks adding yet another layer of complexity. 
 
In peace and security terms, the EU has been a significant partner for Africa. 
The EU has made a major financial contribution to a functioning African 
peacekeeping capacity, not least through the Africa Peace Facility, which has 
supported AU capacity-building and has provided significant operational 
support, such as for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The EU has also been a 
staunch operational peacekeeping partner in Africa, notably its various 
deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But operational 
support has to date been ad hoc. The EU Battlegroups concept as an attempt 
to systematise operational support appears tailor-made to support UN or AU 
peacekeeping deployments in Africa. Battlegroups were supposed to be fully 
operational in 2006. But, at the time of writing, none have been deployed, 
and it is still not clear how operational they are likely to become. The EU’s 
African Peace Facility has designed its terms and conditions to ensure a high 
degree of African ownership, so that, within a set of strict guidelines, Africa 
can largely prescribe where, when and on what European money is disbursed. 
 
Practical and political problems to a improving cooperation between the EU 
and Africa include agreeing unified policies, streamlining European funding 
sources, and developing forums in which a functioning dialogue can take 
place between the two continents at all levels. The problems with convening 
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the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, and the struggles of the two partners to 
agree a workable solution to who should attend, has been a major hindrance 
to achieving a truly joint partnership. 
 
Ahead 2010 of the 2010 EU-Africa Summit in Tripoli, an international 
conference on ‘Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New 
Africa-EU Partnership’, concluded that “[w]hile the African Union (AU) and the 
European Union (EU) have collaborated  on traditional forms of hard security 
they need to look at issues of human  security and address underlying causes 
of conflict”.442  
 
The overall conclusion of the conference on the current state of affairs mirrors 
the findings of my research: 
 
“The complexity of African states and security threats in Africa must be 
properly appreciated if their responses are to be effective, yet there is 
still a tendency in some quarters to view Africa though a single lens. 
Much focus is given to how Europe can help Africa but there are 
important lessons for Europe to take from Africa. In some respects the 
AU has made greater progress than the EU in establishing continent 
wide security structures, and as one speaker remarked it was only in 
1993 that Kenyan troops were serving and dying in Sarajevo to help 
stabilise Europe.   
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The divergence between the rhetoric of an equal partnership between 
Africa and the EU and the reality is something that should be 
recognised. There have been positive developments since the 2000 
summit in Cairo, where many African leaders felt they were simply 
taking part in a photo-opportunity with their European counterparts. 
The Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) is a sign of this more serious 
commitment to collaboration. However while the relationship remains 
dominated by the donor recipient dynamic the question of ownership 
will remain extremely difficult. This theme arose on multiple occasions 
during the conference and is something that the upcoming summit 
should be aware of.   
 
… The motivations for European engagement in Africa are further 
reaching than rhetoric in public statements would suggest. EU missions 
to DRC in 2003 and Chad in 2007 had as much to do with proving the 
relevance of Europe as a global player capable of projecting influence 
as with desires to help states affected by conflict.   
 
Much progress had been achieved in improving peace and security in 
Africa given limited time and resources. However there was recognition 
of much work still to be done. The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) is able to raise 80% of its budget internally 
and is seen as the most effective regional body in addressing Peace 
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and Security. It is only when Africa is itself able to pay for missions 
that there can be true independence of action. Ownership of peace and 
security initiatives will likewise only exist when states are paying for 
them themselves. The AU values the EU contribution to support its 
peace and security efforts but as long as funding is not predictable, 
sustainable and flexible the AU and regional organisations are likely to 
be less than fully effective. Achieving a more equal partnership will be 
greatly facilitated by more sustainable funding arrangements. 
Coherence between different actors was also highlighted as something 
that needed attention. Multiple SSR missions in DRC for example do 
not in the end help reform if they are not properly coordinated.   
 
The Africa-Europe relationship does not exist in a vacuum and nor is it 
the only relationship that each continent has. On the side of Europe, 
Afghanistan is absorbing military resources and political focus and in 
the light of budget restrictions and defence cuts it seems that at least 
in the short term the appetite for direct European engagement on land 
in Africa will be limited. The AU has a longstanding relationship with 
the United Nations and the AU is seeking a means to benefit from UN 
assessed contributions for missions it carries out under UN mandate, 
however the Security Council is reluctant to consider this proposal. The 
conference heard how increasingly China is having to calibrate its 
approach with African concerns around governance and human rights.   
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The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa play a central 
role in the implementation of peace and security initiatives on the 
continent. There is an evolving and generally improving relationship 
between the RECs and the African Union although between RECs there 
is some way to go. In many regions leadership is provided by stronger 
more capable states and often times this has been very fruitful 
although there can be political problems when neighbours seek to 
impose ideas on each other. It is also important to note the difference 
in progress by various regional bodies. This is especially true 
concerning North Africa which despite greater financial and military 
resources lags far behind other regions in the development of their 
regional security mechanisms. Some participants attributed this lack of 
engagement to the fact that North Africa aligns its priorities north to 
Europe or east towards the Middle East. In this context engagement 
with the rest of Africa is primarily useful when blocks of votes are 
necessary.   
 
The conference underlined the paramount importance of 
understanding the political context if peace and security initiatives are 
to be successful. This is true at the level of EU-Africa continental 
relations as well as at the operational level of individual AU, REC, EU or 
UN missions. Without a clear understanding of the political context 
efforts are unlikely to be successful. Peace and Security do not exist in 
isolation from issues of governance and human rights and the evolving 
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African Governance Architecture seeks to address some of these 
underlying causes of conflict and will be as important as the kinetic 
instruments in ensuring widening and lasting peace”.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 examined G8 support for African peacekeeping. Specifically, 
they assessed the effectiveness and relevance of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to 
Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations (the 
Joint Plan), agreed at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian. Research for this thesis 
exposed some major gaps in the Joint Plan. In practical terms, serious 
shortfalls are evident in relation to strategic management capacity, donor 
coordination, operationalising the African Stand-by Force, and training and 
logistics. These are highly significant to building a core peacekeeping 
capacity.  
 
The Joint Plan also stresses the importance of African ownership, and both 
international and African partners are keen to reiterate their commitment to 
this objective. But the AU’s lack of capacity to articulate its needs to the G8 
coherently, and an often over-zealous and uncoordinated approach by some 
G8 partners, have made this ambition difficult to achieve in practice. 
 
Capacity challenges and political challenges are closely linked, and the AU has 
often struggled to attract personnel, funding and other essential resources for 
its missions from its own Member States. For example, in 2008, the AU 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was well over 5,000 troops short of its 
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mandated strength of 8,000, and it was hampered by numerous logistic 
challenges. AMISOM was also, absurdly, nearly $818,000,000 short of its 
budget of $885,000,000. Political difficulties were also a major hindrance in 
Darfur. The weakness of the AMIS mandate to protect civilians was in large 
part a political issue, resulting from the inability of AU Member States to 
challenge Khartoum’s culpability in human rights atrocities in the region. As a 
result, the AMIS mandate left primary responsibility for civilians security in 
Darfur to the Sudanese government. 
 
African deployments in Burundi, Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia 
reviewed in Chapter 8 revealed a pattern by which ‘vanguard’ African 
deployments precede larger, UN operations, and the case studies presented in 
this chapter suggested this as a potentially workable operational model. 
African missions clearly lack resources, but in specific circumstances, namely 
in less challenging operational environments, they have been able to create 
suitable conditions to enable a follow-on UN mission. The inadequacies of 
African peacekeeping capacity is brought into sharp relief by the case studies. 
The Darfur study showed how international partners were necessary to 
sustain the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in theatre, including financial support 
from the EU African Peace Facility, without which AMIS would not have been 
able to operate at all. And a functioning operational relationship was 
established between the AU and its international partners, through the Darfur 
Integrated Taskforce (DITF) and other forums. Despite some limited initial 
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success, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) struggled to provide any meaningful 
protection for civilians in Darfur.  
 
While transfer to a UN mission is a key objective of African regional 
deployments, UN peacekeeping has its own problems – not least in relation to 
civilian protection. The AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) replaced 
AMIS in July 2007. But three years later in July 2010, Human Rights Watch 
complained that “fighting and rights abuses across Darfur show clearly that 
the war is far from over and that the UN needs to do more to protect 
civilians”.443 At the UN, many of the largest contributors of peacekeeping 
personnel are developing countries. These often lack modern logistic 
capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, communications and mobility that can 
greatly enhance the effectiveness of a mission. Moreover, peacekeepers’ 
effectiveness is often down to the attitude of a particular individual or a 
national contingent, and it relates to what sorts of tasks they are prepared to 
undertake to enhance the security of civilians. 
 
Peacekeeping mandates are, by definition, multilateral and, consequently, 
they often represent a political compromise. Inevitably, therefore, they 
contain concessions and ambiguities that frame a mission’s mandate, and are 
a clumsy basis on which to establish a military mission. Much is left to the 
interpretation of political and military commanders on the ground. This 
structure can deliver highly varied results, with a commensurate impact on 
                                            
443 Human Rights Watch (2010), UN: Strengthen Civilian Protection in Darfur, July 19 
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the perception of security amongst the local population. This approach is not 
conducive to high-intensity enforcement operations.444  
 
The nascent AU peace and security architecture presents a promising basis 
for a functioning continental peacekeeping capability, which can help protect 
vulnerable civilians. But it needs much clearer focus in terms of the type of 
capacity it is building, and where that capacity fits within the wider global 
peacekeeping capability. This implies honest and lucid planning among 
international partners about the type of support it gives. Key AU Member 
States also need to afford the AU the political respect and the physical 
resources it needs if they want it to become truly functional. This is essential 
to maintain international interest and support. For their part, international and 
donor partners need to provide consistent and appropriate backing, and 
balance their own interests priorities and concerns against the needs of 
African ownership. 
 
Final thoughts 
 
In an interview with the author in 2009,445 the then Special Representative of 
the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and head of the 
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), HE Nicolas Bwakira, asserted that, as a 
subsidiary organ of the AU Commission (AUC), AMISOM was: 
                                            
444 Terrie, J (2007), ‘The African response to Darfur’, in Mepham D, and Ramsbotham A, 
(2007), Darfur: the Responsibility to Protect, London: ippr, p.31. 
445 Ramsbotham, A. (2010), ‘An African solution to Somalia?’, in Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. 
(2010) Accord 22: Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and international 
peacemaking, London: Conciliation Resources, pp. 30-31. 
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“bound by the AU Constitutive Act of July 2000, which sets among its 
objectives the protection of African civilians, including Somalis. 
AMISOM’s ethos is also consistent with the AU’s principle of ‘non-
indifference’. When able to, our forces have continued to provide 
human security for ordinary Somalis.446 
 
Bwakira described how the overall AU strategy in Somalia originates from the 
need to implement the mandate from the AU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), which is backed up by UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to 
support peace in Somalia. The Special Representative acknowledged that, 
although AMISOM was at the time still a long way short of full capacity, this 
did not reflect badly on the commitment of AU member states and the AU’s 
international partners. He maintained that there could be “no question of the 
commitment of AU member states in seeing a lasting peace in Somalia”.447 
 
Bwakira suggested that the existing crisis in Somalia showed that both the AU 
and the UN were able to work in partnership successfully to address conflicts 
in Africa, and that the AMISOM model in Somalia has the capacity to 
strengthen the working relationship with the UN in other ongoing regional 
conflicts. On the subject of AMISOM’s experiences as an indicator of the 
                                            
446 Ramsbotham, A. (2010), ‘An African solution to Somalia?’, in Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. 
(2010) Accord 22: Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and international 
peacemaking, London: Conciliation Resources, p. 30. 
447 Ramsbotham, A. (2010), ‘An African solution to Somalia?’, in Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. 
(2010) Accord 22: Whose Peace is it Anyway? Connecting Somali and international 
peacemaking, London: Conciliation Resources, p. 30. 
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development of the AU’s peace and security capability in the longer term, the 
Special Representative described the mission as a strong statement that there 
should be no doubt about the AU’s commitment to peace and security in 
Africa. While acknowledging that Somalia remained a challenge, he asserted 
that AMISOM was able and capable of delivering a lasting peace to 
Somalia. He also stated that AMISOM’s Somalia model also showed ordinary 
Africans that future conflicts will be primarily resolved within an African 
context. 
 
The Special Representative goes on to claim that AMISOM is already up to 
this task. This thesis has shown why few would agree with him. It suggests 
that AU peacekeeping for civilian protection is not impossible. But there is still 
a long way to go. Capacity constraints, lack of troops, poor intelligence 
capability and financial concerns have all conspired to undermine AMISOM’s 
effectiveness. The thesis demonstrates how international partnership can best 
help remedy this so that the Special Representative’s rhetoric becomes reality. 
In December 2011, the AU was still seeking major support for AMISOM from 
the UN, requesting the Security Council  
 
to consider authorizing funding from the assessed budget, to AMISOM, 
of the required mission support including the enhanced personnel, 
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force enablers and multipliers, contingent-owned equipment, as well as 
allowances for the troops and formed police units.448 
 
This thesis hypothesised that the African Union can, with appropriate 
international support, develop over time effective peacekeeping capability that 
can contribute to the protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict. It has 
shown that while peacekeeping as a discipline is not currently well aligned to 
uphold civilian protection as a primary mandated operational function, 
nevertheless in certain circumstances vulnerable civilians have felt more 
secure in the presence of international peacekeepers.  
 
The African Union is institutionally weak and lacks fundamental capability. 
While AU peacekeepers have often struggled to deliver, they have deployed 
to some of the harshest and most challenging environments. This thesis has 
suggested that AU peace and security architecture is broadly adjusted to 
develop a functioning peacekeeping capability that can support civilian 
protection; and that much international support is well-intentioned, and some 
is well delivered.  
 
But African ownership remains a key challenge – for the AU itself as well as its 
donor partners – that must be continually prioritised and appraised if AU 
peacekeeping is going to develop a functioning capability to protect civilians. 
                                            
448 AU PSC (2011), Communique of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 
the second phase of the AU Mission in Somalia, 2 December, 
PSC/PR/COMM(CCCII) 
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It is certainly the case that, at present, the African Union cannot be seen as a 
default ‘solution’ to African conflict ‘problems’ in which civilians’ security is 
fundamentally challenged.
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